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Summary.
During the last few decades, it has become recognised that 
patients can legitimately exercise their right to autonomy and self- 
determination in health care. Among the obvious privileges that the 
application of this principle accords to the patient in the medical 
context is taking part in the decision-making process and an 
obligation on the part of health professional to respect his or her 
choices with respect to his or her decisions in health care. Hence, 
among other things, the right to consent to or refuse treatment and 
the right to die, became natural and rational claims for patients.
In the present thesis the writer is concerned with the patient's 
right to consent to both therapy and experimentation and the law's 
role in enforcing this right. This discussion commences by outlining 
the ethical principles that should be observed in the doctor/patient 
relationship. The writer is mainly concerned here with the analysis 
of the principle of autonomy and respect.
Following this introductory chapter, and before looking at the the 
nature of consent in the medical context, its forms and elements, and 
the value and role of the consent document, it will be convenient to 
examine the patient's right to consent to or refuse medical 
intervention.
Since the docrine of informed consent which is tied up with the 
principle of autonomy and self-determination first appeared in the 
U.S.A, an analysis of the development of this doctrine is in order in 
chapter three. This historical analysis is relevant to the following 
discussion of the status of consent under the British legal system 
which is outlined in chapter four.
The. second part of the thesis looks at consent and its
implications in relation to human experimentation. Before considering 
the law governing the issue, it will be convenient to start this 
discussion with a general consideration of the ethics of human
experimentation. Here one is concerned with the value society attaches
to human research and its moral justification, if there is any, and
the ethical and practical problems raised by consent. The main 
question which is asked in this respect is whether it is possible for 
the human subject to be fully informed about the potential risks of 
the procedures, bearing in mind that even the investigator himself or 
herself might be unaware of certain of these risks. In other words, is 
it possible to render a valid and informed consent in this area of 
medicine?. Also relevant to the present discussion is the question of 
whether there is a need to control the conduct of experiments and how 
such a control can be achieved.
The last chapter concentrates on the development of the law of 
consent in the experimental setting. The analysis of this issue will 
be made on the light of internationl agreements about the use of human 
subjects in medical research namely the Nuremberg code and the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
It is recognized that persons have a right to individual self- 
determination. There are many grounds on which this right has been 
asserted. These are political, philosophical, religious, moral and 
legal. The right also relies on the notion that human beings are 
capable of determining their own course of action in accordance with a 
plan they themselves have chosen.
In a similar way, patients have been accorded the same right 
during the last few decades. However, the call for patients' rights to 
self-determination has engendered a bitter controversy which is not 
surprising if one appreciates that patient self-determination is an 
idea alien to medicine. As Katz pointed out,
"Since physicians have generally maintained that 
patients do not have the capacity to participate in 
decision-making, patient autonomy was not a concept 
inscribed in medicine's vocabulary."[1]
What is meant then by the term "Autonomy and self- 
determination"?. The starting point of the present discussion will be 
concerned with the notion of autonomy. Moreover, the need to make a 
full analysis of the principle of autonomy and other principles means 
that most of this chapter will be taken up with a rather abstract 
philosophical discussion in preparation for a more detailed 
exploration of the practical problems of consent to both therapy and 
experimentation.
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1.1 NOTION OF AUTONOMY:
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress[2]define autonomy as a form of 
personal liberty of action where the individual determines his or her 
own course of action in accordance with a plan chosen by himself or 
herself. The autonomous person is one "who deliberates about and 
chooses plans and is capable of acting on the basis of such 
deliberations, just as a truly independent government is capable of 
controlling its territories and policies".[3]
A person of diminished autonomy, however, is to a considerable 
extent dependent on others and in some aspects does not have the 
capacity of deliberating or acting on the basis of such deliberations. 
Beauchamp and Childress come to the conclusion that the term autonomy 
as applied to individuals can be used quite broadly. It can refer to 
the person, the will, or action in society, and both internal and 
external constraints can limit autonomy.[4]
For Downie and Caiman[5], to be autonomous is to have the ability 
to choose for oneself or more extensively to be able to formulate and 
carry out one's own plans and policies. The moral importance society 
attaches to these abilities, they argue, is reflected in its approval 
of traits of character such as being able to live on one's own 
initiative, having desires and plans in one's own life and the ability 
to decide for oneself without the help of others.
Conversely, to weaken an individual's capacity to deliberate about 
and carry out aims and policies of his or her own choosing is to that 
extent to hurt him or her as a person.
Kant mentioned another feature of the autonomous person; the 
ability to govern one's conduct by rules and values valid for others 
as well as oneself; "act only on that maxim through which you can at
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the same time will that it should become a universal law."[6] That is, 
to be autonomous is to govern oneself, including making one's own 
choices in accordance with universalizable moral principles, i.e., 
principles that can be willed to be universally valid for everyone.
In analysing autonomy, Kant contrasted it with heteronomy (rule 
by other persons or conditions) . To be heteronomous, is to lack the 
internal control of one's own life. Under heteronomy, Kant mentions 
both external and internal determinations of the will but not moral 
principles. One, he points out, is obliged to act in accordance with 
a moral rule, whereas one is only complying with a self legislated
rule. Moreover, Kant also includes actions from fear and impulse as 
well as coerced actions under heteronomy.
Mill by contrast, was concerned about autonomy or as he called
it,'the individuality of action and thought'. He points out that the 
state's interference with individual actions is legitimate only when 
it is necessary to prevent harm to other individuals. In this respect 
he wrote;
"As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects 
prejudically the interest of others, society has
jurisdiction over it....but there is no reason to
entertaining any such question when a person's conduct 
affects no persons besides himself, or need not affect 
them unless they like (all the persons concerned being 
of full age and the ordinary amount of understanding).
In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, 
legal and social to do the action and stand the
consequences."[7]
Mill recognizes the importance of a true character. He notes that
a person with a true character is one of genuine individuality.
Conversely, a person without character always depends on an
authoritative environment and most notably, parents or family.[8] Mill
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mentions 'firmness', 'self-control' and 'choosing a plan of life' as 
indispensible elements to a proper framing of one's character.
From this analysis, one can draw a comparison between the Kantian 
and Millian approaches to the concept of autonomy. It seems 
apparently that Mill and Kant had somewhat different objectives in 
treating the issue. Kant was concerned about moral autonomy, i,e the 
idea of giving oneself the moral law, or self-determination in 
accordance with morally valid principles. He argued that one has a 
moral duty to act in accordance with such principles. Mill, by 
contrast, was more interested in the concept of individual autonomy or 
self-determination. He believed that the individual's right to this 
form of self-determination or individuality is fundamental from the 
moral point of view. These two thoughts are different since Kant 
considered a "purely individual action as outside the moral order".[9]
There is, however, a consensus that a person is autonomous, if and 
only if he or she is self- governing. Autonomy as governance lies in 
the ability to legislate norms of conduct for oneself (Kant), and the 
ability to chart one's own course of action voluntarily (Mill).
It should be noted that there is a different between being 
autonomous and behaving autonomously, and being respected as an 
autonomous person.
1 : 2 RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY:
As Beauchamp and Childress put it, to respect autonomous 
individuals is "to recognize their right to self-governance by 
affirming that they are entitled to such autonomous determination free 
from imposed limitations".[10]
This principle has its origin in both Kant's and Mill's thoughts. 
For Kant, to respect an autonomous human being, or as he prefers to
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say it, 'to respect a person as an end', is to take into consideration 
in one's conduct that he or she is self-determining and self- 
governing, or that he or she has desires, feelings and reasons. [11] He 
argues that the respect due to autonomous persons flows from the 
recognition that all persons "have unconditional worth solely as ends 
in themselves determining their destinies".[12]
To disregard a person's autonomy is to consider that person merely 
as a means for one's own ends, for he or she is made to behave in 
accordance with rules not of his or her choosing. Again, to show no 
consideration of a person's own judgements and decisions or to prevent 
him or her from acting on the basis of those considered decisions is 
to that extent to impair his or her autonomous personhood. For 
instance, if the physician does not mention any of the risks inherent 
in the proposed treatment and the patient consents to the operation 
being performed, the patient can not make a rational decision since he 
or she has not been provided with the necessary information to reach 
such a decision. By so doing the surgeon limits the patient's 
autonomy. In this respect Kant thinks that a moral relationship 
between autonomous persons requires a mutual respect for autonomy, and 
this raises interesting questions about whether a physician can have 
such a moral relationship if he or she withholds information.[13]
For Mill the autonomous person is free to act in whatever way he 
or she wishes as long as his or her actions do not go against the 
autonomous actions of others. That is to say persons' views and 
actions must be respected so long as they cause no serious harms to 
others. As has been said:
"the principle of autonomy, like all moral principles, 
has only prima facie standing, it asserts a right of 
non-interference and correlatively an obligation not 
to constrain autonomous actions-nothing more but also
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nothing less".[14]
Like most principles, the principle of respect for autonomy has an 
exception. It does not apply to persons who are unlikely to act in a 
sufficiently autonomous manner due to their immaturity, ignorance, or 
coercion. Their actions and behaviour may be validly interfered with 
in order to prevent the harms they might suffer from such actions. In 
other words the intervention is for the sake of their welfare. [15] 
Even those who defend autonomy are in favour of the latter form of 
intervention, for they consider such actions either wholly or
substantially non-autonomous. Further discussion of this point is in 
order later in this chapter.
(A) OTHER PRINCIPLES
There exist other principles included under the principle of
respect for autonomy. In other words, to show respect for the
autonomy of others is to employ the following moral principles when 
dealing with autonomous agents; these are the principles of non­
maleficence, benevolence or compassion, justice or fairness and
utility
(1)-The Principle of Nonmaleficence:
In the health care context, the Hippocratic Oath mentions the 
principle of non-maleficence as well as the principle of 
benificence."I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the 
sick according to my ability and judgment, I will keep them from harm 
and injustice".[16]
The establishment of such a moral principle is due to certain 
obvious facts about human beings and their characteristics. One of
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these characteristics is "human vulnerability". Human beings have 
bodies that can easily be injured by any attack. [17] This was one of 
the reasons which led all moralities to restrict the use of physical 
violence in social life. It also the reason which gave rise to the 
existence of the concept of assault. As Downie and Caiman noted:
"A concept like assault logically could not exist 
unless the human body were liable to physical damage 
, and in more general terms, principles such as 'one 
ought not harm' or 'one ought to help people in 
distress' clearly reflect the fact that people are 
liable to injury and vulnerable physically and 
psychologically to deliberate attacks or accidental 
mishaps." [18]
As the range of harms that can be inflicted on others is quite 
wide, the principle of nonmaleficence is likely to have several 
specific moral rules. In this respect, Gert[19] pointed out that the 
rules which prohibit harmful actions form the core of morality and he 
quoted the following:'Don't kill', 'Don't cause pain', 'Don't 
disable', 'Don't deprive of freedom or opportunity' and 'Don't deprive 
of pleasure'. [20] Of course none of these derivative rules is
absolute and the same is true of the principle of nonmaleficence 
itself. For example it is a common procedure with the patient's 
consent-to inflict harm in order to prevent worse harms, e.g., to
amputate an affected limb in order to prevent death.[21]
The duty of nonmaleficence requires the agents not only to refrain 
from inflicting actual harms, but also to refrain from exposing others 
to risks of harms.[22] There are many instances in which people do
not expose themselves to risks but also impose them, deliberately, on
others. A good illustration of risk taking and risk imposition is 
driving a vehicle with an excessive speed.
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As the imposition of risks of harm on others is very common, there 
is no need for an explicit justification. Nevertheless in these cases 
law and morality recognize a standard of due care. This standard 
requires that the goals which are sought must be weighty and important 
enough to justify the risks imposed on others [23]. For example, 
rescuing people after an accident may justify the dangers created by 
speeding emergency vehicles.
The duty of nonmaleficence also requires agents to act carefully, 
because they may violate the duty in question unintentionally. The 
violation may be present in acts of commission as well as in acts of 
omission. To act thoughtfully and carefully is part of the other 
moral rules and principles such as the principle of nonmaleficence. 
As D'arcy[24] points out; "Negligence is not a separate moral 
species..., rather it applies to certain type of failure to meet 
obligations connected with many different species."[25] It includes 
"the failure to guard against risks of harm to other".[26] Negligence 
is "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing 
damage" or "conduct which falls below the standard established by law 
for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of 
harm."[27] In the health care context, legal and moral standards 
require from the caring workers knowledge, skills and diligence. If 
the physician's conduct is judged to be below these standards, he or 
she acts negligently.
(2)-The Principle of Benevolence:
In addition to the duty of nonmaleficence considered so far, there 
exists another moral duty which requires not only refraining from 
harming people but also contributing to their welfare by the offering 
of positive help and assistance. Such beneficial actions constitute
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the principle of benevolence or beneficence. It goes without saying 
that the principle of beneficence controls all those involved in the 
caring professions, but in this context some scholars[28]think that it 
is more appropriate to describe it by the term compassion.
Every human being has "the capacity to feel with others, to enter 
to some extent into their predicament and share their emotions."[29] 
The ability to understand other's feelings is part of compassion. 
Compassion, however, is not limited to the capacity to feel with 
others, i,e, it is not just passive. It requires the agent to act on 
the basis of the promptings of natural emotion. The caring 
professions in particular are required to develop in themselves the 
capacity to feel with others, including the capacity of being 
compassionate which demands an active response. Compassion, from 
another point of view, must be distinguished from, 'sympathy' and 
'pity'.
Sympathy is used to describe someone with the capacity to share 
one's feelings or the possibility to act according to one's 
predicament. Compassion, by contrast, requires both responses. Pity 
is similar to sympathy in its passive mode but pity "can involve a 
certain condescension to its objects".[30]
It is important, however, to bear in mind that those who need 
compassion in health care are typically autonomous persons who 
temporarily loose their state of health. Under such circumstances, 
pity is not the suitable or the appropriate term to characterise the 
mode of dealing with such autonomous persons. The term compassion, 
however, does fit its objects; it implies positive help and assistance 
and imaginative understanding along with an awareness and 
consciousness of its objects.
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m - The Principle of Justice or Fairness:
Some moral philosophers[31] considered fairness as the best 
explanation to justice. Desert (giving to each his or her right), 
however, is seen to be the most closely linked concept to justice in 
it broadest sense. That is, as has been said, "one acts justly toward 
a person when that person has been given what is due or owed, and
thus, what he or she deserves and can legitimately claim" [32]. For 
instance, if a person has the required mark to graduate, justice 
requires that this person be awarded his or her degree. Beauchamp and 
Childress[33] argue that in order that persons deserve and can
legitimately claim something, they must possess certain morally 
relevant properties such as being productive, or being in need. 
Similarly, the argument goes, it is unjust to burden or to reward 
someone who does not possess either of these moral properties. For 
example, it is wrong as a matter of justice to reward the chief for 
the work of his or her employees when the former did not contribute to 
the rewardable work. Looked at from this angle, justice is concerned 
with treating individuals rightly in the light of their own wants,
needs and merits.
The principle of justice has another side which applies to one's 
dealing with one person or group as compared with others. This is 
sometimes called "distributive justice", and is usually described in 
the form 'like cases should be treated alike'. It does not mean, 
however, that it always wrong to discriminate for the advantage or
against other people or groups, but rather that any such distinction 
or discrimination must have a justification. The presumption is that 
like cases must be treated alike, and the burden of justification is 
on the discriminator. For example, if two patients need renal 
dialysis, the presumption is that they should be treated alike, but
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perhaps one has more utility to the community as a whole, or he or she 
has been promised treatment, and can therefore justifiably be 
preferred to the other if the resource is scarce. For the existance 
of such a promise gives him or her a moral right to receive the 
treatment before others.[34] But whether in the form of just "desert" 
or "just distribution", the concept of justice is connected with 
autonomous persons and the respect due to autonomy is due or deserved 
by each individual autonomous person alike.
(4)-The Principle of Utility:
The last principle involved in respect is that of utility. 
Utility is commonly explained as usefulness. The principle demands 
that in all circumstances, people ought to seek the best possible 
consequences or "the greatest possible balance of value over disvalue 
for all persons affected"[35] - or the least possible balance of
disvalue in cases where only bad consequences are likely to result. 
For example, in the health care context whenever there is a choice 
between different but equally efficacious ways of treatment, the 
patient's benefits should be maximized, and the costs and risks 
minimized. If any other approach is followed, it would be considered 
as an unethical practice.
The Utilitarian method of taking decisions is done on the basis of 
balancing resources and comparing the actual needs of all persons 
affected. Accordingly, the right decision to take will be the one 
which is likely to promote the greatest amount of goodness for the 
greatest number of people.[36] This means that utility is not 
concerned with individuals but rather with majorities and aggregates. 
As Downie and Caiman pointed out[37], utility might be considered as a 
principle for administrators and legislators. In fact it was adopted
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in the nineteenth century as "a theory highlighting the need for the 
reform of the criminal code"[38]. Later, the theory developed to a 
new version - rule utilitarianism as opposed to act utilitarianism - 
in which the emphasis shifted from individual actions to the utility 
of policies, classes of actions and rules of behaviour. This led some 
scholars[39] to consider the principle of utility as an administrative 
expression of respect.
\
It is worth noting, however, that it is difficult to reconcile the
idea of justice which requires that similar cases be treated alike
with that of utility which suggests that some groups or even 
individuals may be treated better than others for the sought good of 
the aggregates.
1 : V SPECIAL GROUPS:
When considering the autonomous person and the attitude which is 
morally owed to autonomous persons it has been assumed that one is 
dealing with mature and rational adults. But sometimes this is not 
the case, since it is possible that the patient is a baby, perhaps
even an embryo, a dementing elderly person, a mentally handicapped
adult or someone in a coma. It is obvious that these persons are not 
in a position to act in a sufficiently autonomous manner. In fact, 
among individuals forming this group, there are some who have no 
autonomy at all, e.g., the embryo, the baby and the comatose patient 
or the patient with brain damage being kept on a ventilator. Others, 
however, have considerably impaired or otherwise inadequate autonomy, 
because they are young and immature or severely mentally handicapped. 
But does that mean that they are not due the respect accorded to 
autonomous persons?.
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It should be noted that these cases are different from the
standard case of the rational autonomous adult person in many aspects, 
and their discussion raises different questions. The case of the 
embryo and the comatose patient, for example, does not inquire whether 
they should be treated as autonomous agents, but rather when and which 
kind of respect, if there is any, must be shown to them during the 
processes of development into a person (embryo) and degeneration out 
of a person (comatose patient whose brain is decaying). In the case of 
persons with impaired or inadequate autonomy, however, the question is 
concerned with the amount of autonomy the person needs in order to be 
respected as a fully autonomous person. Therefore, in discussing 
these cases, it is necessary to group them in two distinctive groups;
(JJthe first group includes the embryo and the patient with
irreversible brain damage who is being kept breathing on a ventilator.
The main questions which are raised in discussing these situations are
when does life begin and when does it cease?. The answer to thess 
questions is of major importance since, it is believed, it determines 
the period during which respect for human life ought to be shown.
(2_) the second group contains people suffering from mental 
handicap, mental disturbance and young children. The question here 
explores the extent to which paternalism is justifiable.
(A) Embryos and Comatose Patients:
It goes without saying that the central moral principle is that of 
respect for the autonomous agent. But for many philosophers, the main 
moral question remains "when does life begin"?, for many believe that 
the answer to this controversial question determines the time or the 
moment from which respect ought to be shown.
For the lay person, the moment of conception is the obvious answer
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to the question of when life begins. It is known that conception is 
the identifiable event from which point the egg starts a continuous 
process that leads to maturity. From this view many people draw the 
implications that abortion is always wrong and that experiments on 
embryos at any stage of their development are wrong as well, for these 
experiments are seen to be performed on what is at least potentially 
a human being.[40]
Biologically, one may argue that life does not begin at 
conception. In a biological sense, life "is a constantly evolving 
process and conception is only one stage in such a process". [41] For 
instance, the egg is alive before conception and it undergoes a 
process of development without which conception is unlikely to 
materialize. The sperm too is also alive and wriggling.
Furthermore, at conception anything can begin, but not always
life. Fertilisation can lead not to an embryo but to a tumor which
can be fatal to the mother's life. No one presumably will invest this 
tumor with the rights and protections that many think are caused to 
exist at fertilisation. Another complication may be brought about if 
the fertilised egg splits to form twins. In this case the fertilised 
egg can not be considered a new individual. [42]
One can conclude that life is "a continuum and the emergence of
the individual occurs gradually."[43] This conclusion has led some to
argue that if life does not begin at conception and if one cannot 
claim that a new human being begins there, at least the potential for 
a new human being is then present, complete with its full genetic 
make-up and with all its uniqueness and individuality. Consequently, 
the fertilised egg which is the potential human being can be vested 
with some of the rights of the adult human being including the right 
to be allowed to to develop that potentiality. This is what is called
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the potentiality argument.
The first point to note against the potentiality argument is that
the fact that something will supposedly become, for example, X (even
if it will inevitably become X, which is far from being the case with 
the fertilised egg and the adult human being) is not a convincing 
enough reason for treating it at the present time as if it were in 
fact X. Downie and Calman[44]use the illustration that an acorn is 
potentially an oak, but this does not render it obligatory on anybody,
whoever it is, to allow or assist it to develop to an oak.
The second point is that, if one asserts that the fertilized egg 
is potentially a human being, it necessarily follows that the 
unfertilized egg is potentially a fertilized one. A fertilized egg is 
potentially a new human being on the condition that certain events 
happen to it like implantation, and certain events do not, like a 
spontaneous abortion. In a similar way, the unfertilized egg is 
unlikely to become a fertilized one unless certain events happen to 
it, like meeting a sperm and thereafter other events do not take 
place, like meeting a contraceptive. Therefore the fact that a 
fertilized egg is potentially an adult human being is not sufficient 
reason to invest the egg with the rights of the rational adult. It 
does not follow, however, that the egg as human genetic material has 
no moral significance. The appropriate question will then concern the 
amount of moral significance the egg possesses.
It is assumed that there is a continuance in the development 
before and after conception and that the moral consideration of the 
embryo will increase and grow in parallel with its stages of 
development. For the fertilized egg has some moral significance, but. 
not a considerable one. In recognizing this fact, the Committee of 
Inquiry Into Human Fertilisation and Embryology[45], limited the
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period in which experiments could be carried out and determined the 
bodies that are allowed to undertake such experiments.
An embryo with a developed brain and a central nervous system is 
morally much more significant. At this stage it is possible for the 
embryo to experience pain and perhaps some elementary sensory 
cognition. Accordingly, it will be a much more serious offence to 
kill an embryo at this stage than to kill it at an earlier stage. 
Another important stage in the acquisition of moral rights is the 
stage of the possibility of independent existence (viability) followed 
by the birth stage. Later comes childhood with its possibilities of 
having independent plans and purposes, then self-consciousness and at 
last the adult human being.[46]
It is worth noting here that the account given of the status of 
the embryo has important implications for abortion policy. As far as 
morality is concerned, abortion can not be easily defended around 
eight weeks, for it is around this age that the brain develops. 
However, it does not necessarily follow from this fact that abortion 
would be always wrong at this stage. The point is that the mother's
wishes are not the only consideration. In other words there could be
other factors affecting the health of the mother or social situations 
which have to be be weighed against the right of the embryo whose
brain has developed.[47]
To summarise the point one would say that at conception there is 
no sign of a person or of a potential person, rather the embryo
develops gradually into a person. But it should not be understood 
from that that there is no respect for non-persons. As has been said;
" A being should be respected for the sort of being it 
is: living human tissue, an embryo with a brain and 
central nervous system, an embryo capable of 
independent existence, a child with plans of its own
-  16 -
and self-consciousness and finally a full autonomous 
adult."[48]
The second situation in this group concerns the comatose patient 
or the patient with brain damage being kept on a ventilator. The main 
question which is often asked in these situations is "when does death 
occur?", or what is the criterion for determining the occurrence of 
death and the test that might show that the criterion has been met.
Until recently, determining the death of a person caused no 
practical difficulties. Physicians used the traditional methods in 
establishing death, i.e., the cessation of breathing and the cessation 
of heart beat.
Advances in medicine and medical technology, however, gradually 
showed that this was not the the appropriate criterion for all 
purposes. Elective cardiac arrest, for instance, is necessary in open 
heart surgery. In addition there are many cases of spontaneous cardiac 
arrest which are followed by successful resuscitation. The use of 
mechanical ventilators brought major developments in techniques of 
resuscitation and life support for ill patients. The use of these 
techniques can have a very satisfactory outcome, but in some instances 
this is not the case, for example, where the patient's heart keeps 
beating on the machine for a considerable time after he or she stops 
breathing spontaneously, but his or her brain is irreversibly damaged.
In these circumstances many believe that maintaining the patient 
in costly intensive care is useless. Moreover, this may deny access 
to equipment to other patients who can better benefit from them. The 
development which had taken place in transplantation programmes also 
stressed the need to find out a more precise criterion for 
establishing death. Since most organs and other tissues must be taken 
from either a living, or a very recently dead, body, the determination
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of the approximate moment Of death is of special significance.
The question of what is death has two main types of answer. In 
the first one, death , is taken as a moral question.[49] The 
appropriate time to treat someone as dead is when his or her moral 
standing "changes so radically that the same rights claims attributed 
to living persons are no longer attributed".[50] This approach 
suggests that an individual can be pronounced dead when he or she 
loses his or her personality, and consequently no respect ought to be 
shown to him or her as a human being. The second sort of answer looks 
at death from the biological perspective.[51] In order not to exclude 
any biologically living person whose moral standing has changed 
because of, e.g., a mental disease or senility, it is more 
appropriate to adopt an account which concentrates on biology rather 
on the personality.
There is a wide agreement that death can be defined as "the 
permanent cessation of the functioning of the organism as a 
whole." [52] The widely accepted criterion for the cessation of the 
functioning of the organism as a whole is irreversible brain damage or 
brain death. [53] This was a new criterion of death suggested in 1968 
in an influential report of an ad hoc committee of the Harvard 
Medical School. This criterion is totally related to the permanent 
cessation of the functioning of the organism as a whole, for the brain 
is a fundamental necessity for the functioning of the organism as a 
whole. The brain "integrates, generates, and controls complex bodily 
activities." [54] The brain, for instance, controls the breathing 
mechanism through brain stem ventilatory centres and aids in the 
control of circulation through brain stem pressure control centres. 
If the brain is damaged, from, perhaps, a head injury or a spontaneous 
intercranial haemorrhage, this will cause an apneoa (inability to
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breath) which is followed by a vasodilatation (opening of the 
peripheral blood vessels). As a result, heart failure occurs within a 
week. However if the patient is maintained by artificial ventilation, 
the heart will keep beating for some days and this will permit the 
function in other organs, e.g., kidneys, to be maintained. In such 
situations, the physician could declare as dead a comatose patient 
with no discernible central nervous system activity. This is followed 
by turning off the ventilator.[55]
Different sets of tests are used to diagnose death. For a normal 
death, i,e not complicated by artificial ventilation, the traditional 
tests of death-cessation of heart beat and ventilation-are still 
applicable.
The cessation of heart beat and circulation determine that the 
criteria of death have been met, since they are always followed by a 
permanent loss of the functioning of the whole brain. These tests, 
however, are useless when artificial ventilation is being used, for 
the functioning of the whole organism may cease at any moment with 
still intact circulatory, ventilatory subsystems.[56] In such 
circumstances, special tests for permanent cessation of the brain 
functioning will be needed. These special tests require total and 
permanent loss of all functioning of the brain stem and both 
hemispheres. They also require unresponsivity (deep coma), absent 
pupillary light reflexes, apnea (inability to breath), and absent 
brain reflexes. A new set of tests requires the demonstration that a 
lesion of the brain exists as well as tests disclosing the absence of 
cerebral blood flow. So when the tests confirm the permanent loss of 
the functioning of the brain or the brain stem, the doctor can turn 
off the mechanical ventilation, for, as Kennedy noted, "the ventilator 
is merely filling the corpse with air."[57]
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However, there are cases of comatose patients whose brains are 
still functioning. These patients should be kept on ventilators until 
their brain death can be established. In a similar way, any person who 
suddenly stops breathing should be resuscitated, since, again, his or 
her brain death can not be determined at that particular time.[58] 
Many arguments support this position, but the strongest of these is 
the public confidence argument, since even if the basis of the 
decision not to resuscitate is reasonable, and that "the decision 
itself may not be intrinsically wrong, the consequences of such 
decisions are always bad."[59]
1-"public awareness that doctors do not resuscitate may undermine 
confidence in the profession."[60]
2- The slippery slope argument may be invoked. It can be asked, 
for example, If particular kind of patients are not resuscitated 
today, whose turn will it be tomorrow ?.
3- Nursing staff may tend not to continue attentive care, when 
they are informed that particular kinds of patients are not to be 
resuscitated.[61]
4- If the patient's family or relatives are asked to share 
responsibility for the decision not to resuscitate, they may decide 
so, either for the wrong reasons, i.e., according to their own 
interests, or for what may appear to them to be good reasons but still 
be left with life-long guilt about whether they have taken the right 
decision. Sometimes, people write their wishes on the matter of 
resuscitation in a "living will". In such cases the health care team 
is greatly assisted in solving the moral problems on this matter.
When considering the development of the embryo, it was said that 
the respect due to the embryo should be moulded by its stages of 
development. Similarly, with the brain decaying, there is "a
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degeneration out of a person into living human tissue and back into 
the dust and ashes from which [he] came. "[62] The human being must be 
respected in this process as well. Of course, the attitude of respect 
will not be that which is due to autonomous persons, rather that kind 
of respect due to human tissue.'
(B) Mentally Handicapped Adult Persons. The Senile and Young 
Children:
It is not always possible to apply the analysis of the mature and 
rational adult (self-determining and self-governing person) to any of 
the individuals forming this group. For example, there are instances 
in which it is necessary to interfere with their decisions where it is 
obvious that their choice would harm them.[63]
It can be argued that the same situation may be met with a 
competent person. However, it is important to bear in mind that in 
the case of a mentally competent person, it is always possible to talk
to him or her and warn him or her about the risks or drawbacks of any
project. But when it comes to dealing with a severely mentally 
handicapped person or a child, one can not be sure that they have the 
capacity to understand their situations and therefore they can not be 
entirely allowed to decide for themselves. However, as has been
noted,
"the possible inability to understand is ... a matter 
of degree, but it may be reasonable to say that in
extreme cases those without full measure of the 
distinctive endowment of a human being ought not to 
be given the same sort of treatment accorded to a 
rational adult."[64] (emphasis added)
Whatever justifies a diagnosis of mental illness, its effect is to
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classify the individual so diagnosed as to some extent neither 
responsible for his or her actions nor capable of managing his or her 
affairs. But once again it is a matter of degree and each case must 
be treated to its own merits. No paternalistic interference can be 
permitted with the mentally handicapped person's decisions unless it 
is clear in their individual case and in the case of the particular 
decision in question that they are not maximally autonomous with 
respect to their decisions.
Similarly, as to whether or not particular children do not have 
the ability to make autonomous decisions and consequently must be 
protected will be "a question of judgment in each case exactly in the 
same way as it is for an adult." [65] But if the decisions of children 
are autonomous according to particular preferences, there is no need 
to interfere with them, i.e., they must be treated as if they were 
adults deciding in the same circumstances. For, the instability of 
their preferences is not a sufficient reason to justify paternalistic 
interference. Although it is known that children will change their 
views over time, this does not mean that their decisions are not fully 
autonomous, for it is argued that "to respect autonomy is to respect a 
person's decisions made in the light of their present character and 
priorities."[66]
1 : 4 CONCLUSIONS:
The main principle that should be observed in the doctor/patient 
relationship is that of respect for autonomy. The principle fully 
applies when one is dealing with a mature and rational adult, i.e., 
the adult person whose autonomy is not in doubt. There exists, 
however, a group of patients who are not in a position to act in a 
sufficiently autonomous manner because they either lack autonomy (the
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embryo, the baby and the comatose patient) or have considerably 
impaired or otherwise inadequate autonomy (children and the mentally 
handicapped adult persons). But the impairment or the inadequacy of 
their autonomy do not necessarily mean that these patients must be 
denied the respect accorded to autonomous patients in all cases.
In this respect, it is important to reiterate the view that each 
case should be treated to its own merits and that no paternalistic 
interference with the decisions of patients forming these groups can 
be justified unless it is clear in their individual case and in the 
case of the particular decision in question that they are not 
maximally autonomous with respect to their decisions.
The brief discussion of these special groups of patients is meant 
only to acknowledge the existence of such kind of patients and that 
further discussion of these special situations is beyond the scope of 
the present thesis.[67] Alternatively, the present discussion will 
concentrate on the consent of the fully autonomous patient, and the 
ethical and practical problems that the issue raises in medical 
transactions.
The first step in framing the question is made in the second 
chapter and is concerned with the patient's rights, in particular, his 
or her right to consent to or refuse medical treatment which is said 
to flow directely from the patient's right to autonomy and self- 
determination and meant basically to protect it. In order, however, 
that cosent has this effect, the law requires that it must be real and 
therefore valid. Thus it is convenient to outline the main elements of 
a valid consent, how it could be evidenced and the role of the consent 
form or document.
Of major relevance to the present discussion is the law's role in 
protecting patients' rights and the mechanisms the law provides by
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which grievances are redressed. Therefore it would be worth looking 
at some legal systems namely, the American and the British ones. The 
analysis of the law of consent in the American legal system will 
emphasize the development of the doctrine of informed consent, and 
this will be the task of the third chapter. Chapter four examines the 
issue under the British legal system.
The last two chapters will be concerned with the legal requirement 
of consent in the experimental setting. In an introductory chapter an 
exploration of some conceptual and ethical questions raised by human 
experimentation is in order. In the final chapter an analysis of the 
development of the law of consent to human experimentation will be 
outlined.
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CHAPTER TWO
NOTION OF VALID CONSENT
When considering autonomy and respect, it was argued that "to 
acknowledge another person is to acknowledge the possibility of other 
centers of choice and intention." [1] If the individual is seen as a 
self-determining moral agent, it follows that no interference is to 
take place with his or her physical and mental integrity without his 
or her prior agreement to that intervention. The right of the patient 
to consent to or refuse treatment derives from the principle of 
respect for autonomy or self-determination. The former analysis of 
the principle of autonomy made in the precedent chapter is relevant to 
the forcoming consideration of the patient's right to consent to
medical procedures which is outlined in the following section.
2 : 1 THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL 
TREATM ENT:
It is known that in all medical transactions, one side, the
patient, is vulnerable. The patient is short of the technical skills 
which are indispensable for curing himself or herself of any malady. 
Because of this deficiency patients are dependent on those who possess 
these technical skills and who are likely to bring them back to a 
state of health. One can appreciate the importance the individual
attaches to health if one considers the fact that health means freedom 
from physical and mental sickness and the capacity to settle and
determine one's present and future affairs. As has been said, health
"is also an area within which self-determination may
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be exercised. Indeed given the importance of health to 
individuals, it is of central importance to them that 
they have the capacity and the opportunity for choice 
in respect of medical intervention."[2]
This means that if the patient desires to retain his or her 
autonomy he or she must be allowed to accomplish his or her own 
wishes. This can be made possible only if the patient is given the 
opportunity to choose between different alternatives, i.e., he or she 
must be free to decide whether or not to consult a doctor and to 
choose between different kind of treatments, since it is only the 
patient who can determine which treatment or therapy is appropriate 
for him or her. It is often argued that choices and decisions that 
persons make in respect of their health, "are paTt of life choices, 
and therefore can not be readily removed from the would be autonomous 
individual."[3]
But sometimes, it is difficult for the individual to make up his 
or her own mind with respect to medical decisions or choices for these 
decisions may need to be made in circumstances where "clear, long-term 
thought, is difficult." [4] In addition, the assistance of the doctor, 
the possessor of the needed medical skill, confirms the difficult task 
of the patient in reaching an independent decision about his or her 
health care. This may constitute a real threat to the patient's 
autonomy which has an important role in any medical transaction. As 
has been said:
"Nowhere in the interaction between doctor and patient 
is man's fundamental right to self-determination more 
clearly expressed, or more contentious, than in his 
right to provide or withhold consent to therapy or 
other medical intervention."[5]
The fact that the doctor has the needed technical skills does not
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warrant to him or her permission to approach the patient, without 
invitation. Thus the legal obligation to seek the valid consent of 
the patient constitutes a considerable protection to his or her bodily 
and mental integrity. Moreover, legally speaking the provision of a 
valid and meaningful consent is fundamental to the validity of the 
medical intervention. It is the patient's valid consent which renders 
legally permissible actions which could otherwise lead to a charge of 
assault.[6]
In fact, as has been noted, the provision of consent works in 
favour of both patient and doctor.[7] The patient, when exercising his 
or her right in making free decisions concerning his or her physical 
or mental integrity, is protected if he or she has the capacity to
make such understanding decisions and choices about therapy. The
doctor on the other hand protects himself or herself from any future 
allegation of unlawful touching by obtaining his or her patient's 
freely given consent. Apparently, therefore, it would surely be in the 
interests of both parties that a legally valid consent is obtained
prior to any administration of treatment. In these terms, the'
provision of consent must be viewed as an enhancement to the 
doctor/patient relationship and a manifestation of the trust and 
respect which are essential elements in this relationship.
Nevertheless many believe that in order to have a successful 
medical transaction, the patient and only the patient is required to 
trust his or her doctor. As one scholar [8]pointed out, however, 
"trust may also...be perceived as a two way transaction."[9] In other 
words, the doctor can also be asked to trust his or her patient to 
deal appropriately with potentially distressing information and to 
make rational decisions which concern his or her physical and mental 
integrity. It is the acknowledgment of this element in the
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doctor/patient relationship that renders the requirement of. consent 
vital. It could also be viewed as the source of many of the 
disagreements and disputes between doctors and patients, because there 
are many doctors who are not in favour of the idea of discussing all 
that is involved in therapies with their patients. In fact, as has 
been observed, consent is
"....both fundamental to, and highly problematic for, 
the doctor patient relationship. The implications of 
insufficiently or improperly obtained consent are 
often vital to to the general well being of the 
patient and thus to the medical, moral and legal 
aspects of medical practice. Consent is much more 
than a legal device or invention designed to 
intimidate medical practitioners.... [it] is primarily 
derivative from a more general philosophical 
commitment to the essential right of the individual to 
make choices about what can and cannot be done with 
one's own body and mind."[10]
To put it another way, the legal obligation to obtain the consent 
of the individual reflects the accepted moral principle that each 
person has a right to self-determination and to physical and mental 
integrity. The breach of these principles usually leads to a general 
condemnation. A good illustration could be the international 
community's condemnation of the atrocities conducted by the Nazi 
physicians in the course of the second world war in the name of 
medical science and of the disrespect they had shown to these 
principles. Such an attitude confirms that the individual ought not to 
be approached for any kind of treatment or intervention without his or 
her actual consent. The provision of consent is central to the moral 
tone of the medical act. As explained above, the obvious inequality 
between doctors and patients in terms of medical knowledge and 
information, and the vulnerability of patients, make the obtaining of
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the patient's valid consent a fundamental requirement. Equally, the 
observance of this legal requirement can be viewed as a manifestation 
of respect for patient's autonomy.
However, if the patient is to make a free and understanding 
decision or choice either to consent to or to withhold particular 
treatment, he or she must satisfy some moral and legal requirements. 
Most of these requirements are related to the elements of real or
valid consent which will be considered later in this discussion. The 
main point to note at this stage, however, is that there is no 
specific way in which consent may be expressed.[11] What is important, 
in fact, is the manner in which the patient reaches his or her 
decision to consent to the treatment being administered.
For some scholars[12] the patient may be said to consent to
medical treatment merely by consulting the practitioner. This
conclusion is drawn from the fact that the individual presents himself 
or herself voluntarily to the doctor for examination. That is, it is 
often claimed that in the medical context consent is taken as "a 
parallel with the notion of tacit consent as sometimes applied in 
political philosophy".[13]
In politics, consent is the basis of any political obligation.[14] 
Given the circumstances, however, it is practically impossible to 
obtain the express consent of each individual citizen. Hence most
theorists rely on tacit consent which is usually given "passively by 
omissions and by failures to indicate or signify dissent."[15] For 
example, during the meeting of the company's board, the chairman 
announces a change in the time of the next meeting and asks whether 
there is any objection. The board members do not raise any objection. 
In so doing they have all tacitly consented to the chairman's 
proposal.
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It is argued[16], however, that the mere invitation to exercise 
the technical skills possessed by the doctor and to reach a diagnosis 
do not lead to a provision of consent, at least not a proper one, to 
the particular treatment or therapy that the physician may believe is 
suitable to the condition of the patient. For even in the doctrine of 
tacit consent, the potential consentor's silence is meaningful only if 
he or she understands his or her situation and is aware of what is 
happening. [17] Moreover, consultations may be equal to consent only 
when the individual seeks the prescription of a common drug whose 
characteristics and side effects are generally known. For if one 
asserts that consultation equals consent in all instances, it 
necessary follows that in cases where the therapies are more 
intrusive, the patient's consent is already obtained. In fact, a real 
consent requires more than the simple fact of presenting oneself to 
the physician for consultation. A real consent must be based on the 
disclosure of information which permits the patient to make a decision 
about whether or not to accept the proposed treatment. This can only
C
be made possible if the individual is provided with the information on 
which he or she can decide how to act. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that in medical practice, implied or tacit consent can not be 
considered valid consents unless the individual concerned is presented 
with an appropriate disclosure of information which enables him or her 
to make a rational decision as to whether to undergo the proposed 
treatment.[18]
In cases where a sufficient amount of information has been 
disclosed and the patient accepts the treatment, as in the case of a 
prescription, the patient consents implicitly by his or her taking the 
prescription and buying the drugs. That is, what is important in the 
whole issue is the basis on which the patient's acceptance is reached,
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i.e., the reasonableness and adequacy of information on which the 
patient made his or her decision to follow his or her doctor's 
recommendations. As has been said;
"What is fundamental to the provision of consent is 
the protection of the freedom of the individual to 
make choices, and therefore, what functionally makes 
consent valid is that aspect of it which is sometimes 
referred to as being knowledgeable."[19]
In contemporary legal discussions about consent in medical 
practice, the requirement that consent is based on information 
disclosure has been labelled 'informed consent' and is legally 
speaking as essential as care and skill in the performance of the 
treatment.
The description of consent by this concept is the product of 
American medical law. This concept has its roots in a recognition of 
the patient's right to self-determination. It suggests, as will be 
seen later, that a doctor is required to provide the patient with 
sufficient information which concerns the nature of the treatment, 
inherent risks, and the available alternatives, so that the patient 
can make an 'informed' or rational choice as to whether to undergo the 
proposed treatment. Therefore a general or a blanket consent may have 
no legal force, if the patient was not given a chance to compare the 
risks of undergoing treatment with the danger of foregoing it. The 
patient must be given a comprehensible explanation of the treatment in 
question in language which must be as simple and as nontechnical as is 
possible in all the circumstances.[20] Even if the patient signs a 
form containing a statement by him or her that the nature and the 
effects of the treatment have been explained to him or her, this would 
not prevent him or her from later claiming that a comprehensible
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explanation had not been given.
In British law, the concept of 'informed consent' is not adopted, 
and the term 'informed' is hardly used. In fact it seems to be used 
in only one reported case (Re.D "A Minor") f211 . This does not mean, 
however, that British courts have no concern for consent nor that
current legal doctrine has no implications about disclosure. As was 
said in Hills v. Potterf221;
"...it is quite clear from the English cases...that on 
any view English law does require the surgeon to 
supply to the patient information to enable the 
plaintiff to decide whether or not to undergo the
operation."[23]
That is to say that under English law the doctor is required to 
explain the nature and purpose of the proposed therapy, i.e., a duty 
corresponding to the transatlantic doctrine of 'informed consent'.[24] 
The first English case supporting the existence of such a duty was
Chatterton v. Gerson.[251
In sum, it can be safely said at this stage that legal systems
agree to the fact that only by making a reasonable and comprehensible 
disclosure of information can patient autonomy be protected.
(A) THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION:
The requirement of consent is also a fundamental condition of any 
medical research involving human subjects. The first imposition of 
rules requiring consent in this area of medicine took place in 1948 as
part of the judgment in United States v. Karl Brandi f261. the
Nuremberg trial -of Nazi physicians who engaged in biomedical 
experiments during the second world war.
Although it was a common misconception that these were the
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earliest examples of willfully harmful, vicious research on unwilling 
human subjects, the Nazi experiments were in many aspects 
unprecedented in the extensiveness and extremity of the harm and 
suffering to which they knowingly exposed their victims. Using 
subjects drawn from the populations of concentration camps, Nazi 
scientists explored the effects of ingesting poisons, intravenous 
injections of Gasiodine, immersion in ice water and the like. 
Infection with epidemic jaundice and other viruses were typical parts 
of medical experiments.
At the trial it was evident that in no respect could the victims 
of the Nazi experiments qualify as volunteers, much less as informed 
volunteers. The tribunal was satisfied that the defendants had 
corrupted the ethics of the medical profession in particular, and 
those of science in general, and had repeatedly and deliberately 
violated their subjects'rights. The judges gave a central role to the 
voluntary participation and consent of research subjects regardless of 
whether it was common professional practice among physician- 
investigators to seek consent. Specifically, the judges took 
responsibility for establishing the basic principles that must be 
observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts in the 
conduct of human subject research. These principles were ten in all 
and constituted the Nuremberg Code.
According to the Code the primary consideration in research is the 
subject's voluntary consent, which is absolutely essential. It 
requires that consent have at least four characteristics; it must be 
voluntary, competent, informed and comprehending.[27]
In in 1964 the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration 
of Helsinki whose recommendations were extended in Tokyo in 1974.
Like the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki provided a
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useful ethical and legal framework whithin which human research can be 
conducted, and also emphasised the requirement of valid consent.
By and large, international agreements make it a prerequisite of 
professional care either in therapy or human research that doctors 
seek their patients' freely given consent following a sufficient 
disclosure of information. It should be reiterated that this 
requirement is tied to the idea that the patient's right to consent to 
or refuse medical intervention is of considerable importance for the 
would be autonomous person. As has been pointed out, consent is valued 
because of its
"capacity to protect the individual patient from his 
or her vulnerability to the power of medicine and 
stimulates his or her capacity to challenge 
professional paternalism which, however well 
intentioned, can be and often is a face-on threat to 
autonomy."[28]
Patients' rights, including autonomy, are usually protected by the 
law which recognises their significance as legal and moral rights. By 
means of rules and the determination of rights and duties the law 
assures a proper exercise of rights and provides the machinery by 
which their infringement can be remedied.
(B) MECHANISMS OF LEGAL REDRESS:
In the medical context, legal systems provide the patient with 
different forms of action to register a complaint when his or her 
rights are not respected. Under the U.K system, for instance, it was 
possible to base one's action on assault when the patient was not 
satisfied about the given treatment or was approached without his or 
her real consent. However, in recent years there has been an 
important shift away from the assault based action into the negligence
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format. This shift will be considered in later chapters, but it is 
worth noting at this stage that as the patient is certainly the person 
most affected by the malacly, it is he or she who has the ultimate 
right to make decisions about his or her health care, and 
consequently, no interference should take place with his or her right 
to determine his or her future in matters relating to his or her
health care. Failure to respect these basic rights may result in a
legal action against the practitioner.
2 : 2 IS CONSENT ALWAYS NECESSARY ?
This is not to say, however, that the provision of consent as a
legal requirement is always necessary for any medical intervention. 
There are cases where consent is generally recognized as unnecessary, 
for example in cases of emergency or necessity. However, there is 
some doubt here whether these are to be taken as cases of implied 
consent where express consent is impossible as in the case where the 
patient is unconscious, or just as an overriding principle which 
abolishes the need for consent. This problem may arise in two ways:
1-The physician treats a patient in an emergency without any prior 
authorization.
2-The physician is. authorised by the patient to perform one course 
of treatment, in the course of which he or she discovers an 
unanticipated emergency condition substantially unrelated to the 
condition he or she is treating which requires immediate attention in 
circumstances where it is impossible and impractible to to obtain the 
patient's consent. In the Canadian case of Marshall v. CurryT291, 
Chisholm, J said :
"In these emergency cases it is not useful to strain 
the law by establishing consent by fictions-by basing
t
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consent on things that do not exist. Is it not better 
to decide boldly that apart from any consent the 
conditions discovered make it imperative on the part 
of the doctor to operate, and if he performs the duty 
skilfully and with due prudence that no action shall 
lie against him for doing so." [30]
Chisholm's statement seems to be a more logical explanation than a 
fictional imputation of consent, but does it mean that a patient who 
urgently needs medical treatment cannot refuse it.?
In effect, experiences have shown that patients and subjects with 
the capacity to consent may refuse instead. The refusal, however, 
must also be competent, voluntary and informed.[31]
Although refusals can occur in non life - threatening 
circumstances, the major controversies emerge from refusals of medical 
therapy necessary to sustain life. Examples include refusals to allow 
blood transfusions, amputations or kidney dialysis. While patients 
have refused treatment, such as blood transfusions, because of their 
religious convictions, the right to autonomy and privacy are often 
invoked to justify refusals for non religious and even highly esoteric 
reasons. There are also problems of second party refusal in the case 
of children and certain classes of incompetent patient
In discussing the issue a distinction is to be drawn between the 
refusal of competent patients and that of the incompetent or their 
guardians.
First, refusals by competent adult patients usually raise the 
question "what are the implications and limits of the principle of 
autonomy ?"
It is recognised that the patient, if of sound mind, can expressly 
prohibit the performance of life saving surgery. This can be 
reconciled with the principle of freedom and self-determination which
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is fundamental in Anglo-American legal systems.[32] In the crucial 
legal decision which set the standards for 'informed consent' in the 
1960s, Kansas Supreme Court Justice Alfred Schroender declared:
"Anglo-American law starts with the premise of
thorough-going self-determination. It follows that 
each man is considered to be master of his own body,
and he may if he be of sound mind expressly prohibit
the performance of life saving surgery or other 
medical treatment. A doctor may well believe that an 
operation or form of treatment is desirable or
necessary, but the law does not permit him to
substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by 
any form or artifice or deception."[33]
In practice a number of precedent legal cases hold that the
patient's informed refusal should be decisive. In Erickson V.
Dilaardf341. for instance, Judge Meyer acknowledged that the court
will step in as guardian of an infant or an incompetent, but in this 
case the patient was completely competent and capable of making 
decisions on his own behalf. The judge said:
"It is the individual who is the subject of a medical
decision who has the final say....this must be
necessarily so in a system of government which gives 
the greatest possible protection to the individual in 
the furtherance of his own desires."[35]
That is to say, the individual's self-determination was 
considered as an inviolable right. In another case, namely, Re Estate 
of Brooks[361 the free exercise of religion was regarded as a
sufficient reason to prevent physicians from compelling the therapy if 
there is a competent refusal.
Second, concerning the refusal of an incompetent person, or his or
*
her guardian, to any life-saving treatment, it is generally agreed
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that guardian may not refuse a treatment, that would restore reasonably 
normal health. In these cases the courts hold that the freedom of 
religion does not give parents or guardians the right to endanger the 
life of their children.[37] Courts, however, may accept the refusal 
of parents or guardians if the refusal is reasonable. Three grounds 
appear to be acceptable for refusing treatment.
1- A refusal will be reasonable if the risk of the proposed 
treatment is substantial in comparison to benefits.[38]
2- It will be reasonable if there is a lack of a clear need for 
treatment.[39]
3- A third ground for a reasonable refusal is that in non­
emergency cases, particularly those involving older minors, the 
treatment can wait until the minor becomes competent to be 
consulted.[40]
Finally, the refusal of medical treatment may arise in accidents 
and other emergency cases not from the patient himself - because of 
his or her state of unconsciousness- but from a relative or spouse.
It is argued that there exist no grounds on which any relative has 
the right to refuse to allow a patient to receive necessary medical
treatment. Consequently, if the spouse or near relative does not 
purport to be expressing the patient's own wishes, there seems to be 
no alternative but to disregard the purported prohibition. However, if 
the spouse or near relative purports to be conveying what he or she 
believes to be the patient's own wishes, a different situation arises, 
since the law still appears to be that no procedure can be proceeded 
with contrary to the patient's wishes.
When an operation is done in an emergency without consent,
physicians act as agents of necessity to do what it is assumed a 
reasonable person in the patient's predicament would want done for him
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or for her, and this presumption is not rebutted by the information 
given by the spouse or relative, since there is no certainty that if 
the patient were told, "either you have this procedure carried out or 
you will be in danger of almost certain death", he or she would refuse 
consent to the recommended procedure. Therefore, if a blood 
transfusion or any other medical treatment is necessary to attempt to 
save life, it should as a rule still be carried out despite objection 
by a spouse or relative, even if in objecting that person purports to 
be expressing what he or she thinks to be the patient's wishes.
In sum, it can be said that under normal circumstances a doctor 
can not properly undertake any treatment without the prior consent of 
his or her patient. Failure to do so may expose the doctor to the risk 
of being sued for assault or battery. An exception is made, however, 
in cases of emergencies which require immediate treatment. It is 
recognised that an operation done without the consent of the patient 
is lawful only if necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
patient. What are then the implications of the patient's consent when 
it is obtained properly ?. The next section examines the point.
2 : 3 DEFINITION and NATURE of CONSENT:
Consent could be defined as "the granting to someone the 
permission to do something he [or she] would not have the right to do 
without such permission"[41]. Defined this way, consent acts as an 
absolute defence to an action in tort/delict based on the unlawful 
touching of the individual's body. But in order to understand the 
nature of consent, it is important first to have some understanding of 
the legal relationship between the doctor and his or her patient. 
This relationship is contractual by nature. Usually, the contract is 
formed by implication when the parties reach an agreement as to what
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will be done. In the same way, the acts to be performed by them are 
also impliedly defined. For instance, if an individual consults the 
surgeon for the removal of a tumor from his or her arm, a contract is 
formed in which the surgeon is under a legal duty to remove the tumor
and he or she should not go beyond that agreement and also remove the
patient's appendix. That is to say, the surgeon must act in 
accordance with the agreement made between him or her and the patient. 
The patient's consent is usually given in connection with what the 
parties agreed to be done. Therefore, if the surgeon removes the 
appendix as well, as in the example above, he or she must be liable 
in damages.
But it should be noted in this respect that unlike the general 
position in the criminal law, consent may be used as a defence in the
civil law. In criminal allegations, the nature of a charge, e.g.,
murder, cannot under any circumstances be changed by appeal to the 
victim's consent.[42]. Accordingly, voluntary euthanasia still is a 
criminal offence. This implication is drawn from the fact that "the 
behaviour involved in the act is struck at by the law on the grounds 
that it is in itself morally reprehensible" [43] . There is only one 
situation where the provision of consent can be used as a defence in 
the criminal law, and that is when the lack of consent is "central to 
the nature and quality of the act". [44] For instance, if it can 
reasonably be shown that a woman consents to intercourse, this can 
constitute a sufficient defence against a charge of rape.[45]
It is important to bear in mind, however, that medical practice is 
governed by the civil law in which consent as a legal doctrine arises 
in two forms;
(I)-Active consent: the meaning of consent in this form is the 
granting to someone of the permission to invade one's own rights or
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interests which in the absence of such permission would be construed 
as a delict/tort, for example, the performance of an operation on 
one's body.
(II)-The second form is the assumption of risk, or . the maxim
volenti non fit injuria. The significance of this maxim is that it 
expresses the idea that a person who agrees to the infliction upon 
himself or herself of a civil wrong can not recover in respect of any 
injury to which he or she has consented, any more than anyone can 
recover in respect of any injury which he himself or she herself, 
rather than the defendant, has caused.[46] Therefore, although
medical practice may require that the physician performs some actions, 
e.g., surgery or amputation, which in other circumstances would
constitute assaults, the free and knowing consent of the patient will 
render these actions lawful. Moreover, when the patient accepts 
voluntarily the performance of certain actions on his or her body, 
based on a reasonable disclosure of information, he or she can not 
later successfully sue his or her doctor should any of the risks he or 
she was warned of, and which he or she agreed to assume, actually
materialize.
However, if the maxim is to be successfully applied as a defence, 
it must be proved that the party freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he or she ran,
impliedly or expressly agreed to incur it. However, this requires 
again that the nature of the risk which the party agreed to incur, is 
known or explicable. As Walker said;
"If the plea is to succeed, it must be shown not that 
the pursuer consented to take the risk of some harm 
befalling him, but he consented to take the risk of 
the particular kind of harm which in fact befell 
him."[47]
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Usually, the patient's consent is sought before the doctor may 
intervene. Accordingly, when the patient gives his or her real 
consent, this consent is a defence to any allegation based on assault. 
In medical transactions, by the voluntary provision of consent, the 
patient shifts his or her right to bodily and mental integrity to 
another person, usually a caring professional. This means;
first, consent that shifts a right to another person must be 
distinguished from a mere attitude of approval. As Childress [48] 
illustrated it, one may approve of a particular research protocol 
involving human subjects, but one may still refuse to participate in 
it. The person's consent, as distinct from his or her approval, is a 
necessary and vital condition for the research to be carried out with 
him or her as a subject.
Second, consent is an intentional act. No one can consent to or 
authorise another person's actions without doing so intentionally. To 
consent intentionally to the actions of another person means that the 
consenting person is aware and knows what he or she is agreeing to. 
Even if the patient, or the subject of a research project, signs a 
consent form, this does not constitute a real and valid consent if he 
or she does not know what it is all about, for the patient may later 
repudiate the consent form on the grounds that he or she has not 
understood what it was he or she was signing. Moreover, as Kloss[49] 
pointed out, consent must not be obtained by using a "blank cheque", 
or without a sufficient and reasonable disclosure of information, 
since in these cases the doctor obtains an apparent consent not a real 
consent and this may constitute a sufficient ground to found an action 
in negligence for the breach of the doctor's duty toward his or her 
patient. As has been said "the law inquires not whether the patient 
appeared to be willing but whether he was willing"[50].
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Third, consent must be given voluntarily; a consent given under 
duress is not a real or valid consent and "does not change the 
structure of rights and obligations"[51]. For instance, if a woman 
consents to sexual intercourse under duress, her consent will not 
exonerate the criminal from the charge of rape.
Fourth, consent does not necessarily involve oral or written 
statements. Nobody denies the utility of written authorization when 
consent is presented in such a formal way (consent forms), but such 
forms are not indispensible for the carrying out of medical 
treatments. There are cases where, although the patient is conscious, 
he or she can not communicate either by writing or speaking. An 
example of this arose in a case quoted from "The Daily Progress", 
Charlotteville; Va, Sep 19th 1979, where the patient though conscious 
could not speak because of a tube in her windpipe. She blinked her 
eyes twice to indicate that she did not want a blood transfusion. 
This shows that certain actions and gestures can be used to evidence 
or indicate the person's consent or refusal.
(A)■COMPULSORY MEDICAL EXAMINATION:
So far, concentration has been on the nature and characteristics 
of consent. It was argued that if consent is to be used as a defence 
by a doctor this consent must be real and valid and must stem from the 
knowledge and understanding of all that it involves. This can be 
reconciled with the common law's principle that every person has the 
right to have his or her bodily integrity protected against invasion 
by others[52]. There are, however, certain circumstances in which 
this integrity may be compromised without the consent of the person. 
Examples include the carrying out of medical attention without consent
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in cases of emergencies in order to save lives [53] and cases of
compulsory medical examination. In effect there are some special 
circumstances in which a person can be submitted to medical 
examination without his or her consent. However, even under these 
circumstances, the doctor must not go beyond the mere ordinary 
physical or mental examination or the administration of the specific 
treatment sanctioned by the law.
1-Public Health: the law may require that certain kinds of
treatment be proceeded with compulsorily in order to protect all 
members of society as a whole. Accordingly, citizens may be compelled 
to receive vaccination to prevent certain diseases. In these cases the 
individual has no right either to give or to refuse consent, but still 
has the right to choose the doctor who is to perform the treatment in
question [54]. Moreover, a person who has a notifiable disease or is
carrying an organism capable of causing one, may be ordered to be
medically examined and removed to hospital and detained there if 
necessary (Infectious Diseases and the Public Health, Control of 
Diseases, Act 1984, SS 35-38), (Public Health, Infectious Diseases, 
Regulations 1968(SI 68/1366 as amended).
It should be noted that the Public Health (Infectious Diseases) 
regulations 1985 (Si 85/434) did not make AIDS notifiable. It was 
reasoned that that would impose unacceptable restrictions on 
sufferers, including, for example, restrictions in their use of public 
transport, when in fact the virus is not particularly infectious. 
Nevertheless, a local authority can obtain an order from a magistrate 
under S.38 of the Act for the detention in hospital of any patient 
with AIDS where there is evidence that proper precautions would not be 
taken by him or her on his or her discharge to prevent the spread of
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the disease. In addition the AIDS (Control) Act 1987 requires 
authorities to furnish periodic reports on AIDS patients.
2-Prisoners: persons kept in prisons must submit to routine
physical examination. The reason for this procedure is understandable; 
in such closed communities infections may easily be introduced and 
spread and this can have serious consequences for all people involved 
in these institutions. It is important to note that this compulsory 
medical examination does not extend to intimate examinations. There
must be a real consent to that effect, and the same is true in respect 
of the taking of blood samples from prisoners.
3-IMMIGRANTS: for the same reason outlined in the case of
prisoners, port and airport medical officers have the authority to
compel any immigrant to submit to an examination, if they consider it
necessary, in order to exclude infections.
When it is appropriate to seek the person's consent, this can be 
obtain either impliedly or expressly. The point was already made, 
however, that when the treatment is invasive mere consultation is not 
sufficient to evidence the patient's consent and that a proper consent 
must be obtained based on information disclosure. The different forms 
of providing consent are examined below with illustrations.
2 : 4 FORMS OF CONSENT:
There are instances in which consent need not be presented in a 
formal way, i.e., written or spoken.[55] Consent may be 'implied' or 
'express' and the latter may be given verbally or in a written 
form.[56]
Express consent can be given either by a signing of a written
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statement or by agreeing in words, so that any reasonable person would 
conclude that the patient agrees to the proposed treatment. Implied 
consent, however, is not expressed at all, it is rather inferred from 
the actions or from the person's conduct, where his or her conduct is 
such that one would naturally conclude from his or her behaviour and 
the surrounding circumstances of a given situation that he or she 
agrees to the act being performed or to the treatment being 
administered. For instance, consent is given impliedly when a person 
presents himself or herself for a medical examination; he or she 
agrees to what is necessary to carry out the proper examination in 
question. But it is important to bear in mind that consent in this 
form does not permit any other step beyond an ordinary physical 
examination of the patient. For example, it does not extend to the 
performance of intimate examinations, [57] or to a more invasive 
procedure. This is to say that there are limits to what an individual 
can be thought to have consented to by having a consultation. Failure 
to obtain a proper consent from the patient can result in the doctor 
being sued either on the basis of unlawful touching due to the lack of 
consent, or for negligence if the doctor fails to disclose information 
about the treatment. In Devi v. West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority [58], a woman consented to a minor operation on her womb. 
On the basis of this consent, the surgeon proceeded with a major 
operation of sterilisation which he thought was necessary. In 
ordering damages for the plaintiff patient, the court held that the 
woman's consent to the first operation was not sufficient to go ahead 
with a more serious operation and that the operation itself was not 
necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman. The surgeon 
could have postponed the operation until his patient's consent was 
sought, even though it was convenient to operate when the patient was
still under anaesthetic. This is to say that the physician must act 
according to what the patient consents to be done to his or her body, 
and that mere consultation of the physician is not sufficient grounds 
for the doctor to assume the patient's consent and proceed with the 
appropriate treatment without disclosing information or obtaining a 
real consent for the proposed treatment. The patient may consent to 
the course of a given treatment and either impliedly or expressly make 
a restriction thereon or give express instructions. In this case the 
doctor must comply with these instructions, otherwise his or her 
interference with the patient's body will be held to be 
tortious/delictual. In Rolater v. Strainf591. the plaintiff patient 
made it clear that she didn't want to have any bones removed when the 
defendant surgeon operated on her to drain a puncture wound in her 
foot. Despite the express restriction and prohibition the defendant 
removed a sesamoid bone. In deciding in favour of the plaintiff, the 
court held that when a physician agrees to perform a certain course of 
action, he or she is bound to such agreement unless there are some 
unusual circumstances from which consent can be implied regardless of 
the prohibition. Similarly, in Mulloy v.Hop Sanaf601. the physician 
was requested to repair an injured hand and not to amputate it. Again 
despite the warning the surgeon amputated it and was held liable for 
trespass.
As mentioned before, both express and implied consent are legally 
sufficient for the carrying out of any medical treatment. However, 
where express consent is sought, there are obvious advantages in 
obtaining it in writing. [61] This raises the issue of the signing of 
the consent form on admission to Hospital or prior to surgical 
interventions.
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2 : 5 THE CONSENT FORM:
It is common practice to obtain the patient's signature on consent 
forms especially when the Hospital regulations make it a prerequisite 
condition precedent to the performance of any procedure. A signed 
consent form means that the patient has been made aware about the 
nature and purpose of the proposed treatment. But usually it is a 
nurse who obtains the patient's signature on the consent form, and the 
nurse is unlikely to provide the patient with an adequate disclosure 
of information about his or her treatment. The nurse merely mentions 
that a signed consent form is necessary.[62] Under these 
circumstances the signed document is not conclusive evidence that the 
patient has been provided with the needed information on which to base 
a real consent. This is to say that even if the patient signs a 
consent form which contains a statement by the patient that the nature 
and effects of the treatment have been explained to him or her, 
nothing would prevent him or her from later claiming that he or she 
has not actually received an adequate disclosure of information and 
explanation.[63] The written document should contain at least "the 
nature of the treatment and its side effects", "the methods used in 
the trial", "the stage of the patient's illness" and "the importance 
of the personal nature of the doctor/patient relationship."[64]
Under British law a standard form has been made available by the 
Department of Health in cooperation with the Department of Social 
Security, the British Medical Association, the Medical Defence Union 
and the Medical Protection Society. The form is some kind of evidence 
that the patient consents to the treatment being performed on his or 
her body, and is usually required for surgical intervention. The form 
contains a statement that the patient also consents to further 
procedures or measures that may be found necessary. [65] However the
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doctor is allowed to undertake only those procedures that may save the 
life or the health of the patient. It would be unwise to go ahead 
with further procedures that could be postponed to a later stage and 
until the patient's consent is obtained.
Recently, in Sept. 1988, the Department of Health put at the 
disposition of Hospitals three proposed new consent forms; ones to be 
used in medical and dental treatment and others to be used
specifically for vasectomy and female sterilization. The proposed new 
consent form has a space where the caring professional, whether doctor 
or dentist, should sign a statement that he or she has explained the 
treatment to his or her patient or to the patient's guardian in case 
of proxy consent, that he or she has mentioned the need for the
administration of an anesthetic if required, and finally that he or 
she reasonably believes that the patient has assimilated the disclosed 
information.
The patient on the other hand has to sign, on the same document, a 
statement that he or she has received the due explanation , that he or 
she understands that the treatment will not necessarily be performed 
by the specific doctor and that he or she authorizes further measures 
that may be found necessary during the performance of the intended
treatment. Again, the further measures are not to be proceeded with 
unless they are necessary to save the patient's life or health.
In any event the consent form should not be considered merely as a 
legal device to protect the doctor from subsequent litigation, rather 
it must be considered as an extension to the doctor/patient
relationship that is built on trust, and the provision of consent, 
whether verbally or in a written form, must be seen as "a natural 
extension of the trust established".[66]
Earlier in this chapter, it was mentioned that for consent to be
-  53  -
meaningful and/or to be used as a defence by a doctor, it must be a
real and valid consent, and must stem from knowledge and understanding
about all that it involves. The point has now been reached where it 
is necessary to consider what amounts to a valid consent. The 
following discussion will therfore be concerned with the elements of a 
valid consent.
2_l£  ELEMENTS OF V A LID  CONSENT:
A valid consent is formed of two main elements:
1-Information element: this contains;
A-Disclosure of information: the patient has the right to be 
provided with certain information. Correlatively, the doctor is under 
a legal duty to disclose this information on the basis of which the
patient decides whether or not to consent to the proposed treatment.
In general patients are thought to know at least certain information. 
Others may be presumed to be aware of additional information on the 
basis of personal experience. This raises the question of what needs 
to be disclosed and which standard is to be used in determining the 
adequacy of the explanation given
B-Comprehension of information: generally, the patient can not be 
said to have given a real consent unless he or she understands the 
information that the doctor is under a legal duty to disclose. Of 
course the disclosure of information should be done in a certain 
manner to ensure that the patient understands what he or she is told. 
But, is the doctor responsible for the patient's inability to 
understand the information.?
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2-Consent elements:
C-Vol nnt a r in ess: the consent must be freely granted and not
obtained by force, fraud, coercion or mistake.
D-C.ompptence: the patient must be a competent person to give a 
valid consent. Generally, only adult, sane persons are believed to 
have the capacity to consent to treatment, but there are borderline 
cases.
INFORM ATIO N ELEMENTS
A —DISCLOSURE O F 'INFORMATION:
The disclosure of information is the first important element of a 
valid consent. It is a manifestation of the respect due to the 
autonomy of the patient and to his or her right to make a rational 
decision about the future of his or her health care. Before 
considering different elements of disclosure, it will be convenient to 
say a word about certain factors that affect the amount of information 
that should be disclosed.
The law is well settled that the physician should deal honestly 
with his or her patient in terms of providing the patient with the 
necessary information to make a rational decision. But it does not 
follow that the doctor is obliged to give all the details of the 
procedure or to warm the patient about any risk however remote it may 
be, for this may only distress and frighten the patient, and prevent 
him or her from undergoing the procedure. [67] This is to say that 
when the doctor reasonably believes that the giving of certain 
information will have a directly detrimental effect on the patient's 
health, he or she will not be in breach of duty if he or she does not 
disclose this information. Therefore, the likely effect of information 
on the patient should be taken into consideration when disclosing
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information[68]. It is assumed in the example above that the 
procedure is intended for the benefit of the patient's health, for it 
is often argued that when the treatment is not intended for the 
benefit of the patient's health, e,g subjecting the patient to non- 
therapeutic experimentation, the patient must be given a full 
disclosure of all the factors that are necessary for him or her to to 
decide whether to consent. In addition to what physicians believe to 
be relevant, the disclosure must include any other piece of
information that the particular patient would prefer to know before 
agreeing to the treatment or the experiment.[69]
First, the patient's capacity to understand the information and
make a rational decision on the basis of this information also 
determines the amount of information to be disclosed; if the patient's 
capacity to understand is restricted, the amount of explanation will 
be much less than if the patient shows a greater capacity to
comprehend.
Second, the extent to which the patient desires to be informed
affects to some extent the amount of information to be given; if the 
patient desires not to be informed and leaves all the decisions to his 
or her physician, it is his or her right if he or she wishes to do so. 
But if the patient asks for certain information the doctor must tell 
him or her.
Finally, the likely occurrence of risks; when some risks are
likely to occur during the course, or after the performance, of the 
treatment, or are known to have serious consequences, the doctor's 
duty to mention them is much greater than if these risks are remote or 
of little consequence.
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B: ELEMENTS OF DISCLOSURES
As stated before, the physician is under a legal duty to disclose 
certain information about the nature of the treatment, the benefits or 
the results expected, the risks inherent in the treatment and the 
alternatives.[70] These elements define the nature and the scope of 
the duty of the physician to make sure that the patient consents to 
the proposed therapy in light of information relevant to that 
decision.
1-The nature of the procedure: the law requires that physicians 
explain the nature of the therapy to their patients in order to obtain 
a meaningful and valid consent from them. The nature of the treatment 
can be characterized in different ways; the physician has to explain 
whether the procedure is diagnostic or therapeutic, for the surgeon 
may operate on the patient in order to find out what is wrong with him 
or her. In this case the surgeon has to explain this fact, since the 
majority of patients may think that the surgeon's intervention is 
meant to bring relief from suffering. [71] The doctor has also to 
explain whether the procedure is invasive or not, i.e., does the 
procedure involve a physical touching or an entry into their body, 
e.g., Angriography. Part of the nature of the treatment is the 
duration of the treatment and the need for anaesthesia. It is also 
essential to tell the patient whether the procedure is therapeutic or 
merely a part of a research protocol.
2-Disclosure of risks inherent in the treatment: most allegations 
of unlawful medical touching or administration of treatment are based 
on the failure to warn of the risks involved in the treatment. [72] 
Ethically, the matter is related to the person's right to self­
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determination. As far as morality is concerned, a person is not to be 
exposed to a risk if he or she has not agreed to it. This makes the 
warning of risks that may occur in the procedure one of the most 
emphasized elements of information disclosure.
In effect, knowledge of the risks is essential for the patient in 
order fully to understand the therapy, since it is on the basis of the 
disclosure of these risks and the likelihood of their occurrence that 
the patient decides whether to undergo the treatment or to go on 
living without such treatment in cases where it is the only 
alternative.
In determining the risks that should be disclosed or warned of, 
the doctor has to refer to the applicable or prevailing standard of 
disclosure. In the U.S.A courts and legislatures very often
distinguish among material[73], substantial[74], probable[75] and 
significant[76] risks. Under British law, as will be seen later, 
courts require the disclosure of 'real' risk.[77]
It should be noted that disclosure of risks must include; the 
nature of the risk, its seriousness and the probability of
occurrence. If ,however, the probability of occurrence is extremely 
low, nondisclosure may be justifiable. In a similar way, if a risk is 
likely to occur, but with little consequence, nondisclosure may again 
be justifiable.[78]
Mention was made earlier that the physician should take into 
account the likely effect of the disclosure of information on the 
patient. It was said that the doctor is privileged to withhold 
disclosure when it is likely to cause the patient distress and
confusion. However, it must be borne in mind that "this is not the
same thing as deciding to withhold information which it is thought 
would lead the patient to refuse the treatment. The latter practice is
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hardly acceptable ethically".[79] As has been said, the patient as a 
free agent has a right to make even a wrong decision. [80]
However, some scholars are against the practice of 'therapeutic 
privilege', even when the information is likely to cause harm. For 
example, Buchanan[81] noted that the physician can hardly determine 
which information will be to the detriment of the patient's health, 
since the determination of this depends to some extent on factors 
personal to the patient and outside the medical context. Moreover, if 
the doctor believes, he argued, that the disclosure of a certain risk 
or information is very likely to be psychologically detrimental, he or 
she has also to make sure that withholding this information will not 
do a greater harm to the patient in comparison to the harm that may 
occur when giving the information.
3-Alternatives: it is argued that the disclosure of alternatives 
to proposed treatment is as essential as the warning of risks to 
medical decision making. Usually, the physician proposes the 
treatment that he or she believes to be the best for the patient's 
condition. This means that any other procedures have less value from 
the medical point of view. However, decision making in health care is 
not based on medical grounds alone. There are other factors which 
should be taken into consideration. These concern the patient's 
values, preferences, goals and needs. The patient may choose a course 
of treatment which can be less successful than the one proposed by the 
doctor but this decision must still be respected.
To make a rational choice requires that physicians also disclose 
the other alternatives to the recommended treatment. The disclosure 
of alternatives should include the nature and purpose of these options 
as well as their risks and benefits. [82] With such information, the
-  59  -
patient will be able to compare and evaluate medical risks and 
benefits according to his or her personal considerations. Sometimes, 
there may be alternatives of the same value, or it is difficult to 
determine objectively which procedure is preferable to another. But 
in any event, there is still the alternative of no treatment at all.
4-Benefits: although it is part of the physician's legal duty to 
enumerate the benefits expected from the proposed treatment, these are 
self-evident and can be understood from the purpose of the procedure, 
i.e., to bring relief to his or her suffering and troubles.
Accordingly, when the patient asks for relief or anticipates that the
proposed treatment will bring total relief to his or her suffering, 
the disclosure of benefits is not so important.
There are, however, two cases in which the disclosure of benefits 
is fundamental.[83]
1- When the purpose of the treatment or procedure is merely
diagnostic rather than therapeutic. In such case, the patient must be 
informed that the procedure is not meant to bring any relief but
rather is intended to provide some information as to how to proceed 
with other therapeutic procedures.
2- The disclosure of benefits expected from the recommended 
treatment can also be important when the purpose of the treatment is 
to bring only some relief to the patient's condition.
C : Standards of Disclosure:
The standard of disclosure is "the standard by which the adequacy
of the physician's disclosure is measured, thus allowing the fact
finder to evaluate whether the duty of disclosure has been
fulfilled".[84]
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Following the birth of the doctrine of informed consent in the 
U.S.A, courts generally adopted a professional standard in determining 
the scope of disclosure that should be made to patients. Accordingly, 
a physician will fulfill his or her duty of disclosure if the 
disclosure he or she has made equals the one that a reasonable medical 
practitioner would make under similar circumstances.[85]
However, in Canterbury v. Spence [86], the court enunciated the 
"prudent patient" test for determining the scope of disclosure of 
information, and in particular, information concerned with material 
risks.
"A risk is thus material when a reasonable person in 
what the physician knows or should know to be the 
patient's position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in 
determining whether or not to forgo the proposed 
treatment"[87]
However, it should be noted that both standards are in use in the 
U.S.A. Some states, have preferred to adopt the test enunciated in 
Canterbury (prudent patient), whereas the majority apply the 
"reasonable doctor" test.[88] Canadian courts also have opted for the 
"prudent patient" test for determining the scope of disclosure that 
should be made by physicians. In this respect, the Canadian Supreme 
Court gave priority to "the patient's right to know what risks are 
involved in undergoing or foregoing certain surgery or other 
treatment."[89]
Under British law, it is now clear that the physician is required 
to warn his or her patient of the risks inherent in the recommended 
treatment, a legal duty similar to that found in the doctrine of 
informed consent. How the law developed to this stage will be seen
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later, but at the moment one should note that under English law the 
doctor's duty to disclose the risks is restricted in its scope. His 
or her duty is concerned with disclosure of 'real' risks only.[90]
In determining whether a particular risk is a real one, English 
courts have generally rejected the transatlantic test that what the 
doctor should disclose is determined and judged by what the reasonable 
patient would want to know. This rejection has been confirmed by the
majority of the House of Lords in the case of Sidaway v. Board— o£
Governors of Bethlem Royal and the Maudesley Hospital.T911 The test 
was criticised as being damaging to the doctor/patient relationship 
and as uncertain in its application. [92] Instead English courts 
adopted the 'reasonable doctor' test, i.e., what a reasonable doctor 
would disclose in similar circumstances.[93] Further consideration 
will be given to this issue in chapter four infra.
B-COMPREHENSION OF INFORMATION;
It is often argued that a patient can not be said to have made a 
rational decision as to whether to consent to the recommended 
treatment unless he or she understands the information that the doctor 
is legally required to make known to him or her.
But from the legal point of view no court has expressly held that 
the doctor's duty extends beyond merely disclosing relevant infor­
mation to the patient. In accordance with what has been said, the 
United States Supreme Court mentioned as the meaning of "informed 
consent" merely "the giving of information to the patient as to just 
what would be done and as to its consequences" [94]
However, there is strong support in the common law for the 
existence of the requirement of understanding - that patients 
understand what the doctor is required to disclose in order to obtain
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his or her patient's valid consent. In effect the common law 
establishes that legally effective consent can be given only by 
competent persons. Accordingly, a person who lacks the capacity to 
consent can not be said to have rendered a legally valid consent. In 
the medical context, however, the question which often arises is not 
about the patient's capacity to consent, since even a minor may be 
asked to render his or her consent for a given treatment, but rather 
about the patient's competency in fact to make medical decisions.
The patient's competency is usually determined on the basis of his 
or her ability to understand the information disclosed.[95] Thus, if 
a patient is legally competent i.e., has the capacity to consent, and 
has been provided with the necessary information, these facts do not 
render his or her decision about health care a rational one if he or 
she does not understand the explanation made available by the 
physician.[96]
It should be noted, however, that the possible inability of the 
patient to understand the information given by the doctor may result 
from the manner of communication (the vocabulary which is adopted), 
and/or from the condition of the patient (distress or confusion). For 
this reason physicians are usually asked to choose carefully the 
vocabulary they adopt in explaining their proposed therapies. It goes 
without saying that technical language will not ordinarily suffice to 
warn the patient about a risk inherent in the recommended treatment. 
As has been pointed out, "one can only communicate in terms which, 
based on experience and perceptions of the recipient's capacity, one 
believes he will understand".[97] In other words, the doctor should 
disclose information in such terms that as a reasonable man would 
believe the patient would understand.
Doctors may argue that certain information is so technical that
-  63  -
the non specialist patient is unlikely to grasp it. .Such a claim, 
however, can amount to little more than a pretence for non disclosure, 
for as Buchanan[98] pointed out the doctor's legal duty to disclose 
information does not apply only when he or she reasonably believes 
that the patient will understand what he or she is informing him or 
her of. As he noted:
"The doctor does not and can not have a duty to make 
sure that all the information he conveys is understood 
by those to whom he conveys it. His duty is to make a 
reasonable effort to be understood".[99]
Moreover, even if the patient does not understand the highly 
technical nature of the information, the disclosure "may nonetheless 
have an important symbolic [purpose] which may prove to be vital to 
the creation or maintenance of trust and respect between doctor and 
patient, and to the enhancing of the patient's autonomy."[100]
The problem of understanding is most likely to occur when dealing 
with patients from the special groups, namely, children, the mentally 
handicapped and the mentally ill. It is believed that these persons 
are unable to understand the explanation that might be made available 
to them. However, once again, it is argued that even if these 
patients can not understand the technicalities of a certain procedure, 
they can still comprehend the likely consequences of the treatment or 
its side effects if this information is made known to them in the 
simple and everyday language.[101]
CONSENT ELEMENTS
Mention was made before that for consent to be used as a defence 
by a doctor, this consent must be freely and voluntarily granted as 
well as competent.
C-VOLUNTARINESS;
In order to give a voluntary consent, the patient must be free as 
to whether to assent to the proposed treatment. He or she must be in a 
position to choose between consent and refusal without any feeling of 
constraint. [102] He or she must be physically and mentally able to 
consent voluntarily. In the Canadian case of Beausoleil v. Soeur de 
la charity[1031. the court rejected the defence of consent since there 
was evidence that the patient's consent was obtained following the 
giving of a sedative. It was found that the patient consented in words 
of defeat, exhaustion and abandonment of willpower.
There are various factors which may render consent ineffective. 
Consent may be expressly given, but for one reason or another it won't 
be considered valid from the legal point of view. Generally speaking, 
consent can be invalidated by fraud, coercion or mistake.
(I)-Fraud;
The law is well settled that if the authorization for a 
therapeutic intervention is obtained through fraud, such consent is 
legally meaningless. Such fraud may consist in a misrepresentation of 
the character of the procedure or in a misrepresentation of the 
expected consequences of it. In Hobbs v. Kizer[1041. the court held 
that the consent of the plaintiff for the supposed operation to remove 
a vaginal abcess, was fraudulently obtained, for the physician 
intended in fact to perform an abortion on his patient who has been 
made pregnant by his having illicit relations with her. A similar 
approach has been taken by an English court in the case of Reaina v. 
Case[1051, where the doctor had sexual intercourse with his fourteen 
year-old patient under the pretence that he was treating her 
suppressed menstruation. The examples mentioned above show that any
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procedure undertaken following a fraudulently obtained consent can be 
tortious.
(II)-Coercion;.
The law does not recognize an authorization given as a result of 
coercive measures. Accordingly, one can not compel a patient to
undergo a course of treatment by means of threats or intimidation. In 
this respect, it was held in Heek v. City of Lovelandfl061 that where 
consent is obtained through coercion or duress that consent is 
ineffective since in fact the patient submits himself to the
defendant's act against his desires. However, in the case of Ollet v.. 
Pittsburgh.c.c and St.L .Ry.Cor1071. the court reached a different 
conclusion. In this case the crew of a railroad train which had run 
over a boy injuring his foot, took him to a hospital despite his 
protests. It was held that this case is different from the previous 
one as a result of the fact that the patient involved is a minor who 
is incapable of consenting to or refusing such treatment. In 
addition, it was a case of emergency which made it unwise to wait
until the boy's parents were notified.
(in)-Mist ake;
When the doctor mistakenly renders a treatment or performs the 
treatment upon the wrong patient or in a manner different to that
which was agreed upon between the parties, the submission of the 
patient to such actions or administration of treatment does not lead 
to an implied consent. An example of this arose in the case of Hershey 
v. PeakeflQ81 where the court found for the plaintiff patient for the 
unauthorized extraction of certain teeth which had been proceeded with 
mistakenly by his dentist. Similarly, in Gill v. Sellingf1091. the
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court held the physician liable for damages for the unauthorized 
performance of a lumbar puncture which was originally meant for 
another patient but was given by mistake to the plaintiff who merely 
visited the physician's office in order to' obtain the results of a 
blood test. s
Examples concerning the administration of treatment by mistake 
are in some ways similar to those involving the performance of further 
procedures whether related or unrelated to the original treatment for 
which consent was given. However, in the examples mentioned above, 
the element of intent is almost lacking, for had the doctor not been 
confused, he or she would have treated the right patient or proceeded 
with the right treatment.
D-COMPETENCY;
Generally, only competent persons are allowed to give or withhold 
consent to medical treatment. Accordingly, no problem arises when the 
consent or the authorization is warranted by a sane and legally 
competent patient.
However, the most complex problems relating to consent to medical 
treatment arise when the patient shows some incapacity which may 
prevent his or her consent from being meaningful. Examples involve 
patients from the special groups namely, children, the mentally ill 
and mentally handicapped persons. It is believed that these persons 
are unable to understand the nature and significance of their 
situations, and therefore they can not be said to have given valid 
consents. The principle is simply that one can not authorize the 
performance of a course of action of which he or she is rationally 
unaware.
However, it is often argued that the possible inability to
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understand with respect to these people is a matter of degree, and the 
law should be flexible in determining whether the particular patient 
has the capacity to consent in accordance with his or her particular 
situation. For instance, due to the general lack of knowledge and 
experience of minors, the law has made special provisions for their 
protection. In relation to the capacity of a minor to consent to 
medical treatment, there is a tendency for courts to look towards the 
intellectual maturity of the patient rather towards his or her 
age.[110]
In a similar way, cases involving the mentally ill and mentally 
handicapped persons must be treated according to their own merit. No 
paternalistic interference can be permitted with these persons' 
decisions unless it is clear in their individual case, and in the case 
of the particular decision in question, that they are not capable of 
understanding the nature, the purpose and the likely effect of the 
proposed treatment and are not therefore capable of giving valid 
consents.
It is convenient to note in this respect that the legislation 
affecting this particular group, although affecting only those who are 
detained as a result of a serious mental illness, allows the 
imposition of certain treatment upon these patients but only with 
their consent.[Ill]
Section 97 of the Mental Health (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1984 
states expressly that, except in a case of emergency which requires 
immediate intervention, a detained patient shall not be given any form 
of treatment unless he or she has consented to it. Before the 
treatment is administered, however, a medical practitioner and two 
other persons appointed for this purpose must testify in writing that 
the patient is capable of understanding the nature, the purpose and
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the likely effect of the proposed treatment and has consented to it. 
The appointed medical practitioner must further testify that the 
proposed treatment is necesssary to alleviate or prevent the 
deterioration of the patient's condition and that it should be 
administered.[112] Moreover, according to section 101, when it is 
appropriate to seek the patient's consent and it is obtained, with the 
exception of a case of emergency which requires immediate 
intervention, the patient can withdraw his or her acquiescence to 
further treatment at any time.
2 : 7 CONCLUSIONS:
The preceding sections have sought to demonstrate, through 
discussion of patients' rights, that the patient as human being has no 
less rights than does a healthy person, and that he or she must be
treated as an autonomous person when he or she has the capacity to
decide about his or her own future in respect of his or her health 
care.
It was argued that the patient has the right to consent to any 
medical intervention either in therapy or experimentation and that 
this right provides him or her with a sufficient protection for his or 
her autonomy or self-determination. But, in order that consent have 
this effect it must be based on a sufficient disclosure of 
information, since it is this element which plays a central and
fundamental role both in his or her autonomy and in the morality of 
the medical enterprise.
The only situation in which medical treatment might be 
administered without consent is that of an emergency which demands
immediate attention for the preservation of the patient's life, limb 
or health when the patient is not in a position to consent to or
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refuse treatment.
It was also argued in this chapter that where it is appropriate to 
obtain consent, the physician is now legally asked to disclose to his 
or her patient the relevant information in order to permit him or her 
to make a rational decision about whether to consent to the 
recommended treatment. Such a requirement is both vital and funda­
mental to the patient, for, as was already argued, one can not legally 
consent to the invasion of one's own body if one is unaware of the 
nature and consequences of the invasion. The disclosure of information 
must be made in simple language in order to ensure that the patient 
understands it. It must also be free from any misrepresentation of 
facts or of the nature of the procedure, for such may invalidate the 
patient's consent if he or she does authorize the performance of a 
certain treatment under such circumstances. Different standards are 
used in determining the adequacy of information that is to be 
disclosed to the patient. Mention was made of the "professional 
standard" which is adopted by British courts, and the "reasonable or 
prudent patient" which appeared following the birth of the doctrine of 
informed consent in the U.S medical law.
It should be noted, however, that the doctor is not responsible 
for the possible inability of the patient to assimilate the 
information disclosed. It hard to reconcile this idea with the theory 
that the patient's consent must stem from knowledge and understanding. 
The fact that the patient can hardly comprehend the information, does 
not exonerate the doctor from his or her duty to disclose information. 
In such circumstances the physician is asked to make some effort to 
make himself or herself understood by the patient, for it is often 
argued that if the information is presented in everyday language it 
can be grasped by most patients.
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The validity of the consent does not only depend on disclosure of 
information, it also depends on factors personal to the patient. This 
is concerned with patient competency and capacity to give a legally 
meaningful consent. This aspect of consent usually raises problems 
when dealing with persons from the special groups that include 
children, the mentally ill and mentally handicapped persons. It is 
submitted that the physician cannot legally approach the patient 
without his or her valid or informed consent if the latter has the 
legal capacity of granting it. It is noted, however, that the lack of 
capacity which may affect patients from special groups may justify the 
interference of other persons so that their consent is given by proxy. 
But when the capacity of the individual is not in doubt, he or she is 
the only person who can accept or reject the medical treatment based 
on a comprehensible and reasonable disclosure of information.
These are the general principles that govern consent to medical 
treatment. Before considering the the law of consent in the U.K, it 
will be necessary to outline the development of the doctrine of 
informed consent in the medical law of the United States, and that 
will be the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE U.S.A
The legal theory of valid consent as applied nowadays in the 
medical context is the result of the developments that took place in 
the law of consent during the last few decades. In effect, the legal 
requirement of providing consent developed from a mere authorization 
to invade one's own bodily integrity to a legal means to protect the 
patient's right to autonomy and self-determination, and to enhance 
rational decision-making in medicine as well as in the doctor-patient 
relationship.[1] Analyzing how the law developed to this stage is the 
task of this chapter. This historical analysis shows that the 
evolution of the transatlantic doctrine of informed consent is 
important for comprehending the contemporary notion of valid 
consent[2] under the British legal systems.
Before discussing the major circumstances in which the doctrine of 
informed consent emerged, it is convenient to start first by defining 
the term 'informed consent'.
Originally, the notion of informed consent derives from a 
recognition of the patient's right to self-determination which is "the 
most humane principle advanced by the post-theistic West" [3]. In 
effect, informed consent is connected to the principle of autonomy. 
The clearest early enunciation of the principle of autonomy in the 
area of medicine can be found in the phrase of Justice Cardozo:
"The root premise is the concept, fundamental in 
American jurisprudence, that every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
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what shall be done with his own body" [4]
The doctrine suggests that the physician is required to provide 
his or her patient with sufficient information as regards the proposed 
therapy so as to give the patient the opportunity of making an 
informed and rational f51 decision as to whether to submit to the 
treatment. As will be seen below the doctrine of informed consent is 
a legal concept that imposes on the physician two separate but related 
duties; the duty to disclose to his or her patient, in addition to the 
nature of the proposed therapy, the risks inherent therein as well as 
existing alternative treatments, and a subsequent duty to obtain the 
patient's consent before administering treatment [6] . Failure to 
disclose this information and to seek consent may result in an action 
based on non-consensual treatment if the patient does not understand 
what he or she is exposing his or her bodily integrity to.
The starting point of this discussion will be to look at the value 
given to the patient's desires and decisions in health care in the 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries.
5 : 1 CONSENT AND MEDICAL PRACTICE BEFORE THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY:
By and large, this period witnessed a rapid expansion in 
medicine. It is also characterized by physicians' preoccupation with 
professional standards of care and their resistance to medical 
"quackery".
There is some evidence that consent-seeking practices existed 
during the period in question, especially to consequential 
interventions such as surgery. The legal requirement was that 
physicians should obtain their patients' authorization prior to any 
administration of treatment.
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One of the earliest reported cases to have applied this rule was
the late eighteenth-century English case of Slater y_, Baker— &
Stapleton f71 . The case was concerned with an action for breach of 
contract. In effect the plaintiff consulted his physicians Drs Baker 
& Stapleton for the removal of bandages from a partially healed leg 
fracture. Contrary to the agreement made between the parties, the 
hired physicians refractured the leg "ignorantly and unskillfully", 
said the plaintiff, and over his express protests. Then the 
physicians placed the leg in an apparently new apparatus that was 
still under experimentation, designed to stretch and straighten the 
leg during the rehealing. Expert testimony evidenced that the use of 
such equipment was contrary to standard practice, as was refracturing 
a leg unless the bone was not setting properly. Moreover, even if 
such procedure were carried out, it should not be done without the 
consent of the patient concerned. During the trial the defendants 
maintained that because the plaintiff complained of an unauthorized 
refracture over his objections, his action should have been brought in 
trespass. In order not to dismiss the plaintiff’s action because it 
was brought under an inappropriate 'writ1, the court held the 
physicians liable under contract theory. The court decision in this 
case constituted a recognition of the ethical and legal requirements 
of consent. The court also mentioned the importance of communication 
in the doctor/patient relationship. The court made the remark that it 
is customary for the surgeon to seek his or her patient's consent and 
observed that;
"...it is reasonable that the patient should be told 
what is about to be done to him that he may take 
courage and put himself in such a situation as to 
enable him to undergo the operation."[8]
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In another case in the nineteenth century the issue of consent to 
treatment was faced head on. That was in Wells v. World Dispensary 
Medical Associationf91 . The case involved a claim on the part of the 
plaintiff patient that the defendant physicians had falsely and 
fraudulently obtained her consent for the removal of an alleged 
uterine tumor. At the outset the plaintiff's counsel failed to prove 
that no tumor existed at the time of the operation. He subsequently 
attempted an alternative argument in malpractice which was upheld by 
the court. The court held that the defendants were negligent not for 
fraudulently seeking the patient's consent, but for removing the 
tumor.
Pernick[10J,in his study of the "behavioral values that were 
transmitted through the example of daily medical practice" [11], shows 
that patients' desires and decisions in health care were recognized 
and that patients' refusals to submit to treatments were also 
respected.[12] Pernick comes to the conclusion that the patient could 
even prevent a procedure which is as important and fundamental as a 
life saving one.[13]
The early cases reported in the Boston Medical and Surgical 
Journal show, however, that "the style of handling problems of consent 
was not fixed or routine"[14]. But doctors did not totally ignore 
patients' opinions regarding the proposed treatment and at the same 
time they did not appear "to proceed in accordance with any 
established formal or informal practices of informing or obtaining 
consent" [15]. On the other hand other cases confirm the conclusion 
reached by Pernick that physicians sometimes respected their patients' 
decisions not to proceed with the proposed treatment.
A better example of soliciting consent, as opposed to merely
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respecting patients1 refusals, is found in the case reported in the 
Boston Medical and Surgical Journal[16], in which a hydrocephalic 
baby, whose head circumference had continuously increased in size 
since birth, needed an operation. The surgeon proposed to the parents 
to operate on the baby, but he could not obtain their consent without 
assuring them that a better state of health would follow the 
performance of the operation in question. Another illustration of 
consent seeking, evidencing both purposeful disclosure of information 
and an invitation to autonomous choice by the patient is found in the 
case of a woman with polypous disease of the vagina [17]. The surgeon 
informed the patient that the source of her troubles lay in a diseased 
structure in the vagina, and that the only possible remedy would be
the surgical removal of the diseased part. The patient preferred
another course of treatment although it was not as efficient as the 
one proposed by the treating physician. The alternative treatment 
consisted in applying astringent and stimulating applications to the 
part affected.
Although the cases mentioned above give some evidence that at 
least some consideration was given to consent-soliciting, it is 
difficult to identify the perceived justifications for these 
practices. One can not assert with certainty whether the patient's
choice was respected for the sake of autonomy, or because disclosure
provided some medical benefit for the patient, or because the proposed 
intervention required the patient's active cooperation, or because 
disclosure was commonly practised or consent legally required. [18] . 
As Faden and Beauchamp observed, respect for autonomy is unlikely to 
be included as a justification for such practices because of the 
beneficence model which characterized medical practice in this 
period. [19] The first decision, as will be seen below, to have
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expressly used the term self-determination was the early twentieth 
century battery case of Schloendorff[20].
3 : 2 CONSENT IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY:
By the beginning of the twentieth century the medical profession 
knew another dimension. As the success of scientific knowledge in 
medicine began to increase, case reports and commentaries took on a 
more technical character, neglecting thereby to report information 
about doctor/patient interactions and consent practices. The 
increasing number of malpractice lawsuits also characterized this 
period. An article in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that 
legal action was undertaken by some unsatisfied patient once in every 
four days, soliciting legal redress for alleged malpractice[21] . This 
marked the beginning of doctors' confrontation of the "malpractice 
crisis".
In an attempt to redress the situation and to discourage lawsuits 
the medical profession tried to rely on consent-seeking and 
communication with patients before the administration of treatment. 
Physicians were asked to obtain their patients' consent prior to any 
administration of treatment and particularly in major interventions 
that need the use of anaesthesia[22]. Physicians were also urged to 
seek consent when, in the course of a given intervention, they 
discovered a new condition not anticipated before the operation, 
unless, if not treated, it would endanger the patient's life or 
health, in which case the doctor must treat the newly discovered 
condition with the implied consent of the patient.[23]
In addition to the use of consent-seeking practices in striving to 
avoid malpractice suits, the medical profession also relied upon the 
possibility of legal liability for failure to seek the patient's
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consent. In this respect the Boston Journal reported an example of 
the legal dilemma of whether consent should fbe treated as one ordinary 
issue of medical custom or as authorizing what would otherwise lead to 
an action for assault and battery[24]. The report discussed the case 
of a physician involved in an allegation for non-consensual 
treatment:Delaware v. Gale.r251 The case consisted in an action
brought by a woman against her male accoucheur for assisting her 
during delivery. At the time male assistance during labour was not a
common practice, in fact it was regarded as improper. The woman
testified that the defendant physician touched her body several times 
without seeking her consent and despite her express objections. The 
court held, after hearing the testimony of several doctors called for 
the defence, that the defendant physician's behaviour was appropriate 
and that he only performed his professional duty. The doctor was then 
discharged from criminal custody.
Generally, the early twentieth century cases were very often
dealt with on the basis of negligence, but once "the nature and the 
scope of the patient's authorization is established, extension beyond 
it is a technical battery" [26]. To go ahead with the treatment 
without the patient's consent is considered as a pure instance of 
battery.[27] As was observed, these early cases "examined the 
principles underlying the physician/patient relationship, and applied 
that understanding to develop and illuminate the nature and scope of 
consent." [28]
The period between 1905 and 1914 saw four battery decisions 
considered as the first to have formulated the basic features of the 
doctrine of informed consent in the U.S.[29]These were; Mohr v. 
Williams [3Q]Pratt v. Davisf31]f Rolater v. Stainr321, and the most 
often cited case of Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y Hospitals [33]
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which was the first decision to have pioneered the use of the right of 
autonomy as a justification for the legal requirement of consent.
A-THE PRE-SCHLOENDORFF CASES:
Mohr v. WilliamsT341, Anna Mohr, the plaintiff patient, suffering 
from pain in her right ear, consulted her doctor who obtained her
consent to operate thereon. During the operation the physician 
examined her left ear and realized that it was in a worse condition 
than the one he was about to treat. For this reason he operated on 
the left ear rather on the one he was hired and authorized to treat. 
Following the operation the patient's hearing in her left ear became 
further impaired. Consequently, she sued her surgeon on the basis of 
a battery action for the performance of the operation without her
consent.
In deciding in favour of the patient, the court held that the 
physician should have sought the patient's authorization before
treating the left ear. In this respect the court said:
"The free citizen's first and greatest right, which 
underlies all others (the right to himself) is the 
subject of universal acquiescence, and this right 
necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however 
skillful or eminent, who has been asked to examine,
diagnose, advise and prescribe, to violate without the 
permission the bodily integrity of his patient by a 
major or capital operation, placing him under an 
anesthetic for that purpose, and operating on him 
without his consent or knowledge"[35].
The message of the court seems to suggest that the patient's 
submission to a mere medical examination does not in itself give the 
physician carte blanche to go ahead with whatever he or she would 
think will benefit the patient's health or condition. The patient's
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consent can not be implied from the mere fact that he or she seeks 
treatment. Exceptionally, the patient's consent may be obtained 
impliedly in the case of an emergency or when the surgeon discovers a 
new condition not anticipated in the course of the operation consented 
to. In such circumstances, it is practically impossible to obtain the
patient's express consent, and to postpone the treatment until the
patient's consent is sought may be fatal to the patient's health or
life. Operating on the left ear of the patient, held the court, was 
not within the field of the operation consented to, and no case of 
emergency or of any other exception to the rule of seeking consent
occurred.
The court insisted that the scope of the consent should be 
respected. In this respect the court noted that when the physician 
solicits the patient's consent and the latter agrees to a certain 
course of action "...the patient thereby, in effect, enters into a 
contract authorizing the physician to operate to the extent of the 
consent given, but no further"[36] . As was remarked by some 
writers[37], nowhere did the court in Mohr use words like "self- 
determination" or "autonomy". However, the court used "the free 
citizen' s... right to himself" and this ha's the same effect as the 
language of the right of autonomy or sef-determination. Moreover, by 
stating "If a physician advises a patient to submit to a particular 
operation and the patient weighs the dangers and risks incident to its 
performance, and finally consents"[38], the court treated consent as a 
"full decisional process and not merely as a bare permission to 
touch"[39].
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Pratt v. Davis.[40]
In this case the patient was the subject of a hysterectomy without 
her consent. In the first instance the lower court could not find any 
English or American court decision that held a physician liable for 
the administration of treatment without the patient's consent, nor any 
that stated that consent-seeking was not required for the proper 
practice of medicine, but the early cases mentioned the possibility of 
implied consent.[41] The physician's counsel argued that the hiring 
of a doctor implies that he or she is authorized to do whatever he or 
she would think is necessary or beneficial to the patient's 
condition.[42] But the lower court rejected this argument and held
the physician liable for battery.
Just after the decision in Mohr in 1906, the Pratt case reached 
the Illinios Supreme Court which upheld the decision of the lower 
court. The Supreme Court made it clear that implied consent is to be 
relied upon only in emergency circumstances, or when the surgeon 
discovers a new condition, not anticipated before the operation, that 
requires immediate treatment. The latter decision constituted an 
influential precedent for later cases in other states' courts.
Historically, the Mohr and Pratt decisions are important for
reminding doctors to seek their patients' consent prior to any
touching or intervention and for having limited the use of implied 
consent to emergency circumstances, as well as for their use of strong 
language as regards autonomy in health care decision-making.
Rolater v. Strain [43]
In this case the plaintiff consulted her physician for the 
drainage of an infection in her foot. She expressly instructed the 
physician not to remove any bone from her foot. In the course of the
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operation, the surgeon discovered that the sesamoid bone was in an 
unusual position which blocked access to the joint which was to be 
drained, so the surgeon removed it. There was some evidence that the 
bone has no purposeful function and the operation would not have been 
successful without removing the bone. The defendant argued that, to 
the contrary of the Mohr and Pratt cases, his patient had in fact 
consented to the operation and that it was performed on the correct 
foot. In holding the physician liable for battery, the court said that 
the operation was not performed in accordance with the manner agreed 
upon between the parties and consented to.
Mohr had suggested, as seen above, that some procedures not 
consented to might enter the scope of the consent already obtained. 
Rolater, however, held that when the patient limits the extent of his 
or her consent, this limitation "expressly forbade, against the 
physician's professional judgment, a procedure within the operative 
field". [44]
B-IHE...SCHLQENDQRFF,. CASE.
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y Hospitals [45] . The plaintiff 
entered the hospital for the purpose of an abdominal examination 
under anaesthesia. She instructed the physician that no operation was 
to take place should any need for intervention be discovered during 
the examination. When she was under ether, the surgeon removed a 
fibroid tumor from her abdomen. Ironically, a verdict was sustained 
for the defendants by the court of appeals because no master-servant 
relationship existed between the hospital and the doctors that 
performed the operation. The court could neither find any violation of 
consent nor mentioned anything about the information that the patient 
needs to exercise his or her right of self-determination. Moreover,
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the court encountered the argument that the patient had waived any 
claim for negligence by attending a charitable institution. In this 
respect the court held that the operation was trespass and no waiver 
could be found in the commission of an illegal act. Judge Cardozo 
stated that it was a trespass:
"Every human being of adult year and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without 
his patient's consent commits an assault for which he 
is liable for damages."[46]
Cardozo's formulation reminded physicians that the patient has a 
right to protect his or her bodily integrity by choosing whether he or 
she is to be treated medically, in what way and the extent of the 
treatment. Any inattention to this right may expose the physician to 
an allegation of battery for his or her unauthorized invasion of the 
bodily integrity of the patient, no matter how skilful, faithful or 
beneficient is the physician when approaching the patient.
The decision also recognized that when an emergency occurs and it
is necessary, as opposed to merely convenient, to operate on an
unconscious patient before consent can be obtained, the surgeon can 
administer the treatment without the patient's consent. But in this 
case the court found that no emergency existed. In fact, prior to the 
operation, the patient had already prohibited the performance of any 
intervention should any condition be discovered during the
examination. The fact that the surgeon discovered the tumor which 
could have endangered the life of the patient could not imply a 
consent if one considers the earlier express prohibition, even though, 
as mentioned before, good medical practice might have urged an
immediate intervention.
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Soon afterwards, Shloendorff became the most cited case in .later 
decisions, as some scholars noted[47]. Several reasons can be 
postulated for its popularity: Judge Cardozo, already famously known, 
pioneered the use of the term "self-determination" which is in itself 
a "catch phrase" [48]. In addition, the decision came from the New York 
court, so influential that other courts were already ready to follow 
such an important and distinguished precedent.
In this way Schloendorff and the other cases formulated the 
battery theory based on respect for the patient's right to self- 
determination. These early cases, in particular Mohr, evidenced a 
real consideration of the role of the patient in health care decision­
making, especially his or her right "to weigh dangers and risks" 
before authorizing any course of treatment. Following the 
Schloendorff decision, battery theory continued to be applied in some 
other courts as a basis of liability[49]. In other jurisdictions, 
however, the consent issue was dealt with as a matter of malpractice.
In general, what can be safely be said about the law of consent in 
the early twentieth century is that "a more complicated set of rules 
began to develop beyond the original simple proposition that a 
physician might not treat a patient without the patient's 
authorization"[50]. One of these early rules about consent-seeking is 
that the physician is not only responsible for obtaining his or her 
patient's consent, but that he or she should also not misrepresent 
the nature of the procedure and the expected consequences, for such 
conduct may invalidate the patient's consent and expose the doctor to 
an action for non-consensual treatment[51]. Courts generally indicated 
that fraudulent, deceptive or misleading information invalidated the 
patient's consent. Although no legal rule existed at the time that 
imposed a duty upon the physician to disclose information, in
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particular information relating to the risks inherent in the proposed 
therapy and its consequences, courts made it clear that if such 
disclosure takes place it must be truthful. This early rule 
constituted "the seeds of the requirement of an affirmative duty of 
disclosure"[52].
5 : 5 THE TRANSITION FROM SIMPLE TO INFORMED 
CONSENT:
No significant development was noted during the four decades that 
followed the decision in Schloendorff. As noted before, different 
courts treated consent issues either in battery or in malpractice. 
However, a group of cases in the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a 
major development in the law of consent: a transition from the
traditional duty to.obtain consent into an explicit duty to disclose 
certain forms of information. These constituted the first contemporary 
"informed consent" cases. "Informed" was the new term added to consent
in the landmark decision of Salop v. Leland Stanford Jr Booard of
Trustees in 1957.[53]
A-THE SALGO CASE:
The case involved a permanent paralysis that was suffered 
following an aortography procedure performed upon the plaintiff at
Stanford University Hospital. The patient brought an action against 
his physicians alleging that the latter were negligent in its 
performance as well as in failing to warn him of the risk of
paralysis: The court's view of the law on the subject was stated thus:
"A physician violates his duty to his patient and 
subjects himself to liability if he withholds any 
facts which are necessary to form the basis of an 
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
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treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize 
the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order 
to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, 
the physician must place the welfare of his patient 
above all else and this very fact places him in a 
position in which he sometimes must choose between two 
alternative courses of action. One is to explain to 
the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical 
procedure or operation no matter how remote; this may 
well result in alarming the patient who is already 
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to
undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal
risk, it may also result in actually increasing the 
risks by reason of the psychological results of the 
apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that 
each patient presents a separate problem, the 
patient's mental and emotional condition is important 
and in certain cases may be crucial and that in 
discussing the element of risk a certain amount of 
discretion must be employed consistent with the full 
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed 
consent."[54]
It is obvious that the California court imposed liability on the 
physician if he or she failed to disclose any facts that were 
necessary for the patient to render an intelligent decision as to 
whether to consent to the proposed therapy. The physician is allowed, 
however, "a certain amount of discretion"[55]. Although "it is rather 
difficult to determine what is a certain amount of discretion"[56]as
Myers observed, the statement in Salgo is very often referred to by
other courts. In Salgo, two factors were cited as a justification 
for the physician's discretion; namely the patient's mental and 
emotional condition. After Salgo, the majority of juridictions 
adopted the same language to justify limitation of the duty of 
disclosure.[57]
Salgo also brought new elements into the law;
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1-The new duty to inform the patient about risks attendant on 
therapy and the possible alternative treatments, which is an extension 
of the already settled duty to inform about the nature and
consequences of the proposed therapy.
2-Unlike earlier court decisions the court in Salgo considered, 
not merely whether a consent had been rendered to the proposed
therapies, but whether it had been informed, i.e., preceded by 
information disclosure.
With the new facts of the case, and by "invoking the same right of 
self-determination"[58], the court in Salgo created informed consent 
as a legal requirement for proper medical practice. In other words the 
theory of informed consent is the result of the new factual situation 
and the application of the same theory of consent that had been 
applied to the early cases referred to. In this way, all consent
issues, namely the nature, consequences, risks, benefits and 
alternatives formed the new set of information that patients need in
order to reach an "intelligent" decision as to whether to consent to
the proposed therapy.
It should be noted that Salgo had "tempered its extension of
traditional battery analysis"[59] by allowing physicians to use "a 
certain amount of discretion" in respect of the disclosure of facts 
that are necessary to reach an informed decision. The court, however, 
did not provide physicians with any guidance in relation to the use of 
that discretion.[60] Moreover, although the Salgo court cited battery 
cases, including Schloendorff, in support of the duty to disclose,
there is still a confusion as to whether the court based informed
consent in battery or in negligence[61]. The court itself did not 
discuss the issue. In this respect, it is convenient to invoke the 
work of Professor McCoid who had already suggested a choice between
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battery and negligence theories a few months before the Salgo case 
was decided[62]. In effect, in his 1957 article, McCoid, studied the 
courts' decisions in all previous cases that involved the adminis­
tration of treatment without authorization in order to determine 
whether there was any distinction between negligent, malpractice, and 
non-consensual treatment, or whether courts applied the same standard 
of conduct in all cases concerned with physicians' deviations. 
Because the failure to seek consent and negligent treatment are both 
considered improper actions on the part of doctors, McCoid suggested 
that battery and assault analysis should be' confined to those 
relatively few cases in which the physician has engaged in intentional 
deviations from routine and accepted practice. Other cases ought to 
be tried on the basis of other principles. He suggested that there 
should be a single basis of liability in all malpractice cases;
"The basis of liability should be deviation from the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent doctor 
of the same school of practice as the defendant under 
similar circumstances. The author believes that under 
such a standard the patient will be properly protected 
by the medical profession's own recognition of its 
obligation to maintain its standards. One particular 
obligation which the law may properly exact or impose, 
however, is the obligation of a doctor to make a 
reasonable disclosure to the patient.... and then 
permit the patient to decide whether to submit to the 
treatment or not. To overcome any difficulties of 
proof, the law may also properly create a presumption 
that where the patient has not given his express 
consent to the operation or treatment, there has been 
a deviation from the standard of proper medical care, 
which presumption will impose upon the doctor the onus 
of coming forward with justification of his conduct by 
the use of qualified medical testimony."[63]
McCoid also argued that even if the physician is involved in a
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case where all the requirements of the application of the battery 
theory are met, the physician merits special treatment because he or 
she usually performs his or her professional duty in good faith and 
for the benefit of the patient. [64]
After the Salgo decision, informed consent cases that applied the 
battery theory demonstrated an ability equal to that of negligence 
theory "to address difficult and important consent issues" [65]. 
However, most courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of 
battery theory as a basis of liability and suggested that it should be 
rarely applied. The shift in law towards negligence analysis took
place few years later,, a shift that was, to some extent, orientated by 
McCoid's influential thoughts on the issue, as noted by most 
commentators.[66]
B-BATTERY CASES AFTER SALGO:
Gray v. Grunnaole: \671 In this case the patient authorized what
he was told was an "exploratory operation". He understood that to be a
simple incision that would be made in his spinal column solely for the 
purpose of diagnosis, and that no attempt would be made to treat the 
condition he was suffering from once the diagnosis was complete, at 
least until he was advised of its nature and asked to consent to it. 
For the doctors, however, the operation meant more than that. For 
them, once the source of the trouble was identified, every effort
would be made to treat or correct the pathology, or alleviate the 
symptoms. During the procedure an attempted corrective treatment had 
been performed, but unfortunately resulted in paralysis. The patient 
based his action both on medical negligence and on treatment without 
authorization, claiming that his consent had not been informed and in 
particular that he had not been warned of the risk of the paralysis
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that materialized. Despite the verdict of the jury who awarded $80,000 
for the plaintiff, the lower court gave judgment for the defendant. 
This decision was reversed on appeal and judgment entered on the 
verdict. The appellate court held that although there was ho evidence 
that the procedure had been performed negligently, it had been done 
without the patient's informed consent, because the latter did not in 
fact understand the terminology used when physicians sought his 
consent, regardless of the written consent he had given when entering 
the hospital.
Berkey v. Anderson:f681
This case connected the duty of disclosure to the law of fraud and 
deceit. In Berkey, the patient consented to a procedure called 
"Myelogram", without any warning of the risks it involved. The 
patient testified that prior to the procedure he asked his doctor 
whether the myelogram would be similar in nature to the electro­
myograms he had already undergone. The physician answered that this 
procedure was simply a diagnostic and exploratory one and that the 
most uncomfortable thing about it would be being tilted about on a 
cold table. Following the procedure, the patient suffered several 
injuries in the spinal column. He subsequently sued his doctor 
alleging that the latter had misrepresented to him the real nature of 
the procedure by not having warned him that the procedure also 
involved a spinal puncture. After having reviewed the information 
provided by the physician, the court found that the patient's consent 
was in fact uninformed and therefore invalid due to the inadequacy of 
the physician's explanation of the nature of the procedure. The court 
held that on the facts the jury could have concluded that the 
reassuring language of the physician "was actually deceptive"[69].
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The court also focussed on the physician- patient relationship as 
fiduciary in character, and indicated that this very character imposes 
on the physician a duty of full disclosure of facts. The main 
question before the court was whether the patient received sufficient 
information as regards the nature of the myelogram so that he could 
reach an intelligent or rational decision as to whether to consent to 
the treatment.[70] Therefore, like Salgo, the court applied a 
patient-centered disclosure standard. It also introduced the element 
of deception, as did some of the early cases [71] to invalidate the 
plaintiff's consent.
Cooper v. Roberts:[721
The plaintiff in this case, as in previous cases, had not been 
fully informed of the risks inherent in the proposed procedure. In
this case the physician failed to warn the patient of the risk of
stomach puncture during the performance of a diagnostic examination 
done by a fiberoptic gastroscope. By using almost the same language 
and reasoning of the precedent battery cases the court in Cooper said 
that informed consent's first interest is to "[have] the patient
informed of all the material facts from which he can make an 
intelligent choice as to his course of treatment, regardless of 
whether he, in fact, chooses rationally"[73]. In determining the scope 
of information disclosure that is needed to ensure an informed 
consent, contrary to negligence cases that applied the professional 
standard, the court in Cooper opted for the reasonable person
standard. In this respect, the court argued that the latter standard 
is more appropriate to keep the balance between the patient autonomy 
and "the interests of fostering the practice of responsive, 
progressive medicine."[74]
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These battery cases including Salgo followed, to some extent, the 
early twentieth century cases in terms of reasoning and justification. 
However, these cases faced much more complex problems, in particular 
the problem of determining the risks that should be disclosed, a 
problem that was first identified in Salgo. It does not necessary 
follow that earlier cases ignored these problems, it only means that 
"the courts had not heretofore needed to respond to them on the facts 
before them"[75].
As noted before, some courts continued to ground informed consent 
on battery theory, others however, probably influenced by McCoid[76], 
were coming to deal with the issue according to the law of negligence. 
The first court to have applied negligence theory in informed consent 
cases is the Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v. Kline.[77]
5 : 4 NATANSON AND THE SHIFT TO NEGLIGENCE:
Natanson v. Kline.[78] Following a successful operation for the 
removal of breast cancer, plaintiff Natanson consented to a 
precautionary cobalt radiation treatment. Despite all normal 
precautions that the- defendant radiologist observed during the 
administration of the treatment, the patient suffered serious injuries 
which consisted in the destruction of skin, tissue and bone in her 
chest area. .She brought an action in malpractice claiming that the 
defendant physician had been negligent in failing to inform her that 
the treatment involved substantial risk of harm even if performed with 
due care. Her physicians recognized that although she authorized the 
performance of the therapy, she had not received an adequate 
explanation about the inherent risks of the procedure. The court held;
1-Before the administration of any treatment that involves 
substantial risk of injury, where no emergency occurs, the physician
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has a legal duty to inform his or her patient of such risks. In 
expressing the duty of disclosure and its connection to the patient’s 
right to self-determination, the court used the same strong language 
familiar to the early battery cases including Schloendorff;
"Anglo-American law starts with the premise of 
thorough-going self-determination. It follows that 
each man is considered to be the master of his own 
body, and he may if he is of sound mind, expressly 
prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or 
other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe 
that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or 
necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute 
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form or 
artifice or deception."[79].
Like precedent courts,e.g Salgo[80] and Mohr[81], Natanson 
emphasized information disclosure as a fundamental element for 
rational decision-making, stating that it was the doctor's duty to 
inform the patient about all facts necessary for an intelligent 
decision as to whether to consent to the proposed therapy- The court 
also followed precedent cases in the use of the principle of self- 
determination as a justification for requiring the patient's informed 
consent.
2-Contrary to previous informed consent cases, Natanson applied 
negligence analysis as the basis for liability arising from the 
failure to disclose information. In this respect the court stated 
that when the physician violates his or her duty of information 
disclosure, he or she is liable in negligence even if he or she 
performs his or her professional duty with due skill and care.
The court found that the physician made no disclosure of facts, 
therefore "he failed in his legal duty to make a reasonable disclosure 
to the appellant who is his patient as a matter of law" [82].
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Moreover, the court said that even if the physician informed his 
patient about some facts in relation to the treatment that had been 
performed, other issues would have arisen, in particular whether the 
disclosed information had been sufficient for the patient to make an 
intelligent decision. The court said:
"The expert testimony of a medical witness is required 
to establish whether such disclosures are in 
accordance with those which a reasonable medical 
practitioner would make under the same or similar 
circumstances."[83]
Natanson, therefore, considered the question of what risks ought 
to be disclosed to be a matter of medical judgment. In determining 
whether the physician fulfilled his or her duty to make a reasonable 
disclosure of inherent risks, the court adopted the "reasonable" or 
"prudent" doctor test,i.e did the defendant doctor disclose to his 
patient what a reasonable doctor would have disclosed in similar 
circumstances. Accordingly, depending on the circumstances, a 
physician's failure to disclose certain facts may be justified, if 
expert testimony evidences that the physician's silence is in 
accordance with reasonable medical practice. But in the case before 
the court, there had been no disclosure at all as the patient's 
physicians recognized. So the patient was not required to prove by 
expert testimony that the doctor had been negligent. Instead, the 
burden of proof was shifted to the doctor to give evidence that his 
failure to disclose had been reasonable in the circumstances. The 
court continued; "[to] hold otherwise would be a failure of the court 
to perform its solemn duty."[84]
The application of the law of negligence in informed consent cases 
introduced some new elements. In negligence theory the patient's
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consent does not exonerate the physician from liability even if he or 
she performs his or her legal duty as skilfully as any of his or her 
peers will. The treatment can be administered perfectly, but if a 
risk inherent in the therapy that was not warned of materializes the 
physician may be liable.
The application of negligence theory also requires that a link be 
made between the doctor’s failure to inform about inherent risks and 
the patient's decision to undergo the treatment. This is known as the 
requirement of causation. Some writers refer to it as the "causation- 
decision". [85] In order to succeed in a claim in negligence the 
patient has to prove that he or she would not have consented to the 
treatment, and thereby suffered injury, had he or she been warned of 
the risks. In Natanson, the court held that when the patient 
appreciates the danger involved in the proposed therapy, the failure 
of the physician in his or her duty to make a reasonable disclosure to 
the patient "would have no causal relation to the injury"[86]. The 
subjective test applied in Natanson, however, may subject the 
physician to the danger of the patient's bitterness and 
disillusionment for it would be surprising, as the court said in Cobbs 
v. Grantr871, if the unsatisfied patient did not claim that had he or 
she been informed of the risks of the procedure he or she would not 
have submitted to the treatment.
It is worth noting that the application of negligence theory, with 
its fundamental requirement of establishing the link between the 
injury suffered and the physicain's failure to disclose information 
about the inherent risks, may limit the patient's recovery of damages 
when the court is doubtful about whether the patient would not have 
consented to the treatment if he or she had been informed about the 
risks. Hence, in negligence, if the fulfillment of the duty (in this
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case the duty to disclose information about risks) would not have 
prevented the injury, then the breach did not cause the injury.
In battery theory, however, there is no requirement of 
establishing such a link, for in battery the injury is the 
unauthorized touching by the physician without invitation, which gives 
the patient the right to recover damages regardless of the harm that 
may result from the physician's intervention.[88]
Following Natanson, both battery and negligence theories appeared 
to require the same elements of information disclosure that are 
necessary for an informed consent; the nature of the procedure, 
benefits, possible risks, and alternatives. The apparent difference 
between the two theories, however, concerns the adopted standards of 
disclosure. While Natanson preferred the"reasonable" or "prudent" 
practitioner as a standard to determine the scope of information 
disclosure, battery cases opted for the "lay" or "prudent patient" 
standard.
The result that emerged from Natanson was that by the early 
1970s, informed consent knew two different lines of cases. The 
battery cases that followed the early twentieth-century cases 
including Salgo[89] and negligence cases that relied upon Natanson 
and invoked the principle of self-determination from the early cases 
as a justification for requiring informed consent under the negligence 
theory of liability. By adopting the professional practice standard, 
Natanson tempered the courts' dilemma of determining the scope of 
information disclosure. Courts had already been familiar with the 
professional standard in ordinary negligence cases, thus they found 
its application to information disclosure appropriate. This very fact 
encouraged other courts, after Natanson and McCoid's[90] analysis of 
the issue, to choose negligence analysis, with the adoption of the
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professional standard, as the basis of liability in informed consent.
Earlier, it was mentioned that both battery and negligence 
informed consent cases applied the principle of "discretion" 
(expressly in Salgo and implicitly in Natanson by the adoption of 
the professional standard). The application of this principle in
information disclosure led to some controversy. It had become 
difficult to reconcile the idea of adopting such a principle with that 
of the patient's right to autonomy.
5 : 5  CANTERBURY: AN ATTEMPT TO REFINE THE 
DOCTRINE:
The next important development in the doctrine of informed consent 
occurred in 1972, when three negligence cases, namely; Canterbury v. 
£p£ii££[91], Cobbs v. Grant \921 and W ilkinson v. .Ver.sey [93], introduced
some of the battery cases' features into negligence theory; most 
importantly, the application of the patient-centered or oriented
standard of disclosure. These new cases, with the shift to the 
reasonable person standard, were seen by most commentators as having 
the potential to offer a defined doctrine of informed consent that
provided full protection for the patient's right to self- 
determination, but this dream did not materialise as the majority of 
juridictions continued to apply the professional practice disclosure 
standard.
A-THE CANTERBURY CASE.
Canterbury v. Spence: [94] . The plaintiff in Canterbury underwent 
a laminectomy for severe back pain. Following the operation he 
suffered paralysis. A second attempt was made to relieve the 
paralysis but was unsuccessful. The patient brought an action against
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his physician based on the claim that the latter did not warn him of 
the 1% risk of paralysis that materialized. The appellate court held 
that the risk of possible paralysis should have been warned of before 
the patient submitted to the laminectomy.
Once again, Canterbury emphasized the principle of self- 
determination as a justification for requiring the patient's informed 
consent. Judge Robinson quoted the historical statement of
Schloendorff[95];
"The root premise is the concept...that every human
being of adult year and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body" [96]
As regards the importance of information disclosure and its 
sufficiency, the court said:
"The patient's right of self-decision shapes the
boundaries of the duty to reveal. That right can be 
effectively exercised, only if the patient possesses 
enough information to enable an intelligent
choice"[97].
Moreover, the focus on the principle of self-determination was 
more carefully expounded in Canterbury•Judge Robinson's opinion in 
the issue included a justification for the legal requirement of 
information disclosure:
"True consent to what happens to one's self is the 
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an 
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options 
available and the risks attendant upon each. The 
average patient has little or no understanding of the 
medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to 
whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach 
an intelligent decision. From these almost axiomatic 
considerations springs the need and in turn the
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requirement of a reasonable divulgence by physician
to patient to make such a decision possible"[98].
If one starts from the premise that the decision that determines
what should be done to his or her own body is the patient's
prerogative, it necessarily follows that he or she must reach this 
decision after a careful consideration of the nature of the proposed 
therapy, its risks and possible alternative treatments. Thus, the 
physician is under a legal duty to make a reasonable divulgence about 
all these facts, a duty which stems from the fiduciary character of 
the doctor/patient relationship. The court imposed this duty on the 
physician as part of his or her general duty of care. The court stated 
that, traditionally, the physician's duty of care invoked information
disclosure for proper medical practice. For example, it is common 
practice that a physician warns the patient about any drug's side 
effects so that the latter takes precautions when using them. In such 
an example the duty of information disclosure has a beneficient 
nature, and when fulfilled, it could be equal, in terms of importance, 
to a proper diagnosis or proper administration of treatment which are 
necessary as parts of the general duty of care that the physician 
owes to his or her patient. Therefore, "due-care normally demands 
that the physician warns the patient of any risks to his well-being 
which contemplated therapy may involve"[99].
The apparent conclusion that one may draw is that the court in 
Canterbury called on the principle of self-determination as a primary 
justification, and the doctor's due-care duty to disclose, for the 
protection of the patient's right to decide f-or himself or herself.
In considering the issue of what standard to adopt in determining 
the scope of information disclosure, Canterbury made an historically 
most significant decision. The court rejected the professional
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practi ce standard, holding that;
"Respect for the patient's right of self-determination 
on a particular therapy demands a standard set by law 
for patients rather than one which physicians may or . 
may not impose upon themselves."[100]
According to the decision, the scope of information disclosure is 
to be evaluated in terms of criteria established by courts rather 
than by reference to common practice among other physicians in the 
professional community. The court reaffirmed the view that the 
physician is legally required to disclose all material risks inherent 
in the proposed treatment. In determining which risks are material 
and therefore ought to be disclosed, Canterbury adopted the "prudent 
patient" test;
"A.risk is thus material when a reasonable person in 
what the physician knows or should know to be the 
patient's position, would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in 
determining whether or not to forgo the proposed 
treatment"[101]
It is worth noting in this respect the objective nature of the 
test adopted. Canterbury did not ask whether the patient himself or 
herself would have considered the risk, but rather whether a 
reasonable person in his or her position would have done so. In 
adopting this test the court reasoned that the professional practice 
standard of disclosure has the potential of being used as a 'fagade' 
for non disclosure, and that determination of the materiality of risks 
does not require any special knowledge of medical science.
The court, however, enunciated certain exceptions to the well- 
established duty of disclosure. One of these, probably the most 
important,is the principle of "therapeutic privilege". The principle
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entitles the physician to use some discretion in disclosing 
information concerning the risks of proposed treatment "when risk- 
disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient as to 
become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of 
view."[102] To reach this decision the court reasoned that,
"patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally 
distraught on disclosure as to foreclose a rational 
decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or 
even pose psychological damage to the patient"[103]
But the court made it clear that the "privilege does not accept 
the paternalistic notion that the physician remains silent simply 
because divilgence may prompt the patient to forgo therapy the 
physician feels the patient really needs."[104]
Katz[105] observed that, by establishing the principle of 
therapeutic privilege in information disclosure, the court in 
Canterbury contradicted its attempt to eliminate the professional 
practice standard of disclosure in informed consent litigation, for 
the application of this principle as a justification for not warning 
of certain risks is determined by reference to the professional 
practice disclosure standard.
Like Natanson [ 106] , the court in Canterbury reiterated that 
negligence theory requires that a link be established between the 
doctor's failure to inform about inherent risks and the injury 
suffered by the patient. The patient must prove that if the physician 
had fulfilled his or her duty to disclose these facts, he or she would 
have decided against the treatment, thereby avoiding the injury 
suffered. The court, however, rejected the subjective test in 
examining the credibility of the patient as to the possible decision 
he or she would have made if informed about all the facts. The court
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said;
"Better it is, we believe, to resolve the causality 
issue on an objective basis: in terms of what a
prudent person in the patient's position would have 
decided if suitably i n f o r m e d . [107]
The court believed that the adoption of a subjective test in 
determining the causation requirement would favour the patient, if 
that particular patient claims that he or she would not have consented
to the proposed treatment had he or she been adequately informed. The
court insisted that if the examination of the patient's credibility 
were carried out according to the subjective test, it would be 
guesswork, and would subject the physician to the danger of the
patient's bitterness. Therefore the court enunciated the objective 
reasonable person as the only acceptable standard for the
establishment of the causation requirement. Accordingly, the patient 
has to prove that any reasonable person in his or her position would 
have decided against the treatment if adequately informed. If the
patient fails to prove otherwise, he or she will be denied any
recovery. In this respect, Katz observed that the court did not
resolve the problem of causation as it believed, for the use of such 
a standard undermined the patient's right to self-determination. He 
argued;
"The objective standard of causality contradicts the 
right of each individual to decide what will be done 
with his body by denying the patient's recovery
whenever his hypothetical decision is out of step with 
the judgment of a prudent person. The belief that 
there is one reasonable or prudent response to every 
situation inviting medical intervention is 
nonsense....Since different doctors approach similar 
cases in diametrically opposed ways, equally varying
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responses by patients ought to be considered . 
reasonable." [108] .
Canterbury reaffirmed that the principle of self-determination is 
the main justification and goal of informed consent and that the 
patient's needs for information rather than professionals' practices 
must determine the appropriate disclosure standard. The court opted 
for an objective interpretation of these needs using the reasonable 
person standard. In so doing, however, the court intended to limit 
patients' informational claims as well as to protect physicians from 
liability in the practical application of the doctrine to the 
courtroom setting. According to the standard adopted, only the 
reasonable person's needs will be considered and legally protected. 
Therefore if a particular patient's needs differ from those of the 
reasonable person, his or her right to self-determination will be at 
stake. Canterbury's choice of the reasonable person disclosure 
standard, though designed to protect the patient's choice, created 
controversy and ambiguity. Katz says that this ambiguity manifests 
"judges' ambivalence towards both patients' self-determination and 
medical paternalism"[109] . But it seems that in their attempt to 
resolve this ambivalence courts are much more in favour of the medical 
profession.[110]
The other two cases; Cobbs v. Grant fill). Wilkinson v. 
Versey [112], were decided in the same year (1972) and appeared in the 
same language adopted in Canterbury. In Cobbs, suffering from an 
ulcer, the plaintiff consulted Dr Grant who recommended surgery but 
did not mention the inherent risks of the proposed intervention. An 
undisclosed risk materialized, causing Cobbs extensive and 
debilitating injuries. In imposing a duty of information disclosure 
upon the physician, the court, once again, described the patient as
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having an abject dependence on the physician for medical information, 
and pointed to the necessity of trusting his or her physician to be 
truthful and completely candid. Because of this dependence which 
characterized the doctor/patient relationship, the physician has an 
affirmative duty to disclose "all significant perils"[113]. The court 
defined these "perils" as "the risk of death or bodily harm, and 
problems of recuperation" [114] . In Wilkinson the court held 
that"[the] physician is bound to disclose all the known material risks 
peculiar to the proposed procedure."[115] Wilkinson defined "material" 
as "the significance a reasonable person, in what the physician knows 
or should know is his patient's position, would attach to the 
disclosed risk or risks in deciding whether to submit or not to submit 
to surgery or treatment."[116]
Like Canterbury [117] and Cobbs [118], the court. in Wilkinson 
based the physician's duty to disclose on the patient's need to know, 
rather than on standard medical practice. The court stated;
"The patient's right to make up his mind should not be 
delegated to a local medical group- many of whom have 
no idea as to his informational needs. The 
doctor/patient relationship is a one-on-one affair, 
what is reasonable disclosure in one instance may not 
be reasonable in another"[119]
This trilogy of decisions followed the contemporary trend that 
started in the early twentieth century cases and became firmly 
established after Salgo[120]. During this period courts emphasized 
the patient's right to self-determination as the sole goal of informed 
consent. Courts reasoned that, in order for a patient to exercise his 
or her right in self-decision the physician is legally required to 
provide the patient with a set of information so as to give him or her 
the opportunity of making a rational and intelligent decision as to
-  1 1 1 ~
whether to submit to the proposed therapy. This information comprises; 
diagnosis, prognosis with or without treatment, proposed treatment 
with the risks inherent therein, and alternative treatments and their 
risks.
Following Salgo, however, courts encountered the problem of 
finding a suitable and appropriate standard of information disclosure. 
Their experience in the field evidenced that neither of the standards 
adopted(whether the professional practice standard adopted in battery 
cases and in Natanson [121], or the reasonable person standard adopted 
in negligence cases since Canterbury[122]) could protect both 
physicians and patients. In fact most critics focussed on this 
problem.[123].
B-PQST-CANTERBURY: THE TRUMAN CASE
With the exception of the case of Truman v. Thomas [1241, no 
significant development took place during the decade that followed 
Canterbury. The Truman case was decided in the same court that had 
decided the case of Cobbs [125] 1972. In Truman the children of a 
woman who died from cervical cancer, sued their mother's physician for 
not having warned her of the risk of not undertaking a procedure 
called the Pap smear test, a procedure that she had repeatedly refused 
in her life.
Supported by the minority of the court the physician argued that 
his duty of information disclosure applies only to those treatments to 
which patients consent, and not to those they refuse. But the court, 
relying on Cobbs which, held that the patient must also be informed 
of "the risks of a decision not to undergo the treatment" [126], held 
the physician liable for his failure to warn of the risk of no 
treatment. The court stated that the duty to warn of the risk of no
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treatment[127] resembles the already established duty to disclose 
alternative treatments to the proposed therapy. The court reasoned 
that in many instances, no treatment is an alternative to the proposed 
treatment, therefore the risks of living on without being treated also 
fall within the scope of the physician's duty of information 
disclosure in relation to any proffered procedure. To this extent 
Truman had not said anything new. What was new, however, was the 
application of the duty of information disclosure in the case, despite 
the patient's refusal of the treatment, and without any bodily 
intrusion or invasion. The court stated that the kind of decision 
that the patient makes does not undermine the importance of his or her
right to decide what shall be done with his or her. own body, arguing
that no other result is consistent with^the fiduciary character of the 
physician's duty to inform properly.
This point is legally important for it is incompatible with the
theory of battery as a basis of liability, as traditionally 
understood. The physician can not be held liable for battery without
an unauthorized bodily intrusion or touching. The object of 
information disclosure in battery theory, is the authorization of
interventions that would otherwise be instances of battery. Although 
the early battery cases recognized the patient's right to decide what 
what was to be done to his or her own body, these cases emphasized 
the element of consent to physical intrusions.
Contrary to the battery cases, the court in Truman did not 
envisage such physical intrusion when it held that the patient's 
refusal must be informed. Moreover, because battery theory is 
associated with physical integrity, it can not acknowledge the
importance and value of the patient's decision about medical
treatment. In negligence theory, however, as Truman demonstrated,
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the patient's right to decide can be acknowledged even if he or she 
decides against some invasion or intrusion. By this move, the Truman 
court intended to reinforce the self-determination justification of 
informed consent which is not compromised by this limitation of legal 
theory.[128].
5 : 6 PRESENT POSITION :
Following the landmark decision of Canterbury[129], the position 
of informed consent was one of contrast between the minority of states 
which have chosen to follow the lead given by Canterbury, by adopting 
the prudent person standard of disclosure, and the majority of states 
which continued to adopt the professional standard [130] . However, 
since 1975, there has been a growing tendency for individual states to 
enact legislation in the informed consent arena.
A-STATE LAWS IN INFORMED CONSENT:
The courts' role in introducing doctrinal advances like that seen 
in Truman [131], has been sharply limited by the involvement of state 
legislatures in informed consent law.[132] The statutory language in 
states with legislation on the subject either defined or limited the 
application of the doctrine of informed consent. Before 1975, only a 
minority of states had any laws dealing specifically with this 
subject. However, in 1975 and 1976, coincident with the Canterbury 
decision but resulting from the malpractice insurance crisis[133], a 
considerable number of states enacted statutes in order to limit or 
restrict the application of the doctrine of informed consent. The aim 
of these statutes was to make it more difficult for patients to 
succeed in their actions against physicians for failure to seek
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informed consent. For example, some of these enactments went as far 
as to create as presumption, rebuttable only on proof of fraud, that 
the patient's signature is conclusive evidence that an informed 
consent had been given.[134] In this respect Idaho's statute 
provides;
"Such written consent, in the absence of convincing 
proof that it was secured maliciously or by fraud, is 
presumed to be valid....and the advice and disclosures 
of the attending physician or dentist, as well as the 
level of informed awareness of the given of such 
consent, shall be presumed sufficient"[135]
In Iowa;
"A consent in writing to any medical or surgical 
procedure or course of procedures in patient care 
which meets the requirements of this section shall 
create a presumption that informed consent was 
given"[136] .
By 1977 twenty five states had enacted informed consent 
legislation. The replacement of the common law path to informed 
consent by statute in thirty states "reflects both the doctrine's 
high social visibility and the political influence of physicians on 
state legislatures"[137].
It should be noted that these statutes generally adopted the 
models supplied by the traditional negligence theory of liability, 
namely; the professional practice disclosure standard and the 
objective causation standard. In their study of informed consent 
legislation Meisel and Kabnick[138], concluded that the number of 
jurisdictions adhering to the various possible formulations of 
informed consent theory did not change following the statutory reform, 
and that therefore the doctrine has remained the way it was under
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common law.
3 : 7 CONCLUSIONS:
The main point to note from this analysis of the history of the 
doctrine of informed consent is that self-determination has been the 
principle most called upon to justify the physician's obligation to 
seek the patient's informed consent. Although Schloendorff[139] was 
the first decision to have expressly invoked self-determination, if 
one considers carefully the language of the cases that preceded this 
landmark case, in particular the Mohr case[140], it can be seen that 
courts did not expressly use the term self-determination, but they 
did use terms which have the same function[141] .
On the other hand, the language rarely appears in case law, but 
specific forms of justification can be determined from the precedents 
cited, and from the applied theory of liability. Battery theory for 
example, has a natural justification in respect for self- 
determination interpreted as the right of the patient not to be 
touched unless he or she authorizes such intrusion. But negligence 
theory in informed consent cases may have more than one
justification, for the law of medical malpractice is based on the
principle of beneficence. The law of malpractice imposes upon 
physicians a duty to do what will promote patient well-being through 
the exercise of reasonable skill and care. But as has been said,
"although negligence treatment cases are firmly linked 
to beneficence-based concerns, 'informed consent'
negligence cases have had strong ties to the principle 
of respect for autonomy."[142]
However, because of other concerns that courts had to confront,
sometimes self-determination had been tempered or even ignored. Very
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often these concerns or interests were beneficence-based 
considerations of patient welfare. Therapeutic objects, for example, 
courts believed had to prevail over the patient's right to decide what 
should be done with his or her own body. But courts have been severely 
criticised for this tendency to protect the patient's welfare rather 
than his or her right to self-decide.
In other instances, the law had been turned away from its basic 
role of protecting the patient's right to self-decide because of the 
mechanics and pragmatic constraints that the legal process contains, 
e.g., the causation requirement in negligence, and the proof of 
unauthorized touching in battery. In order to recover damages, the 
patient has to provide a proof of abuse only after the fact, and that 
proof has to satisfy the the courtroom's procedural rules.
In any event, even if the doctrine of informed consent did not 
succeed in fully protecting the patient's right to self-determination, 
at least it has succeeded in bringing the issue to public attention.
On the basis of this analysis, one will turn now to look at the 
issue of consent under the British legal system. It is submitted that 
British courts did not adopt the doctrine of informed consent the way 
it emerged in the U.S, but the doctrine has certainly influenced 
British courts in one way or another.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONSENT DOCTRINE 
IN THE U.K.
It is against the historical analysis of the transatlantic 
doctrine of informed consent outlined in chapter three that one will 
turn now to consider the issue under British law. It should be 
reiterated at this stage that informed consent is not part of British 
law. This view has been confirmed in Sidaway v. Bethlem Hospital 
Governor & Ors.fll
Nevertheless, it should be noted that British courts did not 
ignore the issue of consent and its fundamental elememt of information 
disclosure. It is submitted that the first English case that imposed a 
legal duty upon the physician to provide his or her patient with the 
needed information and particularly that relating to the risks 
inherent in the proposed treatment, was Chatterton v. Gersonf21. 
Before considering this landmark case, it would be convenient to 
examine the status of consent before this decision.
4 : 1 NOTION OF 'REAL' CONSENT:
The law is well settled under the British legal systems that, 
before a physician may approach or treat a patient, he or she must 
seek the consent of the patient if he or she has the mental capacity 
of giving it. If not, the consent of his or her guardian will be 
sufficient, unless the doctor intervenes in an emergency situation 
which requires immediate attention for the preservation of the 
patient's life or health.[3] The touching of another person's body 
without his or her consent constitutes a tort/delict.[4]
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It is also the rule that for consent to be valid, it must be 
'real' in the sense that the patient must be aware of what he or she 
is exposing his or her bodily integrity to. In order to have this 
aspect, the patient's consent must be based on certain information 
that the physician must disclose in relation to 'the general nature 
and purpose of the proposed procedure'.[5] The application of this can 
be seen in the dictum of Bristow J in Chatterton v. Gersonf61, where 
he said;
"In my judgment once the patient is informed in broad 
terms of the nature of the procedure which is 
intended, and gives her consent, that consent is 
real..."[7] (emphasis added)
The phrase 'the general nature and purpose of the proposed 
treatment' is ambiguous, however. It does not determine, for example, 
as Robertson[8] remarked, whether or not information relating to the 
risks inherent in the proposed treatment is also part of 'the general 
nature and purpose of the proposed treatment.' In other words it does 
not show whether the doctor is also legally required to disclose 
information relating to the risks associated with the administration 
of the treatment. Two cases decided chronologically before 
Chatterton, however, seem to give no support for the proposition that 
a legal duty is incumbent on the doctor to inform his or her patient 
of the risks inherent in the proposed treatment. These were Hatcher 
■V.. Black[9] and Bolam v. Friern H.M.CflOI.
Hatcher v. Blackfill
In this case, the plaintiff Mrs Hatcher, who occasionally 
broadcast for the B.B.C, consulted her doctor seeking treatment for a 
toxic thyroid gland. An operation was advised. The patient asked her
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doctor if there was any risk to her voice. The latter reassured her 
that there was not.
After the operation, the patient's left vocal chord was paralyzed 
and she could not speak properly any more. In a claim for damages, 
the patient alleged that her physician was negligent in not warning 
her of the risk of damage to her voice.
During the trial, Denning L.J (as he then was) instructed the jury 
that the doctor should not be held liable for negligence just because 
he had admitted telling the patient that the intervention involved no 
risks, when he knew that there was a slight risk. The only situation 
in which the doctor might be held liable is when the jury are 
satisfied that he or she had fallen bellow the standard of a 
reasonably skilful doctor[12], i.e., where it could be evidenced that 
a reasonable doctor would have warned his or her patient of such a 
risk under the same circumstances. Denning also instructed the jury 
that the decision as to whether to disclose information relating to 
the risks inherent in the proposed treatment was a matter for the 
doctor's own medical judgment.
It should be noted therefore that according to the decision in 
Hatcher, the doctor is legally required only to act in accordance 
with routine and accepted practice. And the question of whether he or 
she is also required to disclose information relating to the risks 
inherent in the proposed therapy is one "not of law, but one of 
reasonable medical judgment"[13]
In another case the court relied upon the notion of clinical 
judgment in assessing whether or not disclosure has been sufficient. 
That was in the Bolam case.
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Bolam v. Friern H.M.CT141
Suffering from mental illness, the patient in this case was 
subjected to an electro-convulsive treatment without being warned of 
the risk of fracture involved in the procedure, and without the use of 
relaxant drugs. There was evidence, however, that the risk of fracture 
was very small.
Expert testimony evidenced that were two accepted methods of 
administering the treatment in question; Some physicians preferred 
the use of relaxant drugs, whereas others were of the opinion that the 
use of such drugs was attended by risks and confined the use of these 
drugs to cases where there were particular reasons for their use. The 
plaintiff was not such a case. After the administration of the 
treatment, the patient sustained fractures and subsequently sued his 
physician for negligence in the administration of the treatment and in 
failing to warn him of the risk involved before the treatment was 
give.
As in Hatcher, the court in this case expressed the view that the 
doctor was entitled to proceed without explanation of the risks in the 
light of the patient's condition. In instructing the jury, the judge 
said;
"...you may well think that when a doctor is dealing 
with a mentally sick man and has a strong belief that 
his only hope of cure is submission to electro- 
convulsive therapy, the doctor can not be criticized 
if he does not stress the dangers, which he believed 
to be minimal, which are involved in their 
treatment..."[15]
It was also stated that, being entitled to administer the 
treatment according to the school of thought which preferred not to 
use a relaxant drug, the physician was not negligent in not warning
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his patient of the small risk of fracture. On the other hand there 
was evidence that the patient was severely depressive and might not 
have been in a position to understand whatever explanation the doctor 
had made.
In sum, the court reaffirmed that the question of whether a 
physician is required to inform his or her patient of the risks 
inherent in the proposed treatment was a matter of medical judgment.
The same approach has been adopted in the influential New Zealand 
case of Smith v. Auckland Hospital Board. [16] The patient in this case 
alleged that he has not been informed properly before undergoing an 
aortagram, in particular of the risks involved in the procedure. In a 
dictum which has since been widely referred to in the British courts, 
the court mentioned certain factors that should be taken into 
consideration when informing the patient,
"...., the paramount consideration is the welfare of 
the patient and, given good faith on the part of the 
doctor, I think the exercise of his discretion in the 
area of advice must depend upon the patient’s overall 
needs. To be taken into account should be the gravity 
of the condition to be treated, the importance of the 
benefits to be expected to flow from the treatment or 
procedure, the need to encourage him to accept it, the 
relevant significance of its inherent risks, the 
intellectual and emotional capacity of the patient to 
accept the information without such distortion as to 
prevent any rational decision at all, and the extent 
to which the patient may seem to have placed himself 
in his doctor’s hands with the invitation that the 
latter accept on his behalf the responsibility for 
intricate or technical decision"[17]
The approach adopted in Chadwick v. Parsonsr181. however, has been 
considered as the first sign that English courts might impose a 
general duty similar to that of the transatlantic 'doctrine of
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informed consent.'[19] In this case the plaintiff successfully sued 
her physician following the severe injuries she suffered as a result 
of undergoing an experimental intervention in an attempt to cure her 
deafness. Her action was based on the allegation that the doctor was 
negligent in not informing her of the risk of injury inherent in the 
intervention. But, because the physician admitted liability, the court 
did not have the opportunity of considering the physician's duty 
relating to the disclosure of information.
In other cases, courts followed the approach adopted in
Hatcher[20] and Bolam[21], i.e., that the doctor is legally required 
to act in accordance with standard medical practice, and that 
information relating to the risks inherent in the proposed treatment 
is given according to what the reasonable medical practitioner would 
disclose. In O'Malley-william v. Board of Governors of of the National 
Hospital for Nervous Diseases[221 the patient suffered permanent
partial paralysis of the right hand following an aortagram, an
exploratory intervention carried out by inserting a needle into the 
patient's arteries. His action was also based on the allegation that 
the physician failed to warn him of the potential risk of the
procedure, in this case paralysis. The court was satisfied by expert 
testimony that the risk of the paralysis that materialized was a 
remote one, and stated that failure to warn of a remote risk did not 
constitute negligence.[23] The court, however, did not discuss whether 
failure to warn of a real risk constituted negligence.
The main aspect that characterized courts' decisions in the cases
mentioned above is that there was no express or positive statement
that shows whether the physician is legally required to disclose
information relating to the risks inherent in the proposed treatment.
By so doing, courts neglected an important issue that needed adequate
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examination.
4 : 2 CHATTERTON: NEGLIGENCE AND THE LEGAL DUTY
TO WARN OF RISKS:
The silence that characterized courts' decisions concerning the 
issue of whether there was a positive duty on doctors to keep their 
patients informed of all aspects of their treatment, even if they do 
not raise this question themselves, was broken in the decision of the 
High Court in Chatterton v. Gerson.f241 In this case, the court 
imposed a legal duty upon the physician to inform his or her patient
of the risks inherent in the proposed treatment, a duty similar to
that of the transatlantic doctrine of 'informed consent'.
THE CHATTERTON CASE:
The patient in Chatterton suffered pain from a post-operative scar 
in her groin. She was referred to the defendant who was a specialist 
in the treatment of chronic intractable pain. In an attempt to relieve 
the. pain, the defendant performed two operations on her. But neither 
of the two interventions succeeded in relieving the pain. In addition 
the plaintiff found that her right leg was completely numb, which
considerably impaired her mobility.
She based her claim for damages, for negligence and trespass, on 
the allegation that the defendant had failed to warn her of the
inherent risk of loss of sensation. In dismissing the claim in 
negligence the court held;
"....there is no obligation on the doctor to canvass 
with the patient anything other than the inherent 
implications of the particular operation he intends to 
carry out. He is certainly under no obligation to say
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that if he operates incompetently he will do damage.
The fundamental assumption is that he knows his job 
and will do it properly. But he ought to warn of what
may happen by misfortune however well the operation is
done, if there is a real risk of a misfortune 
inherent in the procedure..."[251 (emphasis added)
It can be seen from the dictum above that the court imposed a
legal duty upon the physician to inform his or her patient about the
risks associated with the administration of the proposed treatment. 
The physician is required to disclose only 'real risks', however. It 
has been pointed out that by using the term 'real risks' and adopting 
the standard negligence formula, the court implicitly suggested that 
the doctor's duty to disclose the 'real risks' of the proposed 
procedure stems from his or her general duty to exercise due care in 
the treatment of the patient [26]. The court made it clear in 
Chatterton that failure to provide adequate disclosure of the risks 
inherent in the proposed treatment is to be considered as a breach of 
the physician's duty to his or her patient, and must therefore be 
treated under negligence theory. In this respect the court said;
"...it would be very much against the interests of 
justice if actions which are really based on failure 
by the doctor to perform his duty adequately to inform 
were pleaded in trespass" [27]
The shift to the negligence rather than the assault action has 
been said to be appropriate, but as Robertson pointed out;
"To regard the obligation to disclose 'real risks' as 
part of the doctor's overall duty of care places too 
much emphasis on the doctor's duty to to disclose and 
insufficient emphasis on the patient's right to 
receive"[28]
In addition, the plaintiff, in a claim for negligence based on the
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doctor's, failure to warn of inherent risks, must establish causation. 
The principle suggests that the plaintiff must prove that his or her 
consent would not have been granted, had the required information been 
communicated.
4 : 3 S ID A W A Y : STANDARD OF INFORMATION  
DISCLOSURE:
The main issue after Chatterton [29] was concerned with the 
establishment of the appropriate standard to determine whether or not 
the particular risk is a real one, and must therefore be warned of. As 
mentioned earlier, the trend now is that actions based on lack of 
consent to medical treatment should be taken in negligence. British 
courts have generally opted for the professional medical standard that 
was enunciated in Bolam.[30] It was not clear, however, whether the 
Bolam principle applied equally to diagnosis and treatment and to the 
giving of information. That it did so was confirmed in Chatterton 
where it was held;
"The duty of the doctor is to explain what he intends 
to do, and its implication, in the way a careful 
responsible doctor, in similar circumstances would have 
done." [31]
In Hills v. Potter[321.Hirst J rejected any form of the doctrine 
of informed consent as having no place in English law and adopted the 
medical test. The same approach has been taken by Tudor Evans J in 
Sankev v. Kensington and Chelsea Area Health Authorityf331. However, 
the most important decision on this issue came from the House of Lords 
in the Sidaway case in which the court had the opportunity to discuss 
the question of consent and the tests that must be applied.
Before going any further, it should be noted that the House of
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Lords' decision in Sidaway, it is said[34], now represents the law 
of the United Kingdom on the issue, although one scholar[35] maintains 
that the case in question does not mark "the end of .the controversy 
over how much the doctor must tell, "[36] and that all that the 
majority in the House of Lords achieved was the confirmation that the 
'informed consent' test, i.e., what the patient should be told, should 
be judged by what the reasonable patient would want to know, was not 
part of British law. There are, however, subsequent cases which 
confirm the former rather than the latter view.[37]
Sidaway v. Bethlem Hospital Governors and Others[381:
The facts were that the plaintiff, who suffered from persistent 
pain in her neck and' shoulders, was advised by a surgeon employed by 
the defendant hospital governors to operate on her spinal column to 
relieve the pain. The surgeon warned the patient of the possibility 
of disturbing a nerve root and the possible consequences of doing so, 
but did not mention to her the possibility of damage to the spinal 
cord. There was evidence that the risk of damage to the spinal cord 
was a small one (less than 1%) . If the risk materialized, however, the 
resulting injury could be severe. The patient consented to the 
intervention in the course of which she suffered injury to her spinal 
cord resulting in her being disabled.
The patient sued both the surgeon and the Maudsley Hospital for 
negligence. She did not question the surgeon's skill or capacity to 
operate. Rather she maintained that the surgeon had never mentioned to 
her the risk of injury to the spinal cord. But as the surgeon died 
before the action came to trial, the courts had been deprived of the 
vital evidence as to exactly what information the surgeon disclosed to
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Mrs Sidaway, and what reasons, if any, he had for withholding the rest 
of information from her.
In dismissing her claim in negligence, the High Court proceeded 
from the inference that the surgeon would have followed his customary 
practice, that is, he would have informed his patient in general terms 
of the possibility of injury to a nerve root but would not have
mentioned the risk of damage to the spinal cord.
Mrs Sidaway also claimed damages in battery on the basis that the 
surgeon's failure to warn her of the risk of injury to the spinal cord 
invalidated her consent. In dismissing her claim in battery, the High 
Court followed the approach discussed earlier, namely that failure to 
give full information would not render a procedure a battery providing 
the patient understands the general nature of the procedure.
On appeal, - the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High
Court, holding that the doctrine of informed consent based on full
disclosure of all the facts to the patient was not the appropriate 
test under English law. Mrs Sidaway appealed to the House of Lords.
Once again the House of Lords endorsed the traditional test
enunciated in the case of Bolam[39], i.e., the doctor's duty to
advise and warn his or her patient was part and parcel of his or her 
general duty of care in the treatment of the patient. And the doctor 
would have fulfilled his or her duty of information disclosure, when 
he or she conformed to a responsible body of medical opinion in 
deciding what to disclose and what not to disclose to the patient. 
Lord Diplock said that the Bolam test should be applied in the 
context of disclosure as well as in that of treatment and diagnosis;
"To decide what risks the existance of which a 
patient should be voluntarily warned [about] and the 
terms in which such warning, if any, be given, having 
regard to the effect the warning may have is as much
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an exercise of professional skill and judgment as any 
other part of the doctor's comprehensive duty of care 
to the individual patient, and expert medical evidence 
on this matter should be tested in just the same 
way."[40]
In Sidaway, there was evidence that while some neuro-surgeons 
might warn some patients of the risk to the spinal cord, many
preferred not to. The plaintiff lost her case.
It is noteworthy that while maintaining the professional standard 
of information disclosure, the House of Lords brought some
modification to the existing law in certain aspects. In this respect, 
Lord Bridge said;
"A judge might, in certain circumstances come to the 
conclusion that the disclosure of a particular risk 
was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on 
the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent 
medical man would fail to make it." [41]
This view suggests that the courts retain ultimate control of the 
definition of the physician's duty to inform. That is, even when the 
overwhelming body of medical opinion accepted non disclosure of a
particular risk, Lords Bridge and Templeman asserted the judicial
right to intervene where disclosure was obviously necessary for the 
patient to make a rational decision as to whether to undergo the
proposed procedure.
Only Lord Scarman rejected the professional medical standard as 
the test of what should be disclosed to the patient. His rejection
stems from his recognition of the patient's right to self-
determination, and his or her right to decide what shall be done with
his or her own body. For Lord Scarman, it is the patient's right to
know which makes the issue of advice given the to patient distinct
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from other aspects of medical care. Accordingly, the physician 
should be held liable if he or she "omits to warn where the risk is 
such that in the court's view a prudent person in the patient's 
situation would have regarded it as significant" [42] . However, Lord 
Scarman entitles the doctor to withhld information as to risk if it 
can be established that "a reasonable medical assessment of the 
patient would have indicated to the doctor that disclosure would have 
posed a serious threat of psychological detriment to the patient"[43]. 
Although Lord Scarman recognized the patient's right to be informed of 
all material risks, he too found against Mrs Sidaway. He said that the 
plaintiff failed to prove that the less than 1% risk was such that a 
prudent patient would consider it significant. In addition the death 
of the surgeon made it difficult for the court to know his medical 
assessment of Mrs Sidaway and her state of mind before he operated on 
her.
THE DUTY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS:
One aspect of the information issue that has been confirmed as 
aresult of Sidaway deals with the issue of the curious patient. 
According to the judgments of the Law Lords, when questioned 
specifically by the patient about risks involved in the proposed 
procedure, the physician must answer as truthfully and as fully as the 
questioner requires[44]. This principle has been upheld in the more 
recent case of Blvth v. Bloomsbury Health Authority.[45]
In this case the patient who suffered prolonged bleeding after 
receiving Depo-Provera, a long term contraceptive, succeeded in 
recovering damages. Although the patient has asked specific questions 
about the proposed treatment, she was not informed of the drug's side 
effects.
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4 : 4 POST-SIDAWAY: NON-THERAPEUTIC CONTEXT:
There are various references in the argument and judgments in the 
Sidaway case, to the 'healing' or 'therapeutic' context in which that 
case was decided. Does the same approach followed in Sidaway, i.e., 
the adoption of the professional standard of information disclosure, 
also apply in instances where the patient needs advice about an 
elective procedure and the options involved in, for example, non- 
therapeutic context like cosmetic surgery or birth control?. This 
qhestion was raised in the case of Gold v. Haringey Health 
Authority.[46]
The facts of this case were that when, in 1979, the plaintiff, Mrs 
Gold, entered her third pregnancy she and her husband decided to have 
no further children after that one. She consulted the defendant 
physician for advice. The latter told her that a sterilisation would 
be arranged for her but mentioned nothing about other contraceptive 
options and the failure rate of sterilisation. There was evidence that 
in 1979 there was a responsible body of medical opinion that would not 
have spoken of the other options or the failure rate.
At first instance the judge said that the Sidaway case was 
decided in a therapeutic context and that he was concerned with a 
different situation where the patient asked for advice as to methods 
of contraception and was told that sterilisation was the appropriate 
procedure for her without being informed of the other options, and 
without being warned of the risk of failure.
It was held that in that context the adequacy of what she was told 
was to be determined not by reference to prevailing medical practice 
but by the court's view as to whether the person giving advice-who 
might be a hospital doctor, a general practitioner, or a counsellor at 
a family planing clinic or a health visitor-acted negligently. The
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court found that there was a duty upon the doctor concerned to mention 
the other options and the failure rate, a duty that the defendant had 
not fulfilled.
The Court of Appeal, however, took a different view. [47] The 
appellate court held that the distinction the judge drew at the first 
instance between therapeutic contexts, where the Bolam principle 
applied, and non-therapeutic contexts such as contraceptive 
counselling, was "unwarranted and artificial."[48] The fact that 
medical practice as to warning was divided at the time of Mrs Gold's 
srerilisation meant that a doctor who did not warn could not be held 
liable in breach of his duty.
The result of this decision is that , even in the context of 
counselling a healthy adult as to methods of birth control, her right 
to information to help her decide is governed solely by what the 
profession is willing to tell her, and the court will not assert any 
other right to information on her behalf. So long as there are some 
doctors, sufficient to constitute a responsible body of medial 
opinion, who give only a limited or no disclosure (in this or in any 
other context), such disclosure will be declared by the court to be 
consistent with the patient's right.
4 : 5 THE WAY FORWARD:
The way the law of consent to medical treatment developed in this 
country and particularly following the decision in Sidaway[49] seems 
to suggest that British courts are and will probably be always in 
favour of the principle enunciated in Bolam[50], and medical 
paternalism. That is, it is the medical profession that decides for 
the patients what they need to know concerning their treatment. 
Needless to say, such a position goes counter to the patient's right
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to autonomy and self-determination.
The courts' opting for the medical standard and medical 
paternalism reflects, in part, their desire to avoid what followed the 
development of the doctrine of informed consent in the United States, 
namely, the malpractice crisis and the practice of defensive 
medicine.[51]
The fear of developing a similar crisis in Britain has influenced 
British courts very strongly. Dunn, L.J., for example, considered that 
the adoption of the doctrine of informed consent "would be damaging to 
the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, and might well 
have an adverse effect.on the practice of medicine."[52]
As mentioned earlier the law opted for current medical practice to
judge whether the particular doctor has fulfilled his or her duty of
information disclosure. This certainly works in favour of doctors. 
But the law has also recognized the judicial right to intervene in 
exceptional cases.[53] This recognition will encourage many patients 
to continue go to courts over informed consent claiming that their 
case is an exceptional one.[54] As has been pointed out, "[l]imiting 
liability to exceptional cases of non-disclosure...will not stem the 
flood of litigation, [i]t will make litigation more acrimonious. "[55]
4 : 6  CONCLUSIONS:
So far in Britain, the law recognizes that the person has a right 
to choose what shall be done with his or her own body, and therefore
he or she must consent to medical treatment or it will be trespass to
the person.
It is also established that consent to the nature of the procedure 
is enough to preclude an action in battery.[56] Failure to provide the 
patient with sufficient information to make a rational and 'informed'
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decision as to whether to agree to the proposed treatment, must be 
litigated in negligence. [57] In Chatterton it was held that;
'... justice required that in order to vitiate the. 
reality of consent there must be a greater failure of 
communication between doctor and patient than that 
involved in a breach of duty if the claim is based on 
negligence"[58]
That is ,the doctor's duty to inform stems from his or her general 
duty of care due to the patient, but not from the patient's 'right to 
know'. It follows that the doctor cannot be held liable in negligence 
if he or she fails to inform of particular risks as long as he or she 
acts, when fulfilling his or her duty of information disclosure, "in 
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body 
of medical men skilled in [the] particular art." [59] That is to say 
that the principle also applies as a standard for information 
disclosure. This was confirmed in the decision of the House of Lords 
in the case of Sidaway.[60] Accordingly, the amount of information 
that should be disclosed to the patient is a matter of medical 
judgment and stems from the doctor's general duty of care to the 
patient and not from the patient's right to be informed.
It should be noted, however, that the House of Lords modified this 
principle in some important respects. In particular the court 
enunciated its judicial right to intervene, if it comes to the 
conclusion that the disclosure of a particular risk is so obviously 
necessary to make a rational choice that no prudent doctor would omit 
to disclose. The court's proposition to modify the Bolam test has 
been said to be difficult to reconcile with the conclusion drawn by 
Dunn L.J in the Court of Appeal that the doctrine of informed consent 
is not part of English law. [61] Mason[62] suggested that it is not the
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doctrine of informed consent which is not accepted in Britain. Rather 
it is "the doctrine of complete disclosure, particularly when based on 
the subjective patient [which] forms no part of [British] law."[63] 
He agrees with Robertson[64] who stressed the importance of the 
patient's comprehension as related to a full information disclosure 
principle. But in order to accommodate the American doctrine of 
informed consent with that which is developing in Britain, Mason 
suggested the abandonment of the term informed in favour of 
"rational", "reasoned" or "determinant" consent.[65]
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION
The preceding chapters were concerned with the moral and legal
requirements of obtaining the patient's valid consent in therapeutic 
treatment. It was argued that the physician is legally required to 
obtain the patient's valid consent prior to any intervention or 
administration of treatment. It was shown throughout the analysis of 
the development of the law of consent in the therapeutic setting that 
this legal requirement is basically designed to protect the patient's 
right to self-determination and to promote his or her individual 
autonomy. Courts have always relied upon, and invoked, this principle 
as the main justification for obtaining the patient's valid 
consent. [1] It was also argued that in order to be valid and therefore 
effective, the patient's consent must be competent, voluntary, and 
stem from a rational and intelligent decision made on the basis of a 
sufficient disclosure of information.[2]
In a similar fashion, the following chapters will deal with the 
requirement of seeking the subject's consent, whether they be patients 
or healthy volunteers, to human experimentation. It is submitted that 
the provision of a valid consent is as fundamental as it is in
therapeutic treatments to the moral and legal validity of human
experimentation. Hence, most laws governing the conduct of human 
experimentation, whether they be national or international, mention 
the necessity of obtaining the subject's freely given and informed
consent as a primary condition that must be observed before 
investigators engage in biomedical research with human subjects. In
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the experimental setting, obtaining the prospective subject's 
acquiescence serves a variety of purposes, ranging from promoting 
individual autonomy to involving the public in the research 
enterprise[3]. Moreover, Dyck and Richardson[4] argue that observance 
of the requirement of valid and informed consent also serves to 
maintain structural values, a type of moral value in addition to that 
of benefits, that morally justify the conducting of human experi­
mentation. The use of human subjects in biomedical research may result 
in some risk to their physical and mental integrity, bearing in mind 
that they may or may not benefit from the knowledge gained from the 
experiments. In these circumstances, these subjects deserve respect 
and protection. Respect for them requires that they be treated as 
ends in themselves, not merely as means to an end. The legal 
requirement of obtaining valid consent is one way of ensuring that the 
will of another is respected and that the other is treated as an end 
and not simply as a means [5].
This is a simple statement about the necessity and importance of 
the subject's valid consent in biomedical research. The development 
of the law governing the issue will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Before that one will turn now to explore some conceptual and ethical 
questions raised by human experimentation.
5 : 1 D E F IN IT IO N :
For a definition of human experimentation or research involving 
human subjects, one would need to consider the concepts of "therapy" 
and "experimentation" or "research". This distinction is necessary to 
show which aspects of the law of valid consent might be applicable to 
the experimental setting, and which aspects might not.
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It has been said that it is extremely difficult to distinguish 
between clinical research and the practice of good medicine, because 
stages of illness and individual people are so variable that every 
physician is carrying out a small research project when he or she 
diagnoses and treats a patient. Blumgart[6] for example, stated that 
"every time a physician administers a drug to a patient, he is in a 
sense performing an experiment"[7].
These statements might to some extent be true. Since individuals 
may react differently to the same treatment, the physician has to 
evaluate the patient's reactions to a medication, increase or lessen 
the dosage, or recommend another treatment within the limits, of 
course, that have been established by the standards of routine and 
accepted practice. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the
treatment in question has a statistically known probability of 
success, i,e., the treatment has been tested at some stages in .tM
past for the first time. This is to say that treatments or therapies
that are established as standards of routine and accepted practice 
are distinct from those which are still to be tested on human beings 
by the fact that the latter lack statistics about their probability of 
success. In addition, as will be seen below, the purpose of 
administering a therapeutic treatment is different from that of an 
experimental one, particularly in the case of non-therapeutic
experiments. Accordingly, 'therapy' and 'experimentation' could be 
defined as follows;
(1) Therapy: in medical practice, the term therapy refers to
certain procedures or activities undertaken solely to benefit or to 
enhance the well-being of an individual or all members of a group. The 
procedures and activities in question have already been subject to
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investigation that determined their probabilities of success, after 
which they became the customary standard of routine and accepted
practice.- It necessarily follows that the customary standard of 
practice involves a reasonable expectation of success. The lack of 
precision on which to base such an expectation is not, however,
sufficient ground to define the activities in question as research. 
As Levine[8] argued, uncertainty is inherent in therapeutic practice 
because of the variability of physiological and behavioural human 
response, and this kind of uncertainty is also, itself, routine and 
accepted. It is noteworthy that therapy can take different forms; it 
can be simply diagnostic or even preventive measures, or it may 
involve a treatment for a disease[9].
(2) Experimentation: To the contrary of "therapy", the terms
"experimentation" or "research" involve the undertaking of scientific 
activities for the purpose of developing and contributing to general
knowledge. As will be seen later in this discussion, the knowledge
gained from experimentation may be of direct benefit to the 
patient/subject or/and to the patients of the future in the case of 
therapeutic experiments. In cases of non-therapeutic research, 
however, only future patients are likely to benefit from them.
Human experimentation, therefore could be defined as research or 
investigation that uses human beings as subjects[10]. It could also 
be defined, when contrasted to the concept of therapy, as the 
deviation from standard medical practice for the primary purpose of 
obtaining new knowledge[11]. For the purpose of this discussion, the 
use of the term experimentation or research will be taken to include 
all kinds of biomedical and behavioural research that come under the 
heading of human experimentation.
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Before going any further, it is convenient at this stage to 
classify and clarify the different kinds of experimentation.
5 : 2 TYPES OF EXPERIMENTATION OR RESEARCH:
The classification of the different types of experiments that are 
performed on human beings is relevant to the determination of their 
ethical value. The most frequently cited classification in bioethical 
literature is the distinction between therapeutic experimentation and 
non-therapeutic experimentation.[12]
1-Therapeutic experimentation; resembles therapy to the extent 
that it is designed solely to benefit the patient/subject either to 
diagnose or to treat his or her illness. However, unlike therapy, 
therapeutic experimentation serves another purpose. In addition to 
its primary object of benefitting the patient/subject, the experiment
is undertaken in a controlled way so that other patients can benefit
from the knowledge gained from the study.
2-Non-therapeutic experimentation: by contrast, refers to an 
experiment designed neither to treat the patient's illness nor to 
enhance his or her well-being, but only to gain useful knowledge that
can be used in the treatment of other patients either currently or in
the future.
The Declaration of Helsinki[13] outlined a similar classification 
of human experiments. The Declaration distinguished between clinical 
research and non-clinical research:
"in the field of biomedical research a fundamental 
distinction must be recognized between medical 
research in which the aim is essentially diagnostic 
or therapeutic for a patient, and medical research,
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the essential object of which is purely scientific and 
without direct diagnostic or therapeutic value to the 
person subjected to the research".[14]
1-Medical research combined with professional care: clinical
. research (section II title)..
Clinical research is therapeutic research combined with 
professional care and carried out by the doctor treating the patient. 
The experiment must be related to the patient's illness and be 
designed solely to benefit that particular patient as opposed to being 
merely designed to gain new or useful knowledge.
2-Non-therapeutic biomedical research involving human subjects: 
non-clinical biomedical research (section III title).
Non-clinical research is neither therapeutic nor combined with 
professional care. It is carried out for the scientific purpose of 
seeking and advancing knowledge.
According to the Declaration, then, clinical research must be 
carried out on patients and must be research combined with 
professional care. The physician is allowed to subject his or her 
patient to an experiment provided that the experiment is likely to 
benefit the patient without undue risk. Naturally, the knowledge 
acquired from this experiment can be applied to other patients, but 
the doctor cannot subject his or her patient to an experiment solely 
to satisfy his or her personal curiosity, or to acquire knowledge. 
Para.116 says;
"The doctor can combine medical research with 
professional care, the objective being the acquisition 
of new knowledge , only to the extent that medical 
research is justified by its potential diagnostic or 
therapeutic value for the patient"
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The Declaration refers to non-clinical research as "the purely
scientific application of medical research carried out on human 
being"(para. III1) . In determining the persons that can be subjected 
to non-clinical research the Declaration says;
"The subjects should be volunteers-either healthy
persons or patients for whom the experimental design 
is not related to the patient's illness." (para.1112).
Accordingly, the patient may be subjected to an experiment on 
condition that the experiment is not related to his or her illness and 
could not therefore benefit from the knowledge that can be acquired
from it. This principle can not be easily reconciled with the former 
principle developed in para. 116. Belsey[15] and Levine[16] remarked 
on this inconsistency between these two principles. Belsey argued that 
this inconsistency can be solved only by distinguishing the patient's 
own doctor and other doctors[17]. When the experiment is combined with 
professional care, this experiment would have to be carried out by the 
physician treating the patient. But when the research is purely 
scientific it would have to be performed by another doctor who is not 
treating the patient. Belsey concluded that the Declaration impliedly 
allowed the use of patients in non clinical research on condition that 
the experiment is carried out by other than the patient's own 
physician.
In not permitting the physician to experiment on the patient whom 
he or she is treating, the Declaration reasoned that because of his or 
her illness and complete dependence on the physician, the patient can 
not properly give an informed consent to the proposed experiment. 
Therefore "the informed consent should be obtained by a doctor who is 
not engaged in the investigation and who is completely independent of
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this official relationship" (para. I.10.). Belsey has also challenged 
this recommendation[18] . He pointed out that the patient, particularly 
a hospital patient, is unlikely to disappoint any doctor who 
approaches him or her and asks for participation in an experiment 
because such a patient may feel that he or she is dependent on the 
whole staff of the hospital and not only on his or her personal 
physician.
This is to say that the distinction implicit in the Declaration 
between the patient's own doctor and other doctors is irrelevant, 
because in hospital, the patient is in the care, and under the 
responsibility, of the community of doctors and not only in the care 
of his or her own doctor, a fact that the Declaration failed to 
recognize as Belsey[19] pointed out. Two conclusions can be drawn from 
this misinterpretation of the real nature of the doctor/patient 
relationship in hospitals;
1- The Declaration's objective of obtaining the patient's consent 
without duress can not be attained by merely shifting the task of 
soliciting the patient's consent to an experiment to another doctor.
2- The idea that the hospital patient can only be subjected to . 
non-clinical research by other than the patient's own doctor becomes 
doubtful[20] or meaningless.
The classification of the different types of experiments between 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic or clinical and non-clinical research 
has also been challenged as being unable to include all types of 
experiments. It has been argued that there are some types of 
experiments that can not be clearly identified as either therapeutic 
or non-therapeutic. For example, experiments designed to explore the 
cause of a disease can be put on the borderline between clinical and 
non-clinical research. The patient may or may not benefit from the
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experiment depending on the circumstances[21]. Moreover, there exists 
a kind of medical experimentation which has both therapeutic and non- 
therapeutic aspects. This is called mixed therapeutic and non- 
therapeutic experimentation. Perhaps one of the most problematic 
examples of mixed experiments is the Randomized Clinical Trial, 
(R.C.T)[22] which will be returned to later in this discussion. 
Because of the problems that derive from the use of the distinction 
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research, some scholars have 
advocated[23]the abandonment of this classification. Others have 
noted,[24] however, that there are also strong arguments for retaining 
this distinction. It is important, says Verga[25], for the deter­
mination of the ethical value of an experiment to know whether or not 
the project is designed to benefit the subject, and this fact can 
easily be identified or inferred from the purpose of the experiment 
being either clinical or non-clinical.
3-RANDOMIZED CLINICAL TRIALS (R.C.Ts)
It has already been mentioned that there exists a kind of 
experiment which has both therapeutic and non-therapeutic aspects. 
The subject in this type of experiment, usually a patient, is 
receiving medication for a particular illness. The way the treatment 
is being administered however, is not chosen with the sole objective 
of relieving or curing the particular patient of his or her illness. 
Rather the treatment is administered as part of an experiment designed 
to test new therapies or to compare the efficacy of various 
established treatments. It should also be mentioned that the purpose 
of this study is not limited to reporting the results of different 
treatments in particular cases. Rather, different therapies are 
tried, and patients are assigned to treatment categories partially
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according to the needs of the research design. Usually, this kind of 
experiment takes place in order to decide whether a new drug or other 
treatment is better than a conventional one, or none at all. The 
randomized clinical trial is but one example of this kind of 
experiment in which patients suffering from the same illness, or 
healthy volunteers, are divided into groups and subjected to different 
therapies[26]. The R.T.C is usually carried out in either of two 
ways; (1) one group will be treated according to the conventional 
therapy(control group), whereas the other group will receive the 
experimental treatment(experimental group). (2) One group will receive 
a new drug and the other a placebo.
Many points have been noted against R.C.Ts[27]. It has been 
pointed out for example, that while the control group could be denied 
a chance of receiving a better therapy, the experimental group could 
be subjected to the risk of harm by the therapy under 
investigation.[28] The assumption is that in a controlled trial, a 
serious effort is made to cure all patients. The ethical question, 
however, is not whether the patient will be completely cured, but 
rather whether unrestrained by the [therapeutic] trial design - the 
patient could have been treated more efficiently" [29]. This question 
is essentially related to the design of the trial. The trial must be 
designed in such a way as to ensure that its objective be attained as 
rapidly as possible.[30] Some physicians argue however, that the 
alternative therapies between which patients are randomized both have 
a great deal to recommend them and therefore, there is .no real sense 
in which one or the other group is being deliberately 
disadvantaged.[31]
The controlled trial is also characterized by its double blind 
technique and randomization. These are of major importance for the
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success of the trial. The double blind technique for example, is 
necessary for the evaluation of the new or already established drugs. 
It is believed that the physician is unlikely not to have a certain 
preference in a choice of treatments. This technique serves to 
eliminate such subjective influences by leaving both the doctor and 
the patient uninformed as to the identity of the drug which is being 
used[32].The second principle, randomization, is basically implemented, 
to exclude, as Helmchem and Miiller-Oerlinghausen[33] put it, "unknown 
objective influences".
The idea of having a truly randomized trial remains, however, 
difficult to achieve[34]. In many R.C.Ts, randomization involves some 
form of pre-selection. For example, volunteers for trials distinguish 
themselves from those who are not [35]. In other instances, some 
patients may be deliberately excluded from the controlled trial 
because of the severity of their diseases[36]. As a result, the trial 
is limited to evaluating the effectiveness of the therapy for only the 
milder forms of illness. This selection of patients may also make it 
difficult to find a more effective treatment for the most severely ill 
patients. Nevertheless, randomization in controlled trials is still 
one of the major issues in clinical investigations and particularly in 
therapeutic trials for cancer. In this respect, many physicians, 
especially those involved in the primary care of patients, have been 
hesitant to enroll their patients in R.C.Ts. Many of them pointed to 
the tension they felt between their role as researchers committed to 
the success of the trial and their role as doctors committed to their 
patients' well-being. The enrollment of patients in R.C.Ts, they 
argue, may jeopardize the doctor/patient relationship[37] . Moreover, 
problems may also arise in respect of the legal requirement of 
obtaining the patient's consent to participate in an R.C.T. The
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assumption is that no randomized clinical trial can be ethically valid 
unless physicians have a genuine doubt as to which therapy yields the 
best outcomes[38]. In such circumstances, it is undoubtedly difficult
for any physician to ask his or her patient to take part in a trial
without being able to specify which treatment will be administered. 
This may lead to the confusion of the patient and even end up with a 
refusal. These cumulative adverse factors are very often the cause of 
the slow accrual of patients to important R.C.Ts[39].
It is noteworthy that during the last few years a modification has 
been introduced to the technique of randomization. The new procedure, 
one of those suggested by Zelen[40], involves some form of pre­
selection or pre-randomization before discussing the treatment with 
the patient and obtaining his or her consent to take part in the 
study. In this respect, it has been pointed out that if the 
randomization procedure is made much more comfortable for the
physicians, more patients would be approached to participate in R.C.Ts
and that more patients would be encouraged to agree to participate if 
they were informed of their assigned treatment[41].
The pre-randomization technique may obviate the difficulties 
encountered in the accrual of patients, but it may also give rise to 
other ethical and practical problems[42] . As has been said;
"....it seems doubtfully moral to use what is 
essentially a ruse in order to obviate agreed ethical 
practice which is, in addition, an integral part of 
the basic principles of the Declaration of 
Helsinki."[43]
This is to say that the search for the appropriate procedure for 
the evaluation of alternative treatments, must take into consideration 
the care due to patients. If this commitment to present patients is
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attenuated in favour.of benefits to those of the future, the implicit 
assumptions of the doctor/patient relationship are violated.[44].
5 : 5 THE MORAL RA TIF ICATIO N OF HUMAN  
RESEARCH:
It has been said that the use of human subjects in clinical 
research is not only morally accepted, but in certain instances, 
morally required. This conclusion is drawn from two types of 
considerations; the limitations of experimentation with animals, and 
the moral requirement of alleviating human suffering.[45]
With respect to the former, it has been scientifically proved that 
because of species-specificity, different species have different 
chemical reactions[46]. Therefore, in order to establish sound medical 
practice, medical research has to rely upon the knowledge gathered 
from the reactions of human subjects themselves. Moreover, even if 
such differences do not exist, there always comes a time at which the 
treatment has to be evaluated in the human being. As Marston pointed 
out;
"Even when the situation is as clearcut as it was
when it became possible to prevent the death of
experimentally infected mice by treatment with
Penicillin, it still was necessary to test the
antibiotic in man."[47]
In addition, there is always the need to evaluate in humans 
different therapies that are already in use. As Marston[48] noted, 
the therapeutic value of many reputed therapies is in fact unknown. 
It is necessary therefore, he recommends, that controlled studies be 
carried out to establish their relative effectiveness. The well being 
and health of all human beings depend upon continuing research in man. 
As has been said; "The proper study of mankind is man. "[49]
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Concerning the second ground that justifies the conducting of 
human experimentation, it has been claimed that the submission of 
human subjects to many kinds of experiments, though they involve real 
risks to them, is justified by the very great benefits that can be 
gleaned from their results, either to present patients or to those of 
the future. A good illustration is the development and use of 
vaccines. Although the use of vaccines is known to have a 
statistically minimal, though real, risk to their recipients, they 
have been tested on human subjects and then became compulsory or 
highly recommended treatments, designed to prevent disease. This is 
said to show that in instances where a serious harm needs to be 
prevented, the use of human subjects in risky experiments can be 
easily justified and is more likely to be considered as morally 
required[50].
What has been said so far should not be taken to mean, however, 
that the justification covers only experiments related to instances in 
which the human being's existence is at stake. Rather, even those 
experiments which are carried out for the sake of increasing the 
pleasure and enhancing the well-being of all human beings, can.be 
morally justified in certain instances. What is important, in fact, 
in the evaluation of any research project, is the assessment of the 
possible harm such an experiment may cause to the human subject as 
well as the assessment of all its potential benefits. Usually, in 
order to be ethically justified, the benefits occurring from the 
results of the experiment must more than offset all its potential 
associated risks. Considered from another point of view, the 
subject's interests in not being harmed either physically or mentally, 
should prevail over the community's interests in acquiring new 
knowledge.
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To summarize briefly the points made so far, it can be said that 
human experimentation is valued because, even with the use of animals, 
the human being remains the appropriate subject of medical research 
for the establishment of sound medical practice. Experimentation is 
also necessary for the advance of scientific knowledge which leads in 
itself to the promotion of health (utilitarian argument).
It is noteworthy that human experimentation has been also 
justified on deontological grounds and by invoking the principle of 
justice[51]. According to this view, every person currently alive 
benefits in one way or another from past human experimentation. In 
other words, the submission of past human subjects to various 
controlled studies of, for example, vaccines and antibiotics has 
contributed to the well-being of all humans. Therefore the principle 
of justice requires that present human beings contribute, in a 
reciprocal way, to the alleviation and eradication of human suffering. 
In this respect McCance[52] emphasized the importance of impressing 
patients with the facts that hospitals undertake experimental work, 
not only for the immediate benefit of the ill, but also for the 
benefit of mankind, and that the patients themselves owe incalculable 
advantages to previous experimentation that has been carried out on 
others.
In his leading article "Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting 
with Human Subjects" Jonas[53] challenged both of these proposed 
justifications of human experimentation.
First of all, Jonas rejects the argument that participation in 
human experimentation by beneficiaries of previous research is a moral 
duty required by the principle of justice. He argues that both 
experimenters and subjects of the past engaged on experimentation 
voluntarily and freely as acts of altruism and moral heroism.[54] All
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that present humans owe to the past as debt, if there is any, is a 
debt of gratitude to the previous generations for their contributions 
to the alleviation of human suffering, but not an obligation to 
society based on the principle of justice. Jonas' rejection of the 
justice argument is based upon the idea that human experimentation is, 
in most cases, an optional rather than a vital human activity.
With respect to the utilitarian argument, while recognizing that 
human experimentation is a major scientific method for advancing 
scientific knowledge, Jonas reiterates the view that most research 
involving human subjects is not vital to the well-being or survival of 
the human species[55]. He argues that medical progress is "an optional 
goal, not an unconditional commitment"[56] This reasoning led him to 
conclude that only a present threat or as he says a "clear and present 
danger", or a "state of emergency"[57] would provide a sufficient 
justification for human experimentation.
Schafer[58]noted that according to Jonas' reasoning, the social 
misfortune of those potential victims of disease whose suffering could 
be alleviated by continuing medical research, is not a sufficient 
ground to expose human beings to the risks of experimentation. This 
view suggests that mere benefits, however great they may be, can not 
justify human experimentation, but exceptionally, a state of national 
health emergency can. Jonas' position on the justification of human 
experimentation is based upon the principle that individual human 
rights e.g., the right to be free from invasion of one's bodily 
integrity and the right to consent, are supremely important. It is 
this primary commitment to protecting the rights, dignity and 
inviolability of the individual which makes Jonas unwilling to accept 
"benefits" as a sufficient justification for human experimentation. 
As it has been said the adoption of Jonas' view would require the
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virtual cessation of experimentation with human subjects.[59]
Undoubtedly, such an approach would deprive society of the 
benefits of new remedies as well as of an important scientific method 
for striving against existing and threatening diseases. Moreover, it 
could also be argued that there is a significant ethical cost attached 
to not continuing medical research. In highlighting this point, Dr
George James[60]stressed the need to consider the rights of other 
generations to benefits from the results of medical research. He says:
"In the discussion of ethical considerations relating 
to clinical research the rights of the unborn 
generations to benefit from the fruit of research must 
also be weighed. It can be debated that no man today 
has the free and the moral right to condemn his grand 
children to the same perils to which he is exposed by 
virtue of the present lack of effective scientific 
information, and his failure to participate in a
search for it"[61]
Experiments which are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
new and already established medical products are instances in which it 
is, and will always be, necessary to use human subjects. To forego
such experiments, is to expose many persons to the risks of injury
associated with the use of insufficiently tested remedies either old 
or new. On the other hand, since, as mentioned earlier, there would 
be limited value in therapies that have been tested only on animals, 
it is clear that human experimentation will continue to be necessary 
as long as drugs continue to be developed. Therefore, progress in 
drug treatment is dependent upon the continuation of human medical 
research.[62]
It is convenient to note at this stage that international 
agreements, e.g., the Declaration of Helsinki[63], tacitly allow the
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continuation of medical research. Such position evidences that
"both the international community and medicine itself 
see a need for such experiments as a contribution to 
the development of patient care and the wider 
interests of medical science" [64]
This commitment is grounded upon the assumption that medical 
progress will improve the well-being of present patients or those of 
the future.
A total commitment to medical advancement is not flawless,
however. Many assume, for example, that every piece of acquired 
medical knowledge leads necessarily to the improvement of health care. 
This is not always the case. As McLean and Maher[65] remarked "much 
research is repetitive" and generated, to some extent, by motives 
other than patient care, for example, "the exploration of scientific 
hypotheses or the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry."[66] 
In such cases a reduction in the number and scope of medical
investigations is suggested as a measure to diminish the risks of harm 
to which human subjects are exposed.[67] Moreover, it will also be 
necessary to introduce some form of scrutiny to ensure that human
subjects are not exploited under the pretext of medical progress.
This is related to the issue of social control, an issue which will be 
considered later in this discussion.
Given the fact that human experimentation remains the only 
appropriate method for the acquisition of new knowledge, the question 
which should be dealt with is not whether the use of human subjects 
could ever be justified. Rather the question is related to the 
conditions under which such use could be tolerated in experiments that 
involve some risks of harm to human subjects. Most of these 
conditions were mentioned in the international codes of ethics, such
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as the Declaration of Helsinki, in relation to the ethical framework 
within which human experimentation should be carried out.
Two crucial conditions, in particular, must be satisfied to 
justify the use of human subjects in experiments that are of some risk 
to their bodily and mental integrity;
1-The experiment should anticipate specific benefits accruing from 
its result. In other words, the experiment must be aimed at patient 
care or/and at the acquisition of new knowledge(with the former 
predominating) [68]. It also should be carried out on the basis of 
sound scientific hypotheses tested in the laboratory and on 
animals.[69]
2-The experiment should be carried out only with the freely 
obtained informed consent of the subject.[70]
It should be noted that these two conditions had also been 
emphasized by many philosophers. In stressing the need to observe the 
requirement of obtaining the subject's valid consent, Dyck and 
Richardson[71],for example, noted that it is the observance of the 
requirement of consent which makes all potential benefits meaningful. 
They argue that although there are harms that can be balanced against 
benefits in the matter of deciding which risk is morally justifiable, 
there is a kind of harm which can not be outweighed by any benefit 
however great that benefit may be. This harm is to the "violation of 
a structural value"[72]that necessarily results from the violation of 
the requirement of obtaining the prospective subject's informed 
consent. Such harm can not be tolerated since these values maintain 
the social systems. Among the inviolable structural values that the 
requirement of informed consent protects, they mentioned "veracity, 
freedom and justice."[73]
-  167  -
5 : 4 CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION:
According to what has been said so far, it is clear that an
ethical and legal experiment depends, in part, upon free and 
autonomous participation by the subject and this, in turn, depends 
upon valid and informed consent, the nature of which has been 
discussed in the previous chapter.
In human experimentation, the need to observe the requirement of
informed and valid consent is even greater than in the sphere of pure
patient management. An excessive zeal for medical advancement may 
jeopardize, for example, the subject's rights to autonomy and self- 
determination. His or her freely obtained acquiescence is a way of 
protecting these fundamental rights. Moreover, as in therapy, the 
provision of consent is also crucial for the validation of the 
interaction [74].
Generally, most aspects of the law of consent in therapeutic
treatments might be applicable.to human experimentation. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the experimental nature of the procedure 
gives rise to acute problems in respect of the application of the 
requirement of informed consent. Each component of the concept raises 
its own issues. The information aspect, for example, may be 
questionable in terms of the amount of information disclosure or/and 
in terms of its assimilation on the part of the prospective subjects. 
On the other hand, the component of consent may become ineffective if 
the decision to take part in a given experiment is granted otherwise 
than freely and voluntarily.
It has been said that, although international agreements made it 
clear that the subject's consent must be voluntary and informed in 
nature, and although individual doctors may strive for the realization 
of such an objective, the subject's consent "can never be fully
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informed in experimental procedures since fL2L hypothesi the nature and 
extent of the risk is u n k n o w n [75] In such cases the patient's 
acquiescence does not cover "the nature of the risk" which may 
materialize, but merely "an incalculable risk worked out on 
predictions based on pre-existing knowledge or experience"[76].
With respect to the voluntariness aspect of the subject's consent
to experimentation, it is not possible to assert with certainty that 
his or her consent is always freely granted. This could particularly 
be true in respect of clinical research where the patient has a self- 
interest in the cure. A hopelessly ill person, for example is 
unlikely not to agree to a proposed procedure that may have a 
possibility of bringing an end to his or her suffering.
It could be argued, however, that the self-interest aspect which 
characterizes the hopelessly ill patient's decision to participate, 
does not affect his or her decision and successively his or her
consent. Furthermore, still in respect of the hopelessly ill patient, 
it would probably be difficult to reconcile the act of interfering 
with the patient's choice to take his or her chances in an
experimental procedure with the extreme position society has on the 
rights of the individual.
The human subject's consent, in particular to non-clinical 
research, may also be questionable, not in the sense of not being 
fully informed, since even in such case "the general good of 
experimentation overrides the diminution in the right to receive 
information which the [subject] could otherwise claim."[77] That is 
to say that the subject's consent could be informed in the sense that 
he or she knows that the experimental intervention involves, by 
nature, known and unknown risks. If one considers the argument that 
it....is not rational to accept unknown risks in the knowledge that they
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are of no benefit, the subject's decision to participate in a non- 
therapeutic experiment would be irrational, and therefore 
paternalistic interference would be necessary. If, however, the 
decision to take part in this kind of experiment is based on the 
principle of acting and living for the interests of others, such a 
decision would be rational. For since altruism is morally good, acting 
on the basis of such a principle is not only morally acceptable but 
also rational.
Nevertheless this does not, in any way, remove the fundamental 
problems associated with the provision of consent to human experiments 
since the need to provide the subject with a maximum disclosure of 
information relating to the risks and benefits of the experiment 
remains important regardless of the motives on which the subject based 
his or her decision to participate in experiments(self-interest or 
altruism).
Generally, the subject's consent to a research project must be 
preceded by four types of explanation; the purpose of the research, 
the benefits to the patient and society, the risks associated with the 
performance of the experiment and the alternatives. In Halushka v. 
University of Sackatchewan [77],the court stated: "there could be no 
exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of 
research as there may well be in ordinary medical practice."[78] That 
is that in the experimental setting, and particularly in non- 
therapeutic experiments, a more detailed disclosure and no therapeutic 
privilege should be the rule, since the subject will not benefit from 
the results of the research on the one hand, and there is no need to 
balance the the probable effect of lack of treatment against the 
risks involved in the proposed procedure on the other.
More acute difficulties can be faced when obtaining the subject's
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informed consent to participate in R.C.Ts. As mentioned earlier, it is 
necessary for the success of a controlled study that it be carried out 
with some measure of ignorance-randomization or pre-randomization and 
the double blind technique.[79]
It is clear that it is difficult to satisfy the requirement of. 
informed consent in such circumstances since the subject will be
denied any information relating to the fact of randomization or to the 
treatment that will be administered. Even the pre-randomization
technique has its own ethical problem. Proponents of the pre­
randomization technique argue that since the patient in most cases 
aims to receive the best standard therapy, it will not be necessary to 
seek the informed consent of the control group(the group of patients 
that will receive the standard therapy in a controlled study). Only 
the experimental group(the group that will be treated with the
experimental or new therapy), they argue, would learn that they are 
enrolled in a controlled study.[80]
The main point that has been noted against this technique 
questioned the ethical and legal validity of an R.C.T that leaves half 
the patients uninformed of the fact that they were study patients. 
This is to say that the pre-randomization technique also involves a
violation of the rights of one group of patients(the control group), 
by subjecting them to a controlled study without their knowledge and 
acquiescence.
The complications relating to obtaining the subject's consent to 
R.C.Ts are such that many laws, e.g., Swedish law[81], mentioned the 
legal obligation to seek the subject's informed consent but did not 
define the extent of the information that must be disclosed. In the 
U.S.A, some states' statutes lay down the information that must be 
given to patients in certain treatments.[82] In the U.K, particularly
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in respect of cancer therapies, the leading authority on cancer 
trials, the Cancer Research Campaign Working Party in Breast 
Conservation (the Working Party)[83], recommends the obtaining of the 
subjects' informed consent in major multicentre research programmes. 
It has been said, however, that "the issue of informed consent remains 
unresolved [in the U.K.]. "[84] It has also been noted that "It is 
intolerable...that the burden of accountability should be placed 
entirely on [the] doctors concerned"[85]. In this respect, the Working 
Party suggested the formulation of a workable code of conduct for all 
clinical trials[86]. The Working Party reasoned that the difficulties 
currently faced may nullify the R.C.T which is a major scientific 
method for the evaluation of new therapies,"taking [medicine] back 
into the dark ages where therapeutic innovations were judged by 
intuition and wishful thinking." [87]
Further problems associated with the provision of consent relate 
to the difficulties that the subject may face in comprehending all the 
complexities of the subject. In this respect a leading article in 
the Lancet [88], noted that the patient should not be included in the 
trial if he or she is not capable of assimilating the basic plan of 
management.
Most scholars think, however, that the complexities of the issue 
are such that the ideal informed consent in these circumstances can 
only be rendered by those involved in the caring profession.[89]
A-EXPERIMENTATION AND PRISONERS:
It is obvious that prisoners as a group do not differ physically 
from other adults. Nor is there any difference between them and other 
adults in the capacity to comprehend an explanation of proposed 
research. Thus it is not usually alleged that prisoners are less able
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to assimilate the risks, discomforts and benefits that may be the 
result of experimentation than free-living individuals. Rather it is 
often claimed that prisoners cannot render an informed and valid 
consent because of the fact of their incarceration.[90]
Proponents of research involving prisoners argue that such 
research could be beneficial both to prisoners and to society. It has 
been said, for example, that participation in experiments improves the 
self-image of many prisoners. At the same time, their involvement in
various types of non-clinical research, e.g., the early phases of drug
testing, contributes to the general welfare of society.[91] On the 
other hand, the circumstances in prisons make these institutions the 
ideal places to carry out experiments. Life is routine and subject to 
few variations. The population is relatively stable which makes long 
range studies feasible. And it is less expensive to use prisoners 
than it would be to use other subject groups.
The main question that the use of prisoners in research gives rise
to is whether prisoners are capable of providing an informed consent.
Objectors to the use of prisoners in experimentation argue that 
because of the very nature of their incarceration, prisoners do not 
have a real freedom of choice in respect of their participation in 
these activities. Coercion may take different forms; payment, a 
reduced sentence or a few weeks in hospital. In short, their self- 
interest may influence their decision to take part in experimentation. 
This concern is articulated in the Nuremberg Code[92], Para.I reads;
"The voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential. This means that the person 
involved should have legal capacity to give consent, 
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over reaching 
or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion, and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of 
the elements of the subject matter involved as to 
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened 
decision." (emphasis added)
It is obvious that the situation of prisoners is not really one in 
which an individual can exercise free power of choice. 'Self-interest' 
is surely an element which may affect the subject's decision.
It is argued, however, that 'self-interest' does not in itself 
invalidate the prisoner's consent to take part in research, since 
consent is always speculative in experimental cases.[93] Moreover, 
'self-interest' is, in fact, a characteristic of any voluntary 
participation. Thus, it is rather the combination of self-interest 
and their vulnerability to exploitation which makes prisoners 
unsuitable as subjects for human research. The prisoner, for example, 
may be subjected several times to experimentation with his or her free 
will without being aware of the risks involved in such practices or 
their long-term effects. This consideration is the basis of the legal 
or moral exclusion of certain groups of subjects (prisoners, children 
and the insane) from non-clinical research. As has been said, "[t]he 
vulnerability of those groups makes control over experimental 
procedures imperative."[94]
5 : 5 SOCIAL CONTROL:
The issue of social control over experimentation raises procedural 
rather than substantive questions. The various alternative mechanisms 
of social control are established as a means for ensuring that human 
research is carried out with the observance of basic ethical and legal 
principles and requirements.
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A-The Need to Control Human Experiments:
Two considerations, in particular, require the establishment of 
such control. First of all, there is the need to protect the human 
subject's mental and bodily integrity. This protection requires that 
a reliable form of scrutiny be introduced to maintain the balance
between the interests of medical advancement and the well-being of the
human subject. Second, human experimentation is basically meant to 
promote public health, i.e., to serve the interests of society. This 
factor dictates that society itself intervenes and controls the 
conduct of human experimentation as a means of ensuring that it serves 
its perceived interests on different levels.
The existence of such control is important if one considers the 
fact that international agreements relating to the conduct of human 
experimentation have been laid down in protest at what human subjects 
had been subjected to in the past and particularly at the atrocities 
committed by Nazi doctors during the Second World War.[95]
Social control is also necessary to prevent the exploitation of
vulnerable subjects (children, prisoners and the chronically or
terminally ill patients). A good illustration of how the vulnerable 
can be exploited is the injecting of chronically ill patients with 
live cancer ceils, a case known as the Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital.[96]
Furthermore, such control whether it be national or international 
also serves a symbolic purpose which consists in .reminding the 
investigator to consider deeply the ethical and legal validity of his 
or her project before engaging in human experimentation.
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B-Mechanisms of Control:
The conduct of human experimentation is usually controlled and 
monitored by both international and national laws.
At the International Level:
With respect to international scrutiny, it has been pointed out 
that although international law is an inefficient means of controlling 
professional practice, the international community's codes of ethics 
remain a valuable statement of the purpose and boundaries that should 
be observed by all those involved in biomedical research.[97] The 
inefficiency of international law stems from the fact that few 
sanctions usually follow its breach. As a result, the contemporary 
medical enterprise still continues to provide examples of unnecessary 
and unethically conducted experiments.[98]
The provision of these codes, particularly those relating to the 
issue of consent will be examined in the next chapter, but it is worth 
noting at this stage that further efforts are still being made by 
international organizations to discuss the ethical issues arising from 
contemporary medical science and technology, and to issue 
recommendations and resolutions relating to questions of law, human 
rights and safety. In this respect the Division of Science and 
Technology Policies, as part of the United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O), organized many 
conferences and symposia on the ethics of human research in Western 
Europe in the period between September 88 and May 89. Most of the 
documents which were presented examined the ethics of the use of human 
beings and embryos in medical research, organ transplantation, genetic 
engineering and artificial insemination.[99] Among the important 
documents which were adopted during these sessions is Resolution A.2-
-  176  -
78/88 adopted on Sept.88 on European Harmonization of Meda.-CQethical
Questions. It was noted that "the European Code (of Ethics for the 
Medical Profession) does not necessarily reflect the medicoethical 
views of the health care sector as a whole or of all sections of
society."[100] In addition, doubts have been expressed as to whether 
the code in question is fully representative of the views of the 
medical profession in all the European states concerned. Accordingly, 
the European Parliament recommended that ethical committees in every 
member state at various levels be made up of equal numbers of men and 
women,[101]the constitution of a European Ethical Committee for 
coordinating the national ethical committees,[102] and called for
these committees "to be constituted so as to garantee adequate 
representation of all the parties concerned in the health 
sector..."[103]. Among the other documents which were adopted are two 
resolutions. One on the Ethics and Legal Problems of Genetic
Engineeringr [104] and the other on Artificial Insemination 'In Vivo1
and 'In Vitro' . [105]
The main purpose of these documents is to unify the general 
ethical principles governing the medical enterprise in Europe as 
complementary documents to those adopted at world level. On the other 
hand, these can be of great assistance to individual states in Europe 
or elsewhere in their effort to regulate by way of legislation the 
medical profession in general and the research enterprise in 
particular.
At National Level:
In effect, different checks at national level have been developed 
to scrutinize and monitor experimentation.
Some noted, however, that given the very confidential nature of 
medical transactions, these controls are, to some great extent,
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"medicine dominated, relying heavily on the evidence and opinions of 
the colleagues of the researchers."[106] It necessarily follows that 
such controls may be established according to a "purely or 
substantially" medical view of the ethics of experimentation 
neglecting thereby "the competing claims of community based morality 
or perception."[107]
In the U.S.A, since 1966 the National Institute of Health, Food 
and Drug Administration(N.I.H.F.D.A) and the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare(D.H.E.W), have issued increasingly detailed 
regulations governing the use of human subjects in medical research. 
This was followed by the establishment of the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
(N.C.P.H.S.B.B.R) in 1974, which was designed to advise the 
D.H.E.W.[108]
Part of the 1966 D.H.E.W guidelines included a decision to 
decentralize the review process. Institutions receiving federal funds 
were urged to establish Institutional Review Boards(I.R.B) to 
undertake research review. Their role is to ensure that research 
projects are designed in accordance with the federal regulations. 
Many substantive requirements must be satisfied: the research project 
must, for example, minimize risk to human subjects; the risk must be 
reasonable in relation to the potential benefits; informed consent 
must be obtained and so-called vulnerable subjects must be protected 
from undue coercion.[109]
Like the U.S.A, Britain has also developed several layers of 
scrutiny to control the conduct of human experimentation. The common 
law is still considered as a major means of controlling the potential 
abuse of clinical freedom. The physical touching of an individual 
without his or her consent may be actionable as an assault and battery
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even though there is no physical injury; physical touching of a 
subject or the manipulation of his or her conduct by misrepresentation 
or breach of a fiduciary relationship is actionable as fraud; and the 
careless conduct of an experiment is actionable as negligence if the 
subject suffered injury.[110]
In addition to these doctrines of the common law, further 
mechanisms of control have been introduced, in particular, in respect 
of the marketing of new pharmaceutical products, namely the 
establishment of the Committee on Safety of Medicines[111]as a result 
of the Medicines Act 1968. The role of this organization is to ensure 
that no new pharmaceutical product will be in use before its 
scientific hypotheses have been tested in the laboratory and on 
animals. Further investigations or evaluations of the new products on 
human beings will then be authorized under close supervision.
It is convenient to mention in this respect that many 
recommendations have been issued by the Royal College of Physicians 
(Working Party) relating to the use of volunteers in such 
investigations, [112] as well as recommendations regarding the kind of 
relationship that must be kept between physicians and the 
pharmaceutical indistry.[113] The Working Party . acknowledged, in 
particular, the need to have a close and constructive relationship 
between the medical profession, which prescribes drugs and the 
pharmaceutical industry, which produces and markets them. It was 
recommended, however, that such relationship be conducted on strictly 
professional lines and neither party should abuse its position for 
financial or other gain or mislead the other as to factual evidence 
about the drug under trial.[114]
A further layer of scrutiny was developed on a recommendation of 
the Medical Research Council by means of the institution of Research
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Ethical Committees in all hospitals engaging in experimental 
work.[115] Although these committees are constituted mainly of members 
from the medical profession, they provide, as has been pointed out, a 
model for co-operation between the medical enterprise and the 
public.[116]
It should be noted, however, that these committees are still 
uncertain "whether their role is purely advisory or whether they are 
responsible for monitoring research in progress as well."[117] Some 
scholars relate this uncertainty to an inherent ambiguity in the 
original Medical Research Council guidelines and the statement by the 
Royal College of Physicians in London. [118] On the other hand there 
are still doubts as to their efficiency in scrutinizing research 
projects. Most critics, for example, pointed to the lack of debate on 
general principles that govern the use of human subjects, and the 
degree to which doctors manipulate ethical committees.[119] There are 
many examples in which trials have proved very harmful, if not fatal, 
although sanctioned by many ethical committees.[120]
In any event, although the function of these committees does not 
constitute the ultimate means of controlling human experimentation, 
their existence is necessary to keep a contact between the 
experimental enterprise and the public.
5 : 6 CONCLUSIONS:
The main issue that the present chapter has discussed is the 
conditions under which it would be justifiable to subject human beings 
to experimentation when such subjection will be likely to harm them. 
As has been shown above, two considerations of major importance must 
be satisfied to justify the use of humans in risky experiments; the
-  180  -
anticipation of benefits from the conduct of such experiments and the 
observance of the legal and ethical requirement of obtaining the
subject's informed and valid consent.
That is, the fundamentally crucial aspect of all experimentation 
is the right of the human subject whether he/she be patient or 
volunteer to make informed and rational decisions about his or her own
body. As has been said, the investigator's role is secondary to the
interest that the human subject has in his or her own autonomy. [121] 
The subject's decision to take part in experimentation can be 
motivated by a self-interest in the cure or by altruism, but still 
remains a rational decision.
Whatever the subject's motives, however, his or her interest in 
not being harmed as a result of experimentation must prevail over the 
interest of the community as a whole in acquiring new knowledge or
developing new therapies. In other words a balance is necessary that 
allows for the continuation of all types of experiments which are 
likely to benefit society without neglecting the basic human rights of 
the individual subject.
This is related, in part, to the design of the experiment. The
research project must be designed in such a way as to ensure that the
subject is exposed to minimum risks, and that the experimentation is 
not carried out unless there is a real need to investigate or evaluate 
new or old therapies or techniques. In this respect, some scholars 
have pointed out that the doctor/investigator "should be entrusted 
with the duty of himself deciding when a medical care measure needs to 
be evaluated from an ethical viewpoint."[122] It is argued, however, 
that the adoption of such a view, places the physician in a powerful 
position, and requires a reduction of the rights of the subject "whose
interests have already been subverted to some extent, even in
therapeutic experiments, by the lack of available information."[123]
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It would be safer to say that since many experiments may or do 
benefit the community, it is admittedly necessary that human 
experimentation continues. One way of ensuring its fruitful 
continuation is the introduction of an efficient system of control. 
Such controls can be of great help in accommodatimg the conflicting 
interests of all those involved in human research - the interests of 
the subject in the integrity of his or her personality and physical 
well-being; the interests of the investigator in pursuing his or her 
vocation; the interests of the community in acquiring new knowledge, 
particularly knowledge bearing upon public and individual health. 
Moreover, these controls can afford a reduced but adequate protection 
to vulnerable human subjects when experimentation has to be carried 
out on the otherwise vulnerable. Children, for example, may be needed 
to be used as subjects in certain experiments that deal with specific 
diseases that affect only children. [124] In such cases special 
attention is needed in the assessment of the risks and benefits 
associated with the performance of these experiments, particularly, 
non-therapeutic ones.
The question that can be asked now is whether the present 
mechanisms of control, including the law's response to the issue, are 
efficient enough to keep experimentation going fruitfully without 
subverting the interests of any of the parties involved.
At present it is the medical profession in the U.K. which is in 
charge of the control of human research. Although the function and 
constitution of Research Ethical Committees has been criticised, their 
existence is said to be necessary to keep a contact between the 
experimental enterprise and the public. In this respect, a review of 
the constitution and function of R.E.C.s and the adoption of a policy 
which allows for higher percentage of lay membership in R.E.C.s are
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recommended.
The law's intervention, on the other hand, is limited to a few 
fields of experimentation. It seems that it is only in relation to 
research with new drugs that there is specific legislation. More 
specific legislation, in particular, must be promulgated. In this 
respect it is suggested that such legislative regulation can take the 
form of an enforceable legal framework that defines the general 
principles and guidelines laid down by the international community in 
the Declaration of Helsinki,[125] and other international agreements.
Consent to medical research, in particular, may be very 
problematic as was shown above, and surely all of its principles 
deserve a proper definition. But before making any speculation, it is 
useful first to outline the development of the law governing consent 
in the experimental setting including its current status.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CONSENT DOCTRINE IN HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION
Following the general discussion of the ethics of human 
experimentation outlined in chapter five, attention will turn now to 
an exploration of the development of the consent doctrine in the 
experimental setting.
It has been noted that despite some apparent similarities in the 
issues raised, the requirement of obtaining the prospective subject's 
consent to human experimentation has developed quite separately from 
that to therapy. [1] Consent to treatment has been created by case law, 
with the courts playing an important role. [2] Consent to human 
experimentation, however, has been shaped by professional codes, 
statutes, and administrative guidelines in addition to judicial 
regulations.
It is noteworthy at the outset of this discussion that the use of 
human subjects in research is as old as medicine itself. What is new, 
however, is the concern about its consequences and about the 
protection of the human subjects. The earliest moral and legal 
concern has historically been to control the risks presented to the 
subjects by experimentation. The main objective has been to ensure 
adequate levels of safety and, therefore, to prevent abuses of 
subjects. The requirement of consent first appeared in research codes 
and guidelines without specific reference to justificatory principles. 
Along with the development of research ethics, however, it has become 
firmly established that there are two primary goals for policies 
covering the use of human subjects in research; controlling imposed
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risks, i.e., a beneficence-based consideration, and providing for 
informed and valid consent which is an autonomy-based consideration.
The modern concern with informed consent in human research grew 
gradually only after the occurrence of the unprecedented cruelties and 
generally inferior science administered by the Nazi physicians in the 
course of the Second World War. Prior to this period little attention 
was paid to the circumstances under with research should be carried 
out, including the issue of consent. This does not suggest by any 
means, however, that issues in the ethics of research never arose in 
earlier periods. Public concern in Germany, for example, culminated in 
1931 in the promulgation of guidelines that required clear 
explanations of innovative or experimental treatments. [3] Another 
example prior to World War II is found in public concerns about the 
consent practices involved in Walter Reed's experiments on yellow 
fever.[4] On the other hand a review of the appellate cases decided in 
the U.S.A and in the U.K in the human experimentation field prior to 
this period, reveals the relatively radical shift in the law's 
attitude toward human experimentation. Therefore, before considering 
the Nuremberg trials, a review of some of these appellate decisions is 
in order. This will be followed by a discussion of the provisions of 
the Nuremberg code and the Declaration of Helsinki, particularly those 
dealing with the requirement of consent. The post-war appellate 
decisions are also relevant to the present discussion. Courts in these 
cases, as will be seen later, did not question the appropriateness of 
the experimental interventions. Rather, they focussed on the 
requirement of securing a valid and informed consent from the 
prospective subject. The last section of the present discussion will 
be concerned with the current status of the consent doctrine in the 
experimental setting.
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6 : 1 PRE-NUREMBERG APPELLATE DECISIONS:
It is submitted that before the promulgation of the Nuremberg 
code, any existing legal principles in the experimental setting 
emerged through the appellate court decisions governing actions for 
malpractice, and through a few isolated cases involving injury from 
experimental techniques. These early decisions did not distinguish 
clearly between innovative medical practice and medical research. The 
courts viewed both innovation and experimentation as unjustified 
departures from standard medical practice, although this attitude was 
directed more at protection of the patient than at the restriction of 
experimentation.
The first case of historical significance to reach an appellate 
court was the 1767 English case of Slater v. Baker. [5] The case
involved a novel technique - the use of 'heavy steel thing that has
teeth' to 'stretch and lengthen the leg'- for healing leg fractures, 
that was used without the consent of the patient and that deviated 
sharply from standard practice. In confirming judgment against the
defendants the appellate court made the point that
"Since it appeared from the evidence that this was the 
first time this device had ever been used, it was a 
rash action, and he who has acted rashly acts 
ignorantly, and is accordingly responsible for the 
consequences of his actions"[6]
Slater has been cited as an experimental case, a malpractice case 
and a consent case.[7]As some commentators noted, the mere fact that 
the physician proceeds with a technique for the first time does not 
subject him or her anymore to absolute liability for its
consequences.[8]
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Another significant decision came from the court of New York in 
1871 in the case of Carpenter v. Blake.[91 This case involved, 
treatment of a dislocated arm. Following the administration of the
treatment, the physician failed to inform the patient that his arm
should either remain in a sling or be held on a pillow at a right 
angle for a period of time, information that was found to be standard 
medical practice at the time.
The court held that if an approved procedure already exists, it 
can only departed from at the physician's peril, leaving physicians 
with virtually no freedom to experiment. A similar approach was
followed in the case of Jackson v. Burnham, r 101 It was held;
"[I]f a physician sees fit to experiment with some 
other mode, he should do so at his peril. In other 
words, he must be able, in the case of deleterious 
results, to satisfy the jury that he has reason for 
the faith that was in him, and justify his experiment 
by some reasonable theory."[11]
Few other additional cases dealt with these issues prior to the 
period in question. Most of these cases treated any departures from 
standard medical practice as 'experimentation' and considered it as an 
improper procedure.[12]
However, in 1934 the court in Brown v. Hughes [13] followed a
different approach when it reluctantly acknowledged that some 
experimentation was necessary for the advance of science, although 
still equating experimentation with rash treatments. The court in 
Brown appeared to express a slight openness toward deviation from 
routine and accepted practice referring to the use of "rash or 
experimental method" as putting the physician at risk of liability, 
but later acknowledging that only "total abandon" should give rise to
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liability, or else physicians would not use their learned judgment in 
the advance of science. [14] Therefore, although experimentation was 
still viewed as extreme, at least the court acknowledged the need for 
some experimentation in order to achieve medical progress.
In the following year, Fortner v. Kock[15], added a new dimension 
to judicial understanding of the role of human subjects in medical 
research. The court reiterated the view that experiments involving 
human subjects are needed in order to achieve medical progress. The 
case involved a sixty year-old patient who was suffering from a 
swollen knee. The physician diagnosed and treated the patient for bone 
cancer. The treatment, however, proved inappropriate as the patient's 
condition got progressively worse until the leg broke open and raised 
a "cauliflower mass", causing sharp pain. The patient consulted 
another physician, and following the performance of different 
diagnostic tests, the patient was diagnosed and treated successfully 
for syphilis.
The appellate court commented on the failure of the first 
physician to carry out standard diagnostic tests. The court held in 
particular;
"We recognise the fact that, if the general practice 
of medicine and surgery is to progress, there must be 
a certain amount of experimentation carried on, but 
such experiments must be done with the knowledge and 
consent of the patient or those responsible for him, 
and must not vary too radically from the accepted 
method of the procedure."[16]
The court in Fortner removed human experimentation from the 
category of forbidden activities as long as it was not "too radical" 
and was done with the patient's acquiescence.
It should be noted, however, that the court was primarily
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concerned with permitting medical departures that are potentially in 
the interests of the patient. Therapeutic beneficence therefore, 
provided the primary justification for permitting the research. Most 
of these early cases dealt with so-called therapeutic research, i.e., 
the physician was attempting to cure the particular patient, and was 
sued for injuries arising from that attempt. It is interesting to note 
in this respect that some scholars[17] have attributed the judicial 
conservatism that characterized human research at that time in part to 
such situations, and particularly when conventional treatments are 
available.
The main point to note from the decision in Fortner [18] is its 
acknowledgement of the importance of two fundamental elements in the 
justification of experimentation involving human subjects; an 
acceptable risk-benefit balance and the provision of valid 
consent.[19]
In 1941, another American case came even closer to contemporary 
judicial thinking. That was in Slammer v. Bd.of Regents.[20] In this 
case the physician had his licence to practice medicine suspended 
after he was found guilty of fraud and deceit by the state's licensing 
authority for using an experimental procedure in cancer treatment. On 
appeal there was evidence that the physician had informed the patient 
of £he experimental nature of the procedure and of the possibility of 
benefitting from it without being exposed to any risk of harm. 
Interestingly, the procedure proved to be very effective, and a 
complete cure followed the administration of the experimental 
treatment. In finding for the physician, the court held;
"Initiative and originality should not be 
effecti-vely stifled, especially when undertaken with 
the patient's full knowledge and consent, and as a 
last resort.[21]
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It is submitted that despite their language these early cases 
dealt, in fact, with innovation and not with the conduct of systematic 
human experimentation. Thus these early developments can be of great 
assistance, as Faden and Beauchamp pointed out, in "shed[ing] light on 
the evolution of values in research with human subjects" [22] but these 
have no direct causal influence on later developments in 'informed 
consent'. As mentioned earlier, the modern concern with consent as a 
legal and ethical requirement in the experimental setting developed 
gradually after the trial of Nazi physicians for the atrocities they 
had committed in the name of medical science during World War II. In
effect, the trial helped focus the attention of the world on the
ethics of medical research, and set the boundaries that should be 
observed when involving a human subject in scientific research. These 
bounderies became internationally known as the Nuremberg Code, and 
were later developed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
6 ; 2 INTERNATIONAL CODES OF ETHICS:
A-The Nuremberg Code:
The code was articulated as part of the judgment in the case of
United States v. Karl Bandt et alf231, which involved the trial of
twenty three German physicians for "war crimes" and "crimes against 
humanity" in the course of the Second World War.
Testimony at the trial revealed that concentration camp inmates 
and prisoners of war had been subjected to so-called experiments, many 
of which were carried out without a valid scientific purpose, and 
without either the knowledge or the consent of the subjects. The 
procedures performed ranged from the deliberate inoculation of inmates 
with typhus bacilli, to their exposure to cold water and low air
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pressure to observe the events that would lead to their death.[24] 
The defendants claimed that their experiments with both prisoners of 
war and civilians were consistent with the ethics of the medical 
profession, and that they were as valid as previously published 
experiments on venereal diseases, plague and malaria. The court found, 
however, that with the exception of an insignificant number of medical 
experiments on human subjects, most of the Nazi experiments were far 
from being in comformity with the ethics of medical science. The court 
held that only "certain types of medical experiments on human beings, 
when kept within reasonably well defined bounds, conform to the ethics 
of the medical profession generally."[25] The court then described 
these 'bounds' in the form of ten "basic principles [that] must be 
observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts" in the 
conduct of human experimentation. These principles constituted the 
Nuremberg Code.
Principle one of the code states, without qualification, that the 
primary consideration in research is the subject's voluntary consent 
which is "absolutely essential". In order to be valid, the subject's 
consent must be; voluntary, competent, informed and comprehending.[26] 
The rest of the principles dealt with the general bounds within which 
experiments should be carried out and delineated the conditions under 
which a human subject has the ability to volunteer. As has been noted, 
although the code did not explicitly so state, the requirement of 
securing the prospective subject's valid consent becomes relevant only 
after an appropriate risk/benefit assessment has been made.[27] 
Presumably, the benefits must at least offset the potential risks to 
the subject. For if the risks outweigh the rewards, the experiment may 
be unethical and therefore invalid from the beginning. Furthermore, 
the code did not describe how to secure the subject's consent and how
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the limits of the risks are to be defined. The court reasoned that 
such determinations were beyond its sphere of competence.
In this respect some researchers expressed their dissatisfaction 
with some provisions of the code. Beecher[28], for example, pointed 
out that the absolute requirement of informed consent may preclude 
experimentation with certain types of subjects namely, the mentally 
ill. He also pointed to the requirement of an understanding or 
enlightened decision as being difficult to satisfy, for he believed 
that many subjects were incapable of comprehending the details of the 
techniques of clinical research.
In any event, regardless of these so-called fallacies or errors, 
the Nuremberg code proved influential in the years that followed its 
promulgation. In particular, the code stimulated worldwide discussion 
about the ethics of conducting experiments with human subjects and led 
to the promulgation of subsequent codes of ethics in many 
countries.[29] Most of these national codes used the Nuremberg code 
as a model and many of them reflected it in many aspects. Some codes, 
however, deviated significantly, toward greater leniency with respect 
to consent. The statement of the British Medical Research Council 
(B.M.R.C), for example, made the distinction that later appeared in 
the Declaration of Helsinki[30], between therapeutic experiments 
(experiments that were likely to benefit the patient subject), and 
non-therapeutic experiment (experiments that were not designed to 
benefit the subject). The B.M.R.C made consent required only in the 
non-therapeutic experiments.[31]
It should be noted, however, that soon after its acceptance, the 
Nuremberg code came to be viewed as inadequate to govern the complex 
variety of situations arising in the expanding fields of human 
research. On the other hand, as national codes developed, the need for
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an international restatement of common principles arose. In response, 
in 1964, the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of 
Helsinki. [32]
B-lhe. Declaration of Helsinki:
The Declaration also emphasized the legal and ethical requirement 
of valid and informed consent. It made consent a central requirement 
of ethical research. This requirement was linked to an influential 
distinction that was proposed by the Declaration between therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic research. The former is defined in the Declaration 
as "medical research combined with professional care"[33], and is 
permitted as a means of acquiring new medical knowledge "only to the 
extent that medical research is justified by its potential diagnostic 
or therapeutic value for the patient. " [34] The latter is defined as 
"purely scientific and without direct diagnostic or therapeutic value 
to the person subjected to the research."[35]
The prospective subject's valid consent is required in all 
instances of non-therapeutic research unless the subject is 
incompetent, in which case his or her consent must be obtained by 
proxy.[36] However, in therapeutic research the subject's consent is 
not required "[i]f the doctor considers it essential" not to secure 
it, but "the specific reasons for [not obtaining the subject's 
consent] should be stated in the experimental protocol for 
transmission to the independent [review] committee."[37]
That is, according to the Declaration, informed consent is not 
'required if it is not "consistent with patient psychology"[38] The 
justification of this broad exceptive provision rests on the same 
beneficence-based premises that support the physician's therapeutic 
privilege in therapy. Some commentators[39] pointed to this exceptive
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provision as being a serious flaw, especially if the physician's 
judgment in not securing the subject's consent is checked by 
inattentive review committees.
C-The Legal Standing of International Codes:
Although the Nuremberg proceedings were based on international 
agreement, namely Control Council Law 10, they were conducted by 
American Military Tribunals composed of American judges and proceeded 
with according to American Procedural rules.[40] This fact led many to 
deny the international character of the Nuremberg Trials.[41]
It should be noted in this respect that the British Government 
also refused to take responsibility for the subsequent Nuremberg 
Trials [42] On the other hand the U.S Supreme Court declined to hear 
any appeals from the Tribunal stating that it did not have the power 
to review the proceedings of an international court.[43] In addition, 
its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on Dec 11, 1946, 
and its use as a basis for other international documents such as the 
Declaration of Helsinki [44] have been said to have confirmed the view 
that the Nuremberg Code is part of the international common law. [45] 
Nevertheless, the code was not enforceable under the law of individual 
nations. In the U.S.A, for example, the code has only been used as 
authority by one court. That was in Kaimowitz v. Mich. Dept. Mental 
Health [46] which involved a psychosurgical procedure. The court 
considered the Nuremberg Code as a proper standard against which to 
judge the sufficiency of the consent obtained for the proposed 
experimental brain surgery.
With respect to the Declaration of Helsinki, although there is no 
doubt about its international character, like the Nuremberg code it is 
not legally enforceable. These codes, however, remain valuable because
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of their symbolic function which consists in reminding investigators 
of the nature of the human subject and the respect which is due to his 
or her personal integrity in any kind of research.
6 : 5 POST-NUREMBERG APPELLATE DECISIONS:
After the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, experimentation 
became firmly established as a responsible and legitimate scientific 
technique, and courts focused on the necessity of securing the 
subject's valid and informed consent rather than on the novelty of the 
procedure.
With the exception of a series of cases involving tissue 
transplants from minor donors[47], appellate court decisions on 
systematic human experimentation were relatively rare. Most of the 
cases that went to courts involved innovative treatment and were 
decided in the U.S.A. The 1965 Canadian case of Halushka v. University 
Board of Saskatchewanf481. is, however, the only post-Nuremberg case 
involving non-therapeutic research on a normal volunteer. Plaintiffs 
in these cases alleged that their consents to experimental procedures 
were not informed. These cases are outlined under the headings of 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic research.
A-Therapeutic Research;
The first case that viewed human experimentation as not only 
legitimate, but also as an enterprise that should be encouraged, at 
least when conventional or standard treatment proved ineffective, was 
Baldor v. Rogers, f491 a case that involved treatment for cancer. 
Suffering from lip cancer, the patient informed his physician that he 
did not want surgery, (a treatment that was accepted as standard
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medical practice but not certain in the cure of the condition in 
question). Accordingly, the patient was submitted to a treatment which 
consisted in drug injections for a period of nine months at the end of 
which the treatment proved ineffective as the patient's condition was 
getting worse. The patient was discharged and sent home. He based his 
action for malpractice on the allegation of both wrongful
experimentation and abandonment.
During the trial the court commented on the role of the* medical 
profession in attempting to develop a cure for cancer. It was held, in 
particular, that no malpractice can be found for the mere fact that 
the physician experimented with possible cures, "if there is no 
certain cure and if the physician did not indulge in quackery by
representing he has."[50] On rehearing the court, however, held the 
investigator responsible for the disclosure of other options to the 
patient subject from the moment it became evident that the 
experimental treatment was not effective;
"All of the medical testimony emphasizes the fact that 
time is of the essence in treating cancer. It is the 
doctor, and not the patient, who holds himself out to 
be, and must be, best equipped to detect the warning 
signs. And when the treatment is ineffective, it is
the doctor who must know it first and recommend other
action."[51]
In the Scottish case of Me Hardy v. Dundee General Hospitals Board 
of Management. f521 the court went even further than merely 
acknowledging the necessity of finding cures for existing 
diseases. In finding for the defenders in an action for negligence 
in diagnosis and treatment, the court held that given the nature of 
the medical art and the difference of opinion among professionals of 
the highest qualification and the widest experience both in diagnosis
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and treatment, the doctor is not to be held liable for negligence for
a mere error of judgment or even an error in diagnosis. ,? [T]his should
be so", the court went on, because of the fact that
"currents of medical opinion and practice,
particularly in matters of treatment of disease, are
subject to fluctuation and change according to changes
in available knowledge and of professional practice in
its application."[53]
and thus,
"...the search for further knowledge and experience 
should not be inhibited by indue apprehension of
charges of negligence for the consequences to a
patient of treatment or diagnosis where such may
diverge fron the normal.[54]
The next case on the issue involved a novel approach to disease, 
in this case scoliosis (curvature of the spine). That was in Fiorntino
v. Wenger f551. which also emphasized the quality of the patient
subject's consent.
Five years before using it on the plaintiff's fourteen year-old 
son, the physician developed a technique (surgery) in the treatment of
the condition in question. Five times it had produced "unexpected
results." The procedure involved the insertion of a steel bar or
"spinal jack" screwed into the vertebral column. Following the
performance of the procedure on the plaintiff's son, the latter
suffered an "exsanguinating hemorrhage" which caused him to die.
The court in this case did not discuss the appropriateness of the 
experiment. Rather it focussed on the necessity to disclose the known 
risks of the procedure. The court held that, because the procedure was 
"novel and unorthodox", it was the physician's duty to inform the
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parents of the "risks incident to or possible in its use."[56] 
Moreover, the court also held the hospital liable for failure "to
ascertain that the physician had made such a disclosure before
permitting the operation to take place."[57]
In another case two Texas courts illustrated the point that 
consent is now seen by many courts as much more important than the 
intrinsically experimental nature of the medical intervention. That 
was in Karp v. Cooley[581. where the two courts found the first and 
only implantation of an artificial heart into a human being to be 
exclusively therapeutic. As mentioned before, the patient in this case 
agreed to an implantation of an artificial heart which kept him alive 
for approximatively sixty-four hours, but he died a short period after 
it was replaced by a human donor heart.
In an action for malpractice, the patient's wife alleged that the
physician failed to obtain valid and informed consent prior to the
performance of the experimental surgery. The court found, however, 
that the physician had discussed the procedure with the patient on 
more than two occasions, and that the latter had signed two consent 
forms; the hospital's general consent form that should be signed upon 
admission, and a much more specific one about three weeks after 
hospitalisation and just before the performance of the surgery.[59]
The plaintiff alleged that she did not understand how experimental 
the procedure was, and that her husband did not read the document. 
Both arguments were rejected. The court held that under the law only 
the patient had to consent to the procedure and that in the case 
before the court the patient was charged with reading the consent 
document by the fact of his signature, even though he, in fact, did 
not. The plaintiff's last and important argument was that the 
physician did not inform her husband of the nature of the artificial
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heart so that to enable him to make an informed decision as to whether 
to agree to the surgery being performed. In dismissing this argument 
the court stated;
"the record contains no evidence that Mr. Karp's
treatment was other than therapeutic and we agree that 
in this context an action for experimentation must be 
measured by traditional malpractice evidentiary 
standards."[60]
That is, although this experimental surgery was the first of its 
kind to be performed on a human being, the court viewed it as a
therapeutic one. This proposition has been rejected by many
commentators;
"while the case points up the great utility of a 
consent form that at least attempts some specifity, [to 
hold that the surgery] was not primarily an 
experiment, albeit a therapeutic one, is
untenable"[61]
Furthermore, it was remarked that the court's decision was drawn 
from either the fact that the judge was not convinced by the evidence 
presented on this issue, or that he considered the magnitude of the
risks involved in the surgery irrelevant.[62] Had the court viewed the 
procedure in this case as an experimental one, it could have applied 
Federal Health, Education and Welfare guidelines relating to consent 
forms, which required at that time a complete disclosure of the 
possible risks and benefits of the experimental intervention.[63] It 
is worth noting in this respect that in 1974 the American National
Heart and Lung Institute (N.H.L.I)[64] published supplemental criteria
for the human testing of therapeutic devices under its research 
contracts.[65] This suggests that any investigator currently engaging 
in human research whose funding derives from H.E.W is required to
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follow these and other N.H.L.I guidelines.
Similar guidelines were published by the Committee on Ethics of 
the American Heart Association in early 1976 [66], regarding the 
clinical use of the left ventricular assist device (L.V.A.D), a device 
which is a partially implanted artificial heart for temporary use 
following some forms of heart surgery. The aim of these guidelines 
was to alleviate the difficulties that thoracic surgeons were facing 
when securing informed and valid consent, in particular, from 
terminally ill or dying patients to such experimental interventions. 
In order to ensure that meaningful consent be obtained[67],the 
committee recommended that a third party take part in the consent 
procedure. It was said;
"The participation of a third party, which may be more 
than one person, to mediate the consent process 
without being caught up in the force of its 
dependencies ought to make the consent decision more 
genuine. It should also be a source of reassurance and 
comfort to both family and paramedical personnel, as 
well as to the patient and his doctor. "[68]
B: Non-Therapeutic Experimentation:
It is submitted that there are no post-Nuremberg appellate court 
decisions irivolving non-therapeutic experimentation on a normal 
volunteer neither in the U.S.A nor in Britain. The leading authority 
on this issue is, however, the Canadian case of Halushka v. University 
of Saskatchewan.[69] While United States courts would probably follow 
Canada's lead and require full disclosure of potential risks to all 
participants in this type of experiments, British courts should, as 
has been suggested by some commentators[70], adopt the same approach.
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The Halushka Case:
The case involved the testing of a new anaesthetic drug. In 
effect, the subject in this case volunteered to submit to the test in 
question after being informed by one of the responsible investigators 
that it was a "safe test and there was nothing to worry about", and 
that he would receive $50 as remuneration for each test. The subject 
was not informed that the test involved a new drug, of which the 
researcher had no previous knowledge nor that, being an anaesthetic, 
there was risk involved in its use. Moreover, he was denied any 
explanation regarding the way in which the test would be proceeded 
with or the method that would be followed. He signed a consent 
document which reads, in part;
"...I have volunteered to submit for tests upon my person 
for the purpose of study of Heart and Blood Circulation 
Response under General Anaesthesia.
The tests to be undertaken in connection with this study 
have been explained to me and I understand fully what is 
proposed to be done. I agree of my own free will to submit 
to these tests, and in consideration of the remuneration 
hereafter set forth, I do release the chief investigators.
Dr. G.M Wyant and J.E Merriman... .are absolved from all 
responsibility and claims for whatsoever, for any untoward 
effects or accidents due to or arising out of said tests, 
either directly or indirectly"[71](emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that before signing the document, the 
subject asked and was told that 'accidents' in the consent form 
referred to those that might occur in his home, not in the hospital.
During the performance of the test, the subject suffered heart 
stoppage and remained unconscious for four days and hospitalized for 
another ten days. On his discharge, at which time he was given his 
$50, the subject asked if that was all he would get for what he had 
been through. He was told that he could earn more if his mother or
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elder sister would submit to a similar test.
In an action for damages, the subject alleged trespass and 
negligence in the conduct of the test. A jury awarded $22,500. The 
experimenters appealed on the ground that the subject consented to the 
test, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury in respect of the 
consent obtained and further erred in instructing them that this was a 
case of a doctor and patient relationship, whereas he should have 
charged the jury that it was a contractual relationship. The appellate 
court held, however, that the duty "imposed upon those engaged in
medical research...[was] as great as, if not greater than, the duty
owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient"[72], and 
continued;
There can be no exceptions to the ordinary 
requirements of disclosure in the case of research as 
there may well be in ordinary medical practice. The
researcher does not have to balance the probable
effect of lack of treatment against the risks involved 
in the treatment itself. The example of the risks 
being properly hidden from a patient when it is 
important that he should not worry can have no 
application in the field of research. The subject of 
medical experimentation is entitled to a full and 
frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities and 
opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to 
consider before giving his consent."[73]
The same approach has been adopted by one New York administrative 
agency (The state licensing board) in an American case of non- 
therapeutic experimentation which involved disciplinary proceedings 
against the principal investigators who subjected their terminally ill 
patients to some experiments without their real consents. That was in 
the Jewish Hospital for Chronic Diseases Case.[741
In a study of immune reaction, twenty two terminally ill patients
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were injected under the skin, without valid consents, with live cancer 
cells to determine how long it would take them to reject such cells. 
Following the publicity that arose from this study, an action was 
brought by the Attorney General of New York before the state'licensing 
authority, then the Board of Regents, to revoke the medical licenses 
of the principal researchers. They were sentenced to have their 
licenses suspended, but the sentence was never carried out, and the 
physicians were placed on probation. The Board of Regents Discipline 
Committee[75], however, published an opinion concerning the necessity 
of full disclosure in the non-therapeutic setting, including, the fact 
that the cells being used were cancer cells in the present case. It 
was said;
"A physician has no right to withhold from from 
prospective volunteer any fact which he knows may 
influence the decision. It is the volunteer's decision 
to make, and the physician may not take it away from 
him by the manner in which he asks the question or 
explains or fails to explain the circumstances"[7 6].
The committee then made it clear that this case did not concern 
"the usual doctor/patient relationship", but an investigator/subject 
rela-tionship, and therefore there was "no basis for the exercise of 
the usual professional judgment [regarding disclosures that may be 
potentially harmful to the patient] applicable to patient care."[77] 
The major point underlined by the committee was, however, that
"No person can be said to have volunteered for an 
experiment unless he has first understood what he was 
volunteering for. Any matter which might influence him 
in giving or withholding his consent is material.
Deliberate nondisclosure of the material fact is no 
different from deliberate misrepresentation of such a 
fact....The alleged oral consents that they obtained 
after deliberately withholding this information [that
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the cells were cancer cells] were not informed 
consents and were, for this reason, fraudulently 
obtained"[78]
The main point to note from the last two cases is that a normal 
volunteer can never be considered as a patient.' Thus, the exceptions 
to full disclosure of all material or significant facts such as the 
"therapeutic privilege" that might find some application in the 
doctor/patient relationship, can never apply in a researcher/subject 
relationship.
6 : 4  CURRENT REGULATION ON CONSENT TO HUMAN  
RESEARCH:
It should be reiterated at this stage that the United States took 
the lead in issuing regulations with respect to controlling the 
conduct of human research. As was mentioned earlier, since 1966 an 
extensive system of regulation of research with human subjects has 
been erected.[79] The review process, for example, has been created 
primarily by federal legislation then supplemented with statutes by 
individual states.
Most of these regulations and guidelines dealt with the 
requirement of informed consent. Current federal regulations, for 
example, define informed consent as;
"...the knowing consent of an individual or his 
legally authorized representative, so situated as to 
be able to exercise free power of choice without undue 
inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, or other form of constraint or coercion."[80]
With respect to information disclosure the current regulations 
specify in detail what must be disclosed. Eight basic elements of
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informe d consent must be d i s c l o s e d  to p r os pec tiv e subjects;
(1) a statement that the study constitutes research, 
an explanation of its purposes and the expected 
duration of subject involvement, and a description of 
the procedures involved, with experimental procedures 
identified as such;
(2) a description of risks and discomforts that are 
"reasonably foreseeable";
(3) a description of possible benefits to subjects and 
others;
(4) disclosure of appropriate alternative treatments, 
if any;
(5) a statement describing the extent of 
confidentiality of records generated;
(6) an explanation of whether compensation or 
treatment will be available if injuries occur;
(7) a note as to who can be contacted with questions 
or reports of injuries; and
(8) a statement as to the voluntary nature of 
participation and the subject's right to withdrawal at 
any time.[81]
Moreover, more detailed supplementary guidelines have been issued 
by the D.H.H.S and meant to protect subjects forming the so-called 
vulnerable groups namely, the mentally handicapped adult persons, 
children and prisoners, i.e., the type of subjects who are believed to 
be less able to assimilate the experimental nature of the procedure or 
its potential risks of harm.
In this respect, some commentators [82]pointed out that this kind 
of regulation allows much more precise specification of controls on 
consent than does an approach that relies heavily on case law.[83] 
They noted, however, that existing regulations give no guidance as 
regards "the specific information that should be conveyed, the 
emphasis different elements of disclosure should receive, or the 
method accomplishing meaningful explanation."[84] Concerning the role
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of institutional review boards (I.R.Bs) and their performance, in
particular, in relation to informed consent, it has been noted that
I.R.Bs tend to consider the wording of consent forms rather than the 
more substantial issues of consent and the conduct of research.[85]
In any event, regardless of what has been noted against it, the 
system of regulation has, at least, sought to control the human 
research enterprise and important issues - in particular, informed 
consent.
In contrast to the U.S.A, the situation in the United Kingdom is 
less developed with regard to monitoring and controlling the conduct 
of human research by way of administrative regulation and legislation. 
As has been said, in Britain "[t]he law's role is limited to
intervention when disaster has struck."[86] In effect, apart from 
legislation relating to experimentation with new drugs[87], there is 
still a remarkable lack of specific legislation as regards the conduct 
and control of experimentation, including rules governing consent to 
participation in trials.
A-Ihe. status of consent to experimentation in the U.K:
In the absence of specific legislation governing consent to human 
research, it is necessary to rely on principles governing the issue in 
the common law and international ethical codes like the Declaration of 
Helsinki. It should be reiterated in this respect that, being 
international, these guidelines are unenforceable but not without 
value. These guidelines may be of great assistance to all those 
engaged in human research since they provide the theoretical framework 
within which research may legitimately be carried out.[88]
With respect to common law, most principles governing consent in
therapy may be applicable to the experimental setting. But, because
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experimentation may be clinical or non-clinical, the legal response 
will differ in certain aspects depending on the type of 
experimentation.
• With respect to clinical innovation which is usually defined as 
deviation from standard medical practice,[89]the law is well settled 
as regards its lawfulness and legitimacy and the test for establishing 
liability in such a case. In the leading Scottish case of Hunter v. 
Hanley f901 f it was held;
"To establish liability by a doctor where deviation 
from normal practice is alleged, three facts require 
to be established. First of all it must be proved that 
there is a usual and normal practice; second it must 
be proved that a defender has not adopted that 
practice; and thirdly (and this is of crucial 
importance) it must be established that the course the 
doctor adopted is one which no professional man of 
ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting 
with ordinary care."[91]
It has been argued in this respect that the law is more concerned 
with the reasonabless of the deviation from standard practice than it 
is with the individual's rights to self-determination or personal 
integrity which "form the central theme of the ethical codes [on human 
research] ." [92] As McLean[93] has pointed out the law should also be 
concerned with the provision of information and the obtaining of the 
subject's consent which are also as significant as the technical 
aspect of the medical act. She says;
"If the doctor is to fulfill his or her obligation to 
respect the patient, and to meet the demands of the 
ethical code outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki, 
then information must be given to the patient, and a 
real consent provided."[94]
For consent to be real information disclosure should include the
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innovative nature of the treatment and the doctor's reasons for
choosing such a strategy.
The question which one may ask at this stage is whether the
current law is ever ready to enforce this fundamental right. Some
scholars[95] believe that the Bolam test[96] as modified in
Sidawayi97],
"would be as likely to be followed in experimentation 
as in treatment and a failure of disclosure would
probably have to be of a serious nature for it to be 
regarded as negligence."[98]
Since, however, the Declaration of Helsinki[99] mentioned no 
standard practice, and this is the ethical code that guides both
clinical and non-clinical experiments, the assessment of standard
practice relating to information disclosure must be made in the light 
of the rules of the Declaration.[100]
Concerning non-therapeutic experiments, the assumption is that the 
investigator must give a full disclosure of information to the
volunteer since there is nothing which may prevent him or her from 
doing so, at least, as far as the subject's condition is concerned. 
There is no room for the principle of therapeutic privilege to apply 
in this type of experiment since there is no need to assess the harm 
that may ensue between undergoing or foregoing the procedure. 
Therefore, information disclosure has to be made to the patient's 
satisfaction.[101]
B-Compensation for Injury In Experimentation:
At the present time, the only remedy for redressing grievances in 
experimentation is suing in negligence. In order to succeed in such an 
action, the subject has to prove either that the investigator was
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negligent in informing him or her, or negligent in the performance of 
the experiment depending on the basis of the claim, i.e., uninformed 
consent or professional negligence.
Most scholars [102] agree to the fact that the law of negligence 
does not provide an adequate mechanism for vindicating the subject's 
right to compensation when he or she suffers injuries in research. For 
the subject must not only confront the many drawbacks of the 
negligence format in general but also the specific ones raised in 
experimentation. Perhaps Brazier[103], has best highlighted the point 
when she has said, "[i]f proving negligence in the operation of 
standard procedure is difficult, how much more difficult it is to 
prove negligence in embarking on novel procedures."[104] For example, 
in relation to the legal and ethical validity of the research project 
the investigator will have taken the necessary precautions including 
obtaining the approval of the research ethical committee. It necessary 
follows, as Mason and McCall Smith[105] observed, that on the grounds 
of foreseeability, if an accident or mishap does occur it "will not 
have been reasonably likely." [106]. The need for a defined method of 
compensation in such cases has already been noted. [107] In this 
respect, while retaining the law of negligence for medical accidents 
generally the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (Pearson Commission)[108] recommended a strict basis 
of liability in the context of medical research. It was reasoned that 
the person who put himself at the service of the community is entitled 
to compensation from the community.[109] A system based on strict 
liability, it is believed, would alleviate the many difficulties the 
aggrieved subject usually encounters in seeking damages.
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6 : 4 CONCLUSIONS:
The law has gone through a radical shift in its attitude to human 
research. Before the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, systematic 
human research was not directly recognized by the, law. As was shown at 
the begining of this discussion, appellate courts treated any 
deviation from standard, or routine and accepted practice as 
malpractice and held the physician responsible for the injuries 
resulting from the experimental procedure, particularly when 
conventional treatments were available.
It was not until the trial of the Nazi physicians before the 
Nuremberg Tribunals and the promulgation of the Nuremberg code that 
human research became recognized as a legitimate enterprise. And most 
subsequent codes of ethics whether they be national or international, 
for example, the Declaration of Helsinki, emphasized the idea that 
human experimentation is necessary for medical progress, and focussed 
on the legal and ethical conditions that should be met before 
subjecting human beings to experimentation. Two primary goals became 
important for policies covering the use of human subjects in research; 
controlling imposed risks, i.e., a beneficence-based consideration, 
and providing for informed and valid consent which is an autonomy- 
based consideration. Hence courts no longer questioned the novelty of 
the procedure but rather concentrated on the validity of the subject's 
consent to research.
With the development of the research enterprise and its expanding 
fields, different types of experiments appeared, and it has become 
necessary that experimentation be controlled by specific legislation. 
One of the many reasons that has made state's legislation necessary is 
the judicial inability to control adequately the research enterprise.
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As has been pointed out courts can only control experimentation in a 
retroactive way, but they cannot prevent disasters. In addition, an 
aggrieved subject can only with difficulty succeed in receiving 
compensation. For in the absence of specific dispositions on this
issue the subject has to go through the negligence action, with all of 
its difficulties.
The issue of consent to research, in particular, is far from being 
clear in the U.K. The Sidaway test, it is said, is likely to be also 
applied in clinical innovation. It is recommended, however, that if 
such an approach is to be followed, the assessment of standard 
practice must be made according to Declaration of Helsinki's guidlines 
on the issue. It should be noted, however, that given the lack of 
precision in the current status of consent, one would reiterate the 
view that a proper definition of all its priciples be outlined. Such 
objectives can only be achieved by the promulgation of specific
legislation to that effect. This special emphasis on consent, is 
believed to be necessary given the fundamental role of this 
requirement in medical practice in general and in human 
experimentation in particular. For as has been shown before, the 
requirement of the subject's consent is not only vital for the legal 
validity of experimentation but also fundamental for its legitimacy. 
Thus, acknowledging this fact, most of the international community's 
agreements relating to the use of human beings in medical research 
emphasised the requirement of consent. This emphasis was meant 
basically to protect the personal integrity of subjects and to remind 
investigators of the their nature as human beings who have a right to 
be free to decide as to whether to participate in human research. In 
these terms there seems to be no reason why in this country these
principles should not be outlined in a piece of legislation as has
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already been done in some other fields of research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
The main point which was argued in this discussion is that patient
as a human being when he or she is of sound mind and adult years has
no less rights in the practice of medicine than healbhy person in
other circumstances. He or she must be treated as an autonomous person 
when he or she has the capacity to decide about his or her own future 
in respect of his or her health care.
It was argued that the patient has the right to consent to any 
medical intervention either in therapy or experimentation and that 
this right provides him or her with a sufficient protection of his or 
her autonomy or self-determination.
In order that consent have this effect it must be based on a
sufficient disclosure of information, since it is this element which 
plays a central and fundamental role both in facilitating his or her 
autonomy and in the morality of the medical enterprise. However, the 
lack of capacity which may affect some groups namely children, the 
mentally handicapped adult persons, and the mentally ill may justify 
the intervention of other persons so that their consent is taken by 
proxy. But when the capacity of the individual is not in doubt, he or 
she is the only person who can accept or reject the medical treatment 
based on a comprehensible and reasonable disclosure of information.
As a general rule, then, before a treatment may be administered, 
whether it be therapeutic or experimental it is necessary for the 
physician to obtain the consent of his or her patient. However, if the 
circumstances are such that they demand immediate attention for the 
preservation of the patient's life, limb or health, the doctor may
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proceed with the treatment without consent if the person is not in a 
position to consent to or refuse treatment.
It was also argued that where it is appropriate to obtain consent, 
the physician is legally asked to disclose to his or her patient the 
relevant information for him or her to make a rational decision about 
whether to consent to the recommended treatment. Such a requirement 
is both vital and fundamental to the patient, for as it was already 
argued one can not legally consent to the invasion of one's own body 
if one is unaware of the nature and consequences of the invasion. 
Legally speaking it is also important for the doctor to obtain a valid 
consent since it is the patient's consent which renders permissible 
what would otherwise be assault or battery.
With respect to information disclosure, this must be made in 
simple language in order to assure that the patient understands it. 
It must also be free from any misrepresentation of facts or of the 
nature of the procedure, for such may invalidate the patient's consent 
if he or she does authorize the performance of a given treatment under 
such circumstances.
It should be noted, however, that the doctor is not responsible 
for the possible inability of the patient to assimilate the 
information disclosed. It is hard, one must admit, to reconcile this 
idea with that which suggests that the patient's consent must stem 
from knowledge and understanding. But the fact that the patient can 
hardly comprehend the information, does not exonerate the doctor from 
his or her duty to disclose information. In such circumstances the 
physician is asked to make some effort to make himself or herself 
understood by the patient, for it is often argued that if the 
information is presented in everyday language it can be grasped by 
most patients.
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It was shown that in court decisions whether here in Britain or 
elsewhere self-determination has been the principle most called upon 
to justify the physician's obligation to seek the patient's
'informed', valid, or real consent. The law's protection for this 
fundamental right has been tempered, however, with the shift to the 
negligence format, and the grounding of the physician's obligation to 
disclose information on his or her general obligation of care owed to 
the patient rather than on the patient's right to know.
Moreover, because of other concerns that courts had to confront, 
sometimes self-determination had been tempered or even ignored. Very 
often these concerns or interests were beneficence-based
considerations of patient welfare. Therapeutic objects, for example, 
courts believed had to prevail over the patient's right to decide what 
should be done with his or her own body. In other instances, the law 
had been turned away from its basic role of protecting the patient's
right to self-decide because of the mechanics and pragmatic
constraints that the legal process contains, e.g the causation
requirement in negligence. As has been explained before, in order to
recover damages, the patient has to provide a proof of abuse only
after the event takes place, and that proof has to satisfy the the
courtroom's procedural rules.
Legal Position:
So far in Britain, the law recognizes that the person has a right 
to choose what shall be done with his or her own body, and therefore 
he or she must consent to medical treatment otherwise it will be 
trespass to the person. It is also established that consent to the 
nature of the procedure is enough to preclude an action in battery.
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Failure, to provide the patient with sufficient information to make a 
rational and 'informed' decision as to whether to agree to the 
proposed treatment, must be litigated in negligence. One British court 
reasoned that justice required that "in order to vitiate the reality 
of consent there must be a greater failure of communication between 
doctor and patient than that involved in a breach of duty if the claim 
is based on negligence." [1] That is the doctor's duty to inform stems 
from his or her general duty of care due to the patient, but not from 
the patient's right to be informed. Hence, the doctor can not be held 
liable in negligence if he or she fails to inform of particular risks 
as long as he or she acts in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in the particular 
art. That the principle also applies as a standard for information 
disclosure, was confirmed in the decision of the House of Lords in the 
case of Sidaway[2]. However, according to the House of Lords, the 
court will retain its judicial right to intervene, if it comes to the 
conclusion that the disclosure of a particular risk is so obviously 
necessary to make a rational choice that no prudent doctor would omit 
to disclose.
In these terms, it can be submitted that the principle of full
information disclosure has no place in British law. In fact, it has 
already been pointed out by one writer[3] that the adoption of such 
principle would depend on the judicial policy of the country. In the 
United States 'informed consent' was adopted as a judicial ruse to
ensure compensation for the greatest number of those who may suffer
damages in medical treatment, which led, among other things, to the 
practice of defensive medicine.
It is the fear of developing a similar crisis in this country
which led British courts to adopt the professional standard in favour
-  2 3 4  -
of that, of 'informed consent'[4],
Most scholars stressed the importance of the patient's 
comprehension as related to a full information disclosure
principle. [5] As has been pointed out, what is confusing in the whole 
issue is the use of the term 'informed' consent which has been
interpreted differently. Even in the U.S. where the doctrine of 
informed consent first appeared and developed, the majority
jurisdictions opted for the professional standard instead of that of 
the 'prudent patient'. Perhaps the first thing to do, as Mason[6] 
suggested is to abandon the term 'informed' in favour of 'rational' or 
'valid'.
In any event, as things stand at present, it seems that the
controversy that characterized medical transactions over the standard 
of information disclosure was over following the decision of the House 
of Lords in Sidaway.[l] The decision as to what is to be disclosed is 
a matter of medical judgement, and the doctor fulfills this duty if he 
or she acts in accordance with a practice accepted by a responsible 
body of the medical profession. Up to now at least two cases decided 
after Sidaway have confirmed this view.[8]
In the experimental setting, however, the status of consent is not 
as clear as in therapy.
Ethically, as in therapy, the fundamentally crucial aspect of all 
experimentation is the right of the human subject whether he or she is 
patient or volunteer to make 'informed' and rational decisions about
his or her own body. It is the observance of this ethical and legal
requirement that makes any benefit obtained from experimentation
meaningful. As has been said, the investigator's role is secondary to
the interest that the human subject has in his or her own autonomy. 
The subject's decision to take part in experimentation can be
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motivated by a self-interest in the cure or by altruism, but still 
remains a rational decision.
Whatever the subject's motives are, however, his or her interest 
in not being harmed as a result- of experimentation must prevail over 
the interest of the community as a whole in acquiring new knowledge or 
developing new therapies. In these terms, it can be said that 
different interests are in conflict and, therefore, a balance is 
necessary that allows for the continuation of all types of experiments 
which are likely to benefit society without neglecting the basic human 
rights of the individual subject.
The design of the experiment, in particular, must be made in such 
a way as to ensure that the subject is exposed to minimum risks, and 
that the experimentation is not carried out unless there is a real 
need to investigate or evaluate new or old therapies or techniques.
Since many experiments may or do actually benefit the community, 
a fact which has been recognised by the international community which 
tacitly allowed the conduct of human research by the promulgation of 
codes of ethics, it is admittedly necessary that human experimentation 
continue. On the other hand, a meaningful continuation of this 
enterprise depends, to a great extent, upon the efficiency of the 
mechanisms of control which are in use.
In order to accommodate the conflicting interests of all those 
involved, special mechanisms of control are needed, particularly, when 
experiments involve subjects from the vulnerable groups. For 
experimentation may need to be carried out on the otherwise 
vulnerable. Children, for example, may be needed as subjects in 
certain experiments that deal with specific diseases that affect only 
children. In such cases special dispositions are needed for the 
conduct and control of these experiments, in particular, non-clinical
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ones. The obtaining of consent in these circumstances is more 
problematic than is the case when the subject is an adult and rational 
person. Experimentation with children, for example, may be justified 
when it is the only alternative to find a cure for the patient. Thus 
the parent or the guardian can legally authorise such intervention on- 
the basis that he or she is acting in the best interests of the child. 
When the experiment is non-therapeutic, however, such authorisation 
can not be easily justified, since arguably, as far as the child's 
condition is concerned, there is no ground on which to base such 
authorisation.
This is a mere example of the complexity of the issue. In such 
cases the intervention of the law is necessary to govern the issue. 
In the U.S.A, for example, since the early sixties a system of 
regulation by statutes and legislation has been erected to control 
human research including the fundamental requirement of consent. In 
this respect, there are specific dispositions relating to the issue of 
consent which have gone as far as specifying the information that must 
be disclosed to the subject and how to secure his or her acquiescence.
In the United Kingdom few fields of experimentation have been 
sanctioned by specific legislation. At the moment only research with 
new drugs which is controlled by legislation. Until further 
dispositions are promulgated, its seems that the medical profession 
will continue to control medical research through its own 
administrative bodies. In this respect, a review of the constitution 
and function of Research Ethical Committees is recommended, and the 
adoption of a policy which allows for higher percentage of lay 
membership in R.E.C.s is particularly urged.
The role of the law at the moment is said to be limited to 
intervening only when disasters occur. Courts can only monitor the
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research enterprise in a retroactive way and only after disasters 
occur. In addition a grieved subject can hardly succeed in receiving 
compensation. For in the absence of specific dispositions on this 
issue the subject has to go through the negligence action with all its 
drawbacks.
The Sidaway test, it is said, is likely to be also applied in 
clinical innovation. One would add that if such an approach is to be 
followed, the assessment of standard practice must be made according 
to Declaration of Helsinki's guidelines on the issue. But, one must 
reiterate the view that it is only through a proper definition of the 
principles governing the research enterprise, including those relating 
to consent and compensation for personal injury, that experimentation 
becomes moral.
Thus, it is suggested that regulation should take the form of a 
legal framework that defines the general principles and guidelines 
that govern the conduct of human research, according to the guidelines 
set by the international community in the Declaration of Helsinki, and 
other international agreements.
In this respect, a special emphasis should be attributed to the 
issue of consent given the lack of precision which surrounds its 
current status. The writer believes that the importance of this 
ethical and legal requirement which basically lies in protecting the 
human subject dictates that consent be regulated efficiently in order 
to achieve the purpose which it has been created for.
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